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Abstract
Britain’s foreign relations formed a crucial component of the political nation during the
eighteenth century. Foreign affairs were a key issue of state, and perceived failure 
within European power politics could cause the fall of government ministries. Britain’s
foreign relations with the main European powers, and especially France and Spain, 
have been extensively recorded. Britain’s unique relationship with Corsica has been 
neglected. Corsica can appear to be insignificant compared to other European states. 
Many British writers, however, government officials, naval and military officers, 
considered Corsica to be of the highest importance within eighteenth-century foreign 
affairs. Corsica was especially important within the larger sphere of Anglo-French 
rivalry. Corsica was one of the few territories that was ruled by both nations during the
eighteenth century. This thesis reveals that Britain’s relations with Corsica were far 
more significant than has been previously realised. Britain’s relations and interactions 
with Corsica remained relatively consistent throughout the period from 1728 up until 
1796. The two main developments to occur between Britain and Corsica during the 
eighteenth century were, firstly, the ‘Corsican crisis’ (1768-1769) and, secondly, the 
establishment of an Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796). These are discussed in 
chapter 2 and chapter 4 of the thesis respectively. Both of these ‘events’ have been 
studied as being separate from each other and as confined to their respective periods of
time. This thesis aims to link and to compare these two key developments for the first 
time, and to show that the Corsican crisis directly influenced the Anglo-Corsican 
constitution in 1794.Corsica was the largest European territory to be ruled by Britain 
during the eighteenth century. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom provides a unique insight
into how Britain might rule conquered territories in Europe. The thesis charts and 
explains Britain’s relations with Corsica against the background of the second hundred 
years war against France. 
7
Acknowledgements 
This thesis has been three years in the making, and has been an enlightening and 
exciting journey. My first and greatest thanks has to go to my supervisor, who first 
convinced me to apply for this PhD. His knowledge and expertise has been invaluable, 
and has helped complete the thesis. I would not have been able to finish it without his 
help. My second thanks goes to my editor Jason Isbit, for his late hours spent reading 
through my thesis. I also thank his friend James Macwhirter for helping in this 
endeavour. 
I am very grateful for the National Archives and British Library, both in London, for 
the easy access they provided to their archives. Their facilities greatly aided me in 
completing the thesis. I also have to thank the University of Sussex library, for 
allowing me access to many books vital for my research. Of course the Online archive,
and other such websites provided me with many valuable sources that were easy to 
access. I also would like to thank the University of St Andrews for providing me the 
time and opportunity to write this thesis. The online access they provided was also 
invaluable.
Finally, and would like to thank my family and friends, who helped me throughout the 
three years I spent writing me thesis. I particular, I would like to thank my parents, for 
their steadfast support, financially and emotionally during these three years. Also my 
brother, aided me with his technical skills, and most importantly of all, kept me 
grounded and on track throughout the writing of this thesis. I am forever thankful for 
the loving support provided by my family, and in part dedicate this thesis to them.
8
Britain and Corsica 1728-1796: Political intervention and the myth of liberty
Introduction
In September 1794, Sir John Moore (1761-1809) was a British officer serving in 
Britain’s recent conquest from France, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796). The
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was formed during the French Revolutionary wars (1792-
1799). It was this context that led Moore to conclude that “the sentiment which 
pervades the country [of Corsica] is that they must be under some foreign power”.1 The
problem was which foreign power would dominate Corsica: Britain or France? This 
was the primary question concerning the future of Corsica throughout the eighteenth 
century. Corsica was centrally involved within the broader spectrum of Anglo-French 
rivalry. This Anglo-French rivalry during the eighteenth century has been dubbed the 
‘Second hundred years war’. The ‘Second hundred years war’ was a term first coined 
by John Robert Seeley (1834-1895) in a series of lectures, later published as The 
Expansion of England (1883). Seeley came to this conclusion due to the series of wars 
between Britain and France that took place ‘symmetrically’ during the period 1689-
1815.2 Corsica became one of the many battle grounds during this period, as the two 
nations attempted to gain supremacy in Europe and throughout the world. This was all 
the more remarkable since Britain in particular had no previous contact or relations 
with Corsica. 
Corsica had been dominated by the Genoese Republic since the fourteenth century. 
Corsica was of seemingly little importance throughout the history the of 
Mediterranean. David Abulafia, states in his book The Great Sea: A Human History of 
the Mediterranean (2011) that Corsica has not featured in his work as often as the 
other islands such as Sardinia, Majorca, Crete or Cyprus. This is due to the fact that 
Corsica “offered fewer facilities for trans-Mediterranean shipping, and fewer products 
of its own than the other islands” in the Mediterranean.3 Why then did this relatively 
1 Sir John Moore, The Diary of Sir John Moore, vol. I, ed. Sir J.F. Maurice, (London: Edward Arnold, 
1904), 120.
2 Sir John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures, (London: Macmillan 
and Co, 1914), 28-29. 
3 David Abulafia, The great sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean, (London: Penguin books, 
2011), 515.
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unimportant island captivate both France and Britain to annex it? During the eighteenth
century these two powers did not fight over the more ‘important’ Mediterranean 
islands, such as Sardinia, Crete or Cyprus. Only Minorca and Malta received a similar 
amount of attention from both powers during the eighteenth century. Why was this the 
case? The answer is not simple, and this PhD project will shed light on this subject. 
How did Corsica continue to captivate British interest throughout the eighteenth 
century?
France’s relationship with Corsica during the eighteenth century has been excellently 
recorded in English, by Thadd Hall in France and the eighteenth century Corsican 
Question (1971). Hall’s book covers in detail the opinions and policies of successive 
French ministries on Corsica, following the beginning of the Corsican revolt against 
Genoese rule in 1728. Genoa after 1685 ‘sank’ into “a state of tutelage to France”; 
therefore, France always had a vested interest in Genoese affairs.4 Genoa’s location 
and control of the Ligurian coastline made it strategically important for France. 
Control of Genoa ensured for France access into Italy. Corsica was also vital for 
French strategic interests in the Western Mediterranean. Its close location to France’s 
main Mediterranean port Toulon (see appendix 1), made the island of vital importance 
for successive French ministries. The break out of the first major rebellion in 1728 
made Genoese rule of the island tenuous. Genoa’s inability to suppress the revolt 
highlighted their weakness. The French ministry feared that a major foreign power 
could seize control of Corsica.5 The Spanish for example were also interested in 
Corsica; they had had previous historical ties with the island. Of more concern for 
France was the interest of the maritime powers of England and Holland. Hall noted 
that in 1735 and 1736 saw the “arrival of two small English ships, laden with supplies, 
that offered temporary respite” to the Corsican rebels.6 France’s plan from 1737 was a 
“policy of pacifying the rebellion in Corsica in order to prevent other powers from 
establishing themselves there and of keeping Genoa within the French sphere of 
interest”.7 France sent troops to Corsica a number of times, in order to ward off any 
4 Thadd Hall, France and the Eighteenth Century Corsican Question, (New York: New York University
Press, 1971), 5.
5 Hall, France and the Corsican Question, 27.
6 Hall, France and the Corsican Question, 31.
7 Hall, France and the Corsican Question, 51.
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British attempt upon the island. During the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the French 
ministry decided to “take early measures in order that the English do not seize 
Corsica”; French troops were subsequently sent to the island.8 
What is clear from Hall’s book is the consistent British interest in Corsica. Fear of a 
British seizure of Corsica prompted France to react many times during the century. 
This would culminate with the French annexation of Corsica in 1768, after ‘buying’ 
the island from Genoa. However, despite the importance of Britain’s role during these 
events, no separate work has appeared detailing them like Hall has done with the 
French position. No historian has looked at the relationship between Corsica and 
Britain directly as a sole focus. I hope to alleviate this ‘gap’ within the historiography. 
This PhD project will understand the importance of Corsica through a British 
standpoint. Corsica can serve as a conduit through which the major foreign and 
political issues of the growing British Empire can be more easily understood. This 
work will also illustrate that British interest in Corsica was relatively consistent 
throughout the eighteenth century, especially within British newspapers and 
periodicals.
Thadd Hall’s book finishes its narrative 1769, with the French conquest of the island. 
His previous work Thought and Practice of Enlightened Government in French 
Corsica (1969) deals with the years of French rule of Corsica from 1769-1789. Hall 
argued that the French administrators of Corsica did not implement despotic 
tendencies. On the contrary, they saw a “ground suitable for experimentation with new 
ideas and new institutions”.9 This was similar to the British plans for Corsica in 1794. 
Sir Gilbert Elliot (1751-1814), the Viceroy of the new Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, 
described the “efficiency of the new system” of government formed on Corsica.10 
Elliot called the new government an “experiment” that was “highly encouraging” after 
the formation of the first parliament.11 The idea of an ‘experiment’ conjures the notion 
that British legislators on Corsica were attempting something new. Hall’s article 
8 Hall, France and the Corsican Question, 102.
9Hall, “Thought and Practice of Enlightened Government in French Corsica”, The American Historical 
Review, vol 74, no 3, (1969), 880-905, 885.
10 FO 20/7, Elliot to Portland, no 57, 3rd April 1795.
11 FO 20/7, Elliot to Portland, no 57, 3rd April 1795.
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describes the respective plans of the French administrators of Corsica. French rule of 
the island saw the creation of a Corsican nobility. The French however “saw the 
nobility as a balancing factor in society, not as the dominant force”.12 The French 
attempted to implement enlightenment ideals on Corsica; the administrators of Corsica 
were ‘steeped’ in the ideas of the philosophes and physiocrats.13 The French 
administration did not merely treat Corsica as a conquered territory. General Louis-
Charles René, the Comte de Marbeuf informed the French minister the Duc de 
Choiseul that “nothing exists there (Corsica), so to speak, and everything remains to be
established”.14 
Corsica was a blank canvas, from which the foundations of a brand new ‘enlightened’ 
administration could be formed. This stemmed from the idea that human history had 
developed in different stages. Adam Smith, in his famous work The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) reflected upon the development of cities and towns after the fall of the Roman 
Empire. For Smith, towns and cities “arrived at liberty and independency [sic] much 
earlier than the occupiers of the land in the country”.15 Societies originally formed as 
pastoral states, based entirely upon herds of livestock. These would eventually develop
into agrarian societies following the development of agriculture. This led to the 
development of more permanent settlements. Ancient Greece and Rome were 
primarily agrarian societies. After the fall of the Roman empire, cities began to band 
together for mutual defence during the uncertain times of the Dark ages.16 These towns 
and cities began to promote free trade with each other, and after some time were 
“erected into a commonalty or corporation”.17 The “commerce and manufactures 
gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and 
security of individuals”.18 For Smith, the commerce and manufactures of cities “have 
been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country”.19 This
represented the next ‘stage’ of human development; a modern commercial society 
12 Hall, “Thought and practice in French Corsica”, 892.
13 Hall, “Thought and practice in French Corsica”, 896.
14 Hall, “Thought and practice in French Corsica”, 885.
15 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Ed Edwin Camon, vol. 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 420.
16 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 424.
17 Smith, The wealth of nations, 423.
18 Smith, The wealth of nations, 433.
19 Smith, The wealth of nations, 440.
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which most states of Europe found themselves in at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. This was what made Corsica both intriguing and fascinating for British 
writers. The island appeared to be at an earlier stage of development than the rest of 
Europe; it was still within the earlier agrarian stage that had characterised both the 
ancient Greece and Rome. 
One of the main books which has covered the British rule of the island is Desmond 
Gregory’s The Ungovernable Rock (1985), in which Gregory provides a relatively 
comprehensive study of the ‘ungovernable rock’. However, Gregory’s book focuses 
more upon Britain’s ‘quest’ for a base in the Western Mediterranean.20 For Gregory, 
only with the loss of Minorca in 1783 would Britain’s interest in Corsica be 
“revived”.21 Gregory primarily views the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom within the broader 
context of the French revolutionary wars. What still needs to be considered is the 
British administration of Corsica from 1794 to 1796. It was not merely an attempt to 
implement British constitutionalism within the island. Rather, the idea of an 
‘experiment’ implied the creation of a completely new system: they were not merely 
recreating another version of British constitutional government. The Anglo-Corsican 
constitution was unique, and in some ways superior to the contemporary British 
constitution. The Anglo-Corsican constitution needs to be re-examined, and placed 
within the proper context of constitutional history. Gregory has noted the bestowal of a
constitution which was “far more liberal than any granted hitherto to a British 
possession”.22 Gregory linked the Anglo-Corsican constitution to the later concepts of 
the British commonwealth and the Dominions. However, it was the unique situation of 
Corsica that led the British administrators to adopt an equally unique constitution for 
the island, based upon the islands own circumstances. Why was Corsica given such a 
‘liberal’ constitution? The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom is the centrepiece of this thesis. I 
will examine how this unique Kingdom and constitution were formed and adopted.
20 Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, and its role 
in Britain’s Mediterranean Strategy during the Revolutionary War, (1793-1797) (Cranbury: Associated 
University Presses, 1985), 43.
21 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 44.
22 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 11.
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The argument of the thesis will in part focus on the shaping of British identity during 
the eighteenth-century. How were British relations with the external world shaped, and
what did the British people think about themselves? Linda Colley’s book Britons: 
Forging the nation 1707-1837 (1992) argues that Britain defined themselves as 
protestants, “struggling for survival against the world’s foremost Catholic power”;23 
France. Colley argues that protestantism was “long at the core of British national 
identity”.24 This protestant world-view gave many Britons a belief that they were a 
“distinct and chosen people”, which persisted long after the Battle of Waterloo”.25 
Protestantism played a major role in forging the distinct British patriotism that 
emerged during the eighteenth century. The wars against France after 1689 played a 
‘significant’ role in terms “of national formation”.26 France was the “embodiment of 
the catholic ‘other’ which Britons had been taught to fear since the reformation in the 
sixteenth century”.27 This played a major role in developing British patriotism. 
However, Colley makes it clear that men and women became patriots “in order to 
advertise their prominence in the community, or out of ambition for state or imperial 
employment”.28 Britain was first and foremost a commercial empire; profit was the 
primary motivator. Colley argues that some during the eighteenth century feared that 
“British identity was too dependent on recurrent protestant wars, commercial success 
and imperial conquest”.29
Were the recurrent protestant wars during the eighteenth century the primary factor in 
forging British patriotism? Tony Claydon’s more recent work Europe and the making 
of England, 1660-1760 (2007) follows on from Colley’s argument. Claydon similarly 
argues that Britons primarily “saw themselves as a protestant people: a Christian nation
chosen by God to uphold the true religion”.30 He ends his book at 1760, as he believes 
this was the point when Protestantism “no longer shaped public discussion as 
23Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 5.
24 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 369.
25Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 368.
26 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 368.
27Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 368.
28 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 371.
29 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 375.
30 Tony Claydon, Europe and the Making of England 1660-1760, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 5.
14
consistently as they once had”.31 The rise of Prussia and Russia challenged the 
protestant foreign policy of Britain. Frederick the Great’s Prussia “put expansion above
religious loyalty”, whilst Russia was neither protestant or Catholic. The Ottoman 
Turks’ steady decline during the eighteenth century “blunted any sense of a united 
Christendom”.32 Clayden argues that “security” would be placed “above confession”.33 
Andrew Thompson, in his book Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688-
1756 (2006) agrees with Claydon’s prognosis that the ‘protestant interest’ did not 
affect British diplomacy as much following 1760. Thompson similarly argues that 
Frederick the Great (1712-1786) “undermined the link between the balance of power, 
the Protestant interest and universal monarchy”.34 What then replaced protestantism as 
the main national identity of Britain? Claydon notes a change in intellectual fashion, 
that affected Britain after 1750; namely the popularity of Montesquieu’s famous book, 
the Spirit of the laws (1748). Montesquieu’s book brought to the fore the “importance 
of government, culture or belief rooted in material factors”.35 Montesquieu discussed 
the nature of British government, and more importantly, British liberty. Montesquieu 
argued that, contrary to all other nations, Britain’s “constitution has political liberty for
its direct purpose”.36 How did Montesquieu come to this conclusion?
What did liberty entail for eighteenth-century Britons? As Rachel Hammersley has 
noted, many British writers stressed the importance of liberty, but were “less 
forthcoming in defining exactly what they meant by it”.37 Modern British liberties, can 
be traced back to the constitution adopted in the Glorious Revolution in 1688-1689. 
The Glorious Revolution enshrined the protestant succession, ensuring that Britain 
would remain a protestant country. 1689 also saw the beginning of the wars against 
Louis XIV and France in general. The new British constitution, forged during the 
Glorious Revolution, adopted many of the measures associated with British liberty, 
31 Tony Claydon, The Making of England, 357.
32 Tony Claydon, The Making of England, 358.
33 Tony Claydon, The Making of England, 359.
34 Andrew Thompson,  Britain, Hanover and the Protestant interest, 1688-1756, (Woodbridge: The 
Bovdell Press, 2006), 230.
35 Tony Claydon, The Making of England, 361.
36 Charles-Louis de Secondat Baron Montesquieu, The Spirit of the laws, tr. Anne Cohler, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university press, 2011), 156.
37 Rachel Hammersley, The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth Century France, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 16.
15
such as the Bill of Rights and the Toleration Act which were both legislated in 1689. 
The lapsing of the licensing act in 1694 was also an under-recognised moment in 
defining British liberties, for it enabled the development of a free press. British liberty 
was essentially neo-Roman, and was mainly concerned with “the protection of basic 
civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, the protection of private property, and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest”.38 There was also an emphasis upon religious liberties, 
that became entwined with civil liberties. 
Perhaps the greatest espousal of British liberties came from the famous Cato’s Letters, 
written by the writers John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. Cato’s Letters were a 
series of essays written to the London Journal, between 1720 and 1723 in the context 
of the collapse of the South Sea company. Gordon later published the letters as a 
collection in 1753. Within the preface, Gordon commented that “these letters were 
translated for the service of liberty in general”.39 Cato (95-46 BCE) epitomized Roman 
Republican ideals and liberty; he was the arch enemy of the ‘tyrannical’ Julius Caesar 
(100-44 BCE). Cato’s Letters idolized British liberties,“where the constitution is so 
poised and tempered, and the administration so disposed and divided into proper 
channels”.40 Here Trenchard and Gordon spoke of the balance of power, enshrined in 
the British constitution. Montesquieu believed that Britain would eventually lose its 
liberty, when “the legislative power is more corrupt than executive power”.41 
Corruption was the great enemy of both Trenchard and Gordon. They used Rome as an
example of a ‘free’ state, which fell victim to “corruption” and impiety”. This 
‘corruption’ of the state led to civil wars and the eventual death of the Roman 
Republic.42 Trenchard and Gordon firmly believed that “the good of the governed 
being the sole end of government”.43 Cato’s Letters were primarily aimed at the British
establishment following the débâcle of the collapse of the South Sea company. 
Trenchard and Gordon reminded the MPs that power in a free state was a “trust”, 
38 Hammersley, The English Republican Tradition, 16.
39 Cato’s Letters: Or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and other Important Subjects, vol. I,
(London: Printed for W.Wilkins, 1753), xxvi
40 Cato’s Letters, vol. I, 91.
41 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 166.
42 Cato’s Letters, vol. I, 118.
43 Cato’s Letters, vol. I, 184.
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conferred by all to one or a few, to maintain security and “pursue the interest of all”.44 
Ultimately, they praised the “inestimable blessing of liberty”, which was the “parent of
virtue, pleasure, plenty, and security; and tis innocent as well as lovely”.45
Liberty was an important theme for many Britons during the eighteenth century. Many 
subsequent writers echoed the thoughts and ideals of Trenchard and Gordon. A 
Critical Review of the Liberties of British Subjects (1750) summed up the intrinsic link 
between Britain and liberty:
“If an unconfined and constrained love of liberty constitutes the distinguishing
characteristic of a free Briton, as every Englishman demands, and every antagonist
allows; whatever concerns liberty, whether it tends to promote or suppress the cause, in
nations near or remote, as well as at home, must in some degree affect every true
Englishman, every generous soul”.46
Two major themes emerge from this particular passage. The first was the idea that 
every Briton should have an ‘unconfined’ love of liberty, ‘as every Englishman 
demands’. Britain was formed after the union with Scotland in 1707. The union was 
dominated by England. Both Scotland, Wales, and to a lesser extent Ireland, were 
meant to adhere to English principles, and ideals of liberty. When referencing ‘Britain’
throughout this work, this predominately means England, although many Scottish and 
Irish writers do feature predominately within this work. James Boswell was Scottish, 
yet adhered firmly to Anglo-British liberties. Colin Kidd in his article North 
Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth Century British Patriotisms (1996) expands 
further upon this phenomenon.‘Patriotism’ had not yet gathered an ethnocentric 
meaning; it was associated with “ideals and practices which held universal appeal”.47 
The universalist conception of patriotism was closely related to the English ideal of 
self-government. More importantly, the dominant ideologies of eighteenth century 
England’s ‘provinces’ tended to “emulate patriotism concerning with the extension of 
the achievements of English exceptionalism within the wider British world”.48
44 Cato’s Letters, vol. I, 184.
45 Cato’s Letters, vol. I, 191.
46 A Critical Review of the Liberties of British Subjects, (London: Printed for R.Watkins, 1750), 3.
47 Colin Kidd, “North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth Century British patriotisms”, The 
Historical Journal, Vol 39, No 2, (June 1996), 361-382, 362.
48 Kidd, “North Britishness”, 362. 
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This was why it was easy for Boswell, a Scotsman, to adhere so heavily to the English 
ideals of liberty in his Account of Corsica (1768). 
The second major theme to emerge from the aforementioned passage, was the idea that
the cause of liberty across the globe ought to ‘affect every true Englishman’. It was this
idealism which led to the belief that Corsica and Britain were bound together as fellow 
isles of liberty. Britons during the eighteenth century believed themselves to be a 
unique nation. This did not stem solely from the belief that they were ‘Gods chosen 
people’. Many firmly believed that the British constitution was the greatest, most 
superior in the world. Trenchard and Gordon called Britain “the best republick in the 
world, with a prince at the head of it”.49 As Hammersley has noted, British 
‘commonwealthmen’ had a certain “reverence for the small republican governments of
antiquity, with a recognition that such governments simply were not viable in the 
different circumstances of modern Europe”.50 The conditions of a mixed/balanced 
system of government in Britain “offered the next-best thing”; republican elements 
within a monarchical framework, with political liberty protected.51 Britain’s 
constitution was seen to incorporate the best features of republican and monarchical 
forms of government. It was the reason why Trenchard and Gordon could quote 
passages from that “excellent” Republican writer Algernon Sidney (1623-1683), and 
yet remain fervent supporters of the British monarchy.52 This fine balance and perfect 
harmony “between the civil liberty of the people, the privileges of the nobility and 
clergy, and the prince’s prerogative”, led the British pamphlet British Liberties, or the 
Free-born Subject’s Inheritance (1766), to confidently assert that Britain had “the best 
species of constitution that could possibly be imagined by man”.53 
The belief in the superiority of the British constitution translated directly into British 
foreign affairs. Brendan Simms has commented that there was a direct link between 
domestic liberty and the ‘balance of power’ and the right to intervene.54  This meant 
the right to intervene within other states affairs wherever ‘liberty’ was believed to be 
49 Cato’s Letters, vol. II, 28.
50 Hammersley, The English republican tradition, 78. 
51 Hammersley, The English republican tradition, 78. 
52 Cato’s Letters, vol. II, 28
53 British Liberties, or the Free-born Subject’s Inheritance, (London: Printed by H.Woodfall and 
W.Strahan, 1766), xiv
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threatened. British ideals of liberty affected foreign policy far more during the second 
half of the eighteenth century. This will be the other main focus for the thesis; to study 
the foreign policy of Britain, particularly within Europe. Britain after the Seven Years 
War (1756-1763) turned away from active intervention in Europe. Thompson argued 
that the emphasis “on the superiority of the British constitution in both its secular and 
ecclesiastical forms served to stress difference, rather than supranational confessional 
solidarity”.55 For Thompson, the decline of ‘protestant interest’ within foreign affairs 
led directly to a discourse of ‘difference’ between Britain and continental Europe, 
which was reinforced by a “Whiggish historical account of English historical 
exceptionalism”.56 However, those writing about Corsica during the eighteenth-century
attempted to promote British intervention on the island, in order to protect Corsican 
liberties. Corsica was used as an example by writers who attempted to promote British 
activity in continental Europe after 1763. 
One of the most prominent promoters of an active British foreign policy in Europe was
Edmund Burke (1729-1797), a member of parliament and an author, who is most well 
known for writing the Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). In an address to 
the House of Commons on the 8th of November 1768, Burke argued that the recent 
French invasion of Corsica was an affront to British interests; “Corsica naked I dread 
not, but Corsica a Province of France is terrible to me”.57 Burke argued that “this 
country used to take part” in the affairs of Europe.58 He believed it was the duty of the 
house to “superintend every action of its neighbours”.59Corsica was used as an example
by Burke to illustrate the dangers of “that Dreadful Scorpion” (the Bourbon powers: 
France and Spain), which was “going to occupy more space in our horizon”.60 The case
study of Corsica can help map developments in British foreign policy. In particular, the
54 Brendan Simms, “A False principle in the law of nations: Burke, state sovereignty [German] liberty, 
and intervention in the Age of Westphalia”, in Humanitarian intervention: A History, ed. Brendan 
Simms and D.J.B Trim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 92.
55 Thompson, The Protestant interest, 237.
56 Thompson, The Protestant interest, 237.
57 Edmund Burke, The Writings and speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. II, ed. Paul Langford, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 98.
58 Burke, The Writings and speeches, 99.
59 Burke, The Writings and speeches, 99.
60 Burke, The Writings and speeches, 99.
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debates concerning British foreign policy following 1763, when it became a choice 
between Europe or America?61 
We can understand the perceptions Britain had of the world through examining her 
relations with Corsica. Protestantism seemingly did not affect British ideology as much
during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was highlighted by their 
relations with Corsica. Corsica was an almost entirely catholic country, but the 
Corsicans catholic religion was rarely talked about by the majority of British writers. I 
aim to situate my argument in the context of the works Claydon and Colley. Through 
the case study of Corsica, I will argue that British attitudes changed around this time: 
they no longer saw themselves as the protectors of Protestantism, but as advocates and 
defenders of liberty. More importantly, British liberty also meant the adoption of the 
British commercial system. British liberty entailed free trade for all. Britain was the 
most superior commercial state in the world. Becoming a part of the British empire 
enabled access to all the economic benefits that came with it. For example, it was 
argued that British liberty had helped to develop Scotland commercially. The counter 
example was Ireland, where the British ‘project’ was less successful. British notions of
liberty were arguably a sham, or a cover for the mercantile system. Ireland for example
did not benefit from Britain’s commercial empire. The idea of British liberties was 
simply a way in which Britain represented themselves; it became the Realpolitik of the 
British empire. I will study how this belief in the superiority of British liberties 
translated directly into foreign affairs. More specifically, would Corsica follow the 
Scottish or Irish model if they became a part of the British commercial empire?
The thesis will study the relations between Britain and Corsica from the period 1728-
1796. In order to encompass this large expanse of time, the thesis is subdivided into 
four main chapters. These are as follows: Chapter 1“Britain and Corsica: the 
development of British opinion and policy on Corsica, 1728-1768”; Chapter 2 “The 
Corsican Crisis in British politics 1768-1769”; Chapter 3 “Paoli in Britain 1769-1789”;
Chapter 4 “The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 1794-1796: An ‘Experiment’ in British 
constitutional government”. Chapters 1 and 3 generally deal with larger time periods 
61 See Jeremy Black’s book America or Europe? British foreign policy 1739-63, (London: UCL Press, 
1998)
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and act as ‘bridges’ to the two main events to occur in the relations between Britain 
and Corsica; the Corsican Crisis (1768-1769) and the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-
1796), which are the subjects for Chapters 2 and 4 respectively. Chapters 2 and 4 are 
more condensed, dealing with their respective events. The thesis analyses the relations 
between Britain and Corsica collectively; the Corsican crisis is linked to and contrasted
with the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. In order to understand these events, the relations 
between Britain and Corsica during the eighteenth century need to be studied as a 
whole. 
The first chapter will study the relations between Britain and Corsica from 1728-1768. 
1728 saw the beginning of the great Corsican revolt against some four hundred years 
of Genoese rule. The chapter will provide an overview of the different British writings 
published on Corsica during this period. This will include the main newspapers and 
pamphlets with articles concerning Corsica. This chapter will also showcase the early 
relations Britain had with the Corsican rebels. Why did Britain start interacting with an
island with which they had had no previous relations? More important were the 
intellectual concepts of Corsica that came out from this period. The most influential 
writings of Corsica were the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Catherine Macaulay and
James Boswell. The chapter will explore their works on Corsica in detail. It will 
showcase in particular how the works of Rousseau and Boswell became the basis for 
all British knowledge on Corsica. They provided the intellectual basis of ideas 
concerning the island. The chapter places Boswell’s Account of Corsica (1768) at the 
centre of discussions. Boswell’s book was the single most important publication on 
Corsica in Britain. The chapter will restore Boswell’s Account of Corsica to its proper 
place of importance within eighteenth century intellectual debates.
The second chapter is an in-depth analysis of the Corsican crisis (1768-1769). The 
French invasion of the island provided the catalyst of mass British interest of Corsica 
during this period. How would Britain react? The country was split between those 
supporting intervention, and those against. There was a mass of British publications 
concerning Corsica during this period. The vast majority of the British literate classes 
supported the Corsican rebels. The chapter will explore how the Corsican crisis 
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influenced British politics. The opposition to government became associated with 
aiding the Corsicans with money and supplies. The Corsican crisis also became 
immersed within the broader debates upon British foreign policy following the Seven 
Years War. Was Britain’s failure to intervene against the French in Corsica, the first 
sign of the decline of the first British empire? The chapter will also explore the reasons
why the divided British cabinet did little to aid the Corsican rebels, despite the mass 
public outcry of support.
The third chapter will provide a bridge between the Corsican crisis 1768-1769 and the 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 1794-1796. This chapter will study the impact the Corsican 
leader Pasquale Paoli (1725-1807) made when in exile in England. There was a 
surprising reversal of attitudes to Paoli in Britain; the government became the 
supporters and benefactors of Paoli whilst the opposition turned against him. The 
chapter will bring to light how this situation came about. Debates upon Paoli were also 
linked to Britain’s precarious foreign policy after 1763. Where should Britain’s 
interests lie; Europe or America? Britain’s failure to aid Corsica was seen as a sign of 
their isolation from European power politics. The chapter will also ask why Paoli’s 
attempt to gain British aid for Corsica failed: despite remaining twenty years in exile, 
no support was forthcoming for the Corsican exiles in Britain. Why was Corsica not a 
strategic target during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), especially after 
France went to war with Britain in 1778? Ultimately, Paoli’s exile in Britain can only 
be considered a failure. Only with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, did 
Paoli’s restoration to Corsica became a reality. Why was the British government so 
reluctant to aid the Corsican exiles during this period?
The final chapter is the crux of the thesis, and looks into where British interest in 
Corsica became reality; the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796). This chapter will 
study how previous British interest in and ideas of Corsica directly influenced the 
formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The chapter also places the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom within the context of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1799). 
It was only within this wartime situation, that a British attempt on Corsica was made. 
One of the main focuses of this chapter is the uniquely legislated Anglo-Corsican 
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constitution. The constitution was distinctively formulated for Corsica, and was 
unparalleled in the constitutional history of Britain and their empire. The chapter will 
explore all the aspects of the constitution, which appeared to be shaped by the previous
notions and ideas Britons had of the island. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom also 
provides a unique insight into British foreign policy: Corsica was the largest territory 
in Europe to be conquered by Britain during the eighteenth century. The Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom provides an insight into how Britain would rule any European 
territories during this period. However, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was also 
uniquely formed for Corsica. Perhaps the most important question to ask is why did the
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom fail? The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom certainly ended any 
thoughts of a union between Britain and Corsica. The main question to be asked is why
Corsicans seemingly looked to France rather than Britain at the turn of the nineteenth 
century?
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Britain and Corsica: the development of British opinion and policy on Corsica, 1728-
1768
In 1762 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) pondered in his famous publication The 
Social contract, the impossibility “of finding the simplicity of nature linked with the 
needs of society”.62 It was difficult to find truly natural ‘conditions’ in modern 
societies. This explained the lack of well-constituted states and Rousseau’s pessimism 
about the future of the world. There was one exception:
“There is one country left in Europe capable of receiving legislation; it is the island of
Corsica. The valour and steadfastness with which this brave people was able to recover
and defend its freedom would amply deserve that some wise man teach it to preserve
it. I rather suspect that this small island will one day astound Europe”.63
Rousseau’s glowing description of Pasquale Paoli’s Corsican Republic helped to bring 
Corsica to the forefront of knowledge in European discussion. James Boswell (1740-
1795) followed the interest of Rousseau with the publication of what became a 
renowned book; An Account of Corsica, the journal of a tour of that island and 
memoirs of Pascal Paoli (1768). Boswell, a relatively unknown Scottish writer and 
biographer at the time, visited the island in 1765. Boswell’s account was very popular 
upon its release, and helped to start his career as an author. Corsica became a major 
topic of curiosity within Britain. The main subject of interest for many British readers 
was that Corsica had become a democratic nation, built upon the foundations of 
‘liberty’. The ideal of liberty was a central theme for eighteenth-century British 
writers. The result of the British Civil Wars (1642-1651) and the Glorious Revolution 
(1688) during the seventeenth-century had given many Britons an intrinsic belief that 
their nation was the most ‘free’ on earth and superior to any other. Other nations 
striving for the same future were viewed with enthusiastic interest.  This was most 
evident after the French invasion of Corsica, in the same year Boswell’s book was 
released. The invasion precipitated a huge public outcry; war with France was only 
barely avoided. Could this ideal of shared liberty compel a nation to war? What made 
Corsica unique for Britain? Should Britain embrace a foreign policy that defended 
62 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later Political Writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 78.
63 Rousseau, The Social Contract, 78.
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liberty across the globe? Should Britain act as the protector of small states, and 
especially those threatened by foreign tyrants?
This chapter will review the development of British perspectives on Corsica. It will 
begin by documenting the Corsican revolt from 1728, and will culminate with the 
publication of James Boswell’s Account of Corsica in 1768. The first section will 
present the historiographical debates surrounding Corsica during this period. This 
chapter will attempt to provide a new way of understanding the Corsican revolt, from a
British position and view point. The second section will then provide a contextual 
analysis of the connections between Britain and Corsica up until 1750.  The third 
section will study the links made between ancient Republicanism and Corsica. In 
particular, the works of both Rousseau and Catherine Macaulay (1731-1791) will be 
studied, in order to understand why they viewed Corsica as a new modern Rome. The 
final section is a case study of Boswell’s famous Account of Corsica. What action did 
Boswell want Britain to take concerning Corsica? Did he hope for Corsica to become a
part of the British Empire, or perhaps merely for Britain to establish a protectorate over
the island? The central thesis question for this review is how did Corsica become so 
important for Britain? There were arguably many similarities between Britain and 
Corsica; both were islands fighting for liberty against French tyranny. The idea that the
Corsicans were struggling for ‘liberty’ was something repeatedly emphasised by 
Boswell, in his attempts to have Britain intervene on the island. Or perhaps British 
interest in Corsica was merely for its strategic location in the Mediterranean? I will 
attempt to answer these questions within this chapter. 
Historiographical debates surrounding Britain and Corsica
There are two overarching themes concerning Britain’s interest in Corsica during the 
eighteenth-century. The first focuses on the major similarities between Britain and 
Corsica; particularly the idea of ‘liberty’ which drew interest from British readers. 
Franco Venturi’s The end of the old regime in Europe 1768-1776 (1989), describes that
the Corsican revolt was “a struggle of poor against rich, of mountaineers against city 
dwellers”.64 The Corsican struggle became a symbol that expressed “the growing 
64 Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime in Europe 1768-1776, tr. R.Burr Litchfield, (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), xv.
25
contrast between virtue and corruption, between liberty and military and government 
coercion”.65 It was this ‘struggle’ for liberty that attracted the attention of Rousseau, 
Boswell, and even Catherine II of Russia. The Corsicans seemed markedly similar to 
the ancient Romans. The Romans under the Republic were traditionally viewed as poor
but virtuous citizens who would conquer the world. Venturi argues that within Britain, 
there was a general enthusiasm for the Corsican struggle for political liberty.
 
John Symonds, an English professor at Cambridge, was noted as an example of 
someone who supported the Corsican revolt. Symonds “judged the regime of Pasquale 
Paoli the second freest in the world after England”.66 Again the link between British 
and Corsican liberties was emphasised. Venturi has also noted that during the Corsican
‘revolution’, there was an “absence of any active or coherent English policy in the 
Mediterranean”.67 This was certainly the case, as illustrated by the hot and cold support
for Theodore von Neauhoff during the 1730s and 1740s. Whilst British government 
activity was incoherent in regard to Corsica, general English interest in the island was 
steadfast in supporting the Corsican rebel cause. What kind of people in England 
supported the Corsican revolt? First of all, the people in question would need to have 
been literate at least, in order to read any information concerning Corsica. The second 
aspect was the ability to financially support the rebels. John Symonds was a typical 
example of this ‘class’ of people. They had the enlightenment ideal of liberty at the 
heart of their ideas and beliefs. It is however difficult to truly ascertain how many 
people in Britain actually supported the Corsican revolt, but the continual newspaper 
reports on the subject suggest a certain amount of British interest in Corsican affairs.
The intrinsic ‘link’ between Britain and Corsica is an aspect studied by Peter France, in
his article Western European civilisation and its mountain frontiers 1750-1850 (1985).
France described that within eighteenth-century conceptualisations, there was the idea 
of the barbarian savage or ‘the other’. European writings were “full of the opposition 
between the rational civilised self and the wild other”.68 Corsica fitted the image of a 
65 Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, xv.
66 Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, xv.
67 Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, xvi.
68 Peter France, “Western European Civilisation and its Mountain Frontiers 1750-1850”, History of 
European ideas, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 297.
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‘wild’ mountainous frontier, similar to the Scottish Highlands. Within Scotland, there 
was a question of revenge. This came about due to the proscriptions that followed the 
Jacobite rebellion of 1745-1746. France believed there was a ‘bridge’ to the case of 
Corsica, which was “home of the primitive vendetta”.69 The Vendetta captured the 
imagination of a ‘civilised’ Europe. The highlanders and Corsicans were associated 
with the ‘savage’, in contrast to the rest of Europe, which viewed itself as a modern 
commercial society. Boswell’s ‘Tour of Corsica’ “fired enlightened opinion for the 
cause of the brave and primitive population of a mountainous island”.70 His heroic 
portrait of the freedom-loving islanders drew upon “the pastoral age of gold and the 
manly ideal of Sparta”.71 The Corsicans lived in the ‘golden age’ described in the 
Second part of Rousseau’s ‘Discourse on inequality’. Rousseau’s golden mean was 
“preserving the ‘manly’ virtues and ancient simplicity of freedom-loving mountain 
people while cultivating the arts of civilisation”.72 Boswell attempted to drum up 
support for this future. France believes that this ‘mythologizing representation’ of the 
Corsicans made them an object of fascination for many ‘enlightened’ Europeans. 
The other major theme concerning the relationship between Britain and Corsica was 
the strategic implications involved. This idea particularly focused on the importance of
Corsica for British interests in the Mediterranean. Jeremy Black’s book Debating 
foreign policy in Eighteenth century Britain (2011) describes that the Corsican ‘issue’ 
“touched chords in British concern about maritime strength”.73 Black argues that in 
1738, when the French first sent troops to Corsica, domestic criticism of the British 
ministry was “relatively restrained”.74 This was due to the growing tensions between 
Britain and Spain, which culminated with war in 1739. 1768 was different; when the 
French purchased the island, “more was known about Corsica by then and it had 
developed into a major topic in public discussion”.75 This ‘public discussion’ 
“encompassed politicians, printed opinion, especially James Boswell’s account of his 
69 France, “Western European Civilisation” 303.
70 France, “Western European Civilisation”, 303.
71 France, “Western European Civilisation”, 303.
72 France, “Western European Civilisation”, 303.
73 Jeremy Black, Debating Foreign Policy in Eighteenth Century Britain, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 
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74 Black, Debating Foreign Policy, 177.
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tour to the island, which also served as the basis for newspaper articles and fashionable
opinion”.76 What all the major historians agree upon is Boswell’s importance in 
making the island a major issue within British politics. The question for this particular 
chapter is how did this ‘crisis’ come about? Black argues that the British government 
was ‘aware’ of the strategic importance of Corsica. In 1768 the government “pressed 
France not to annex” the island, but with little result.77 Otherwise the government’s 
response was limited. The Corsican crisis was for Black, the first ‘challenge’ faced by 
the British Empire following the Seven Years War (1756-1763). However, the ‘public 
outburst’ over the Corsican issue was a clear indication that Corsica was not merely a 
strategic concern. Corsican liberties were identifiable to the British ideals of ‘liberty’ 
and freedom; failure over Corsica meant a loss for the cause of ‘liberty’.
Brendan Simm’s book Three victories and a defeat (2007) also discusses the strategic 
implications arising from Corsica’s annexation by France. Simms argues that in the 
five years following 1768, “a number of bastions across Europe- Corsica, Sweden and 
Poland- had fallen”.78 All these were widely perceived to have “profound implications 
also for Britain’s naval security”.79 Again, Corsica’s important strategic position in the 
Mediterranean came to the fore. Simms argues that previously nobody “paid very 
much attention to the long Corsican rebellion against their Genoese occupiers”.80 The 
first section of this chapter brings forward evidence contrary to this statement by 
Simms. There were many news stories and publications in Britain devoted to Corsica 
prior to 1768. For Simms, the annexation of Corsica is “a serious blow to Britain’s 
position in the western Mediterranean, and reduced the security of her bases in 
Gibraltar, and particularly Minorca”.81 Simms concludes that this loss “symbolized and
hastened Britain’s general European decline”; she found herself outside of the major 
alliance systems.82 This would precipitate the ‘crisis’ during the American war 1775-
1783, when Britain fought a coalition of European powers as well as the American 
76 Black, Debating Foreign Policy,177.
77 Black, Debating Foreign Policy, 178.
78 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire 1714-
1783, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 555.
79 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 555.
80 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 556.
81 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 557.
82 Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, 557.
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revolutionists on their own. However, to view the Corsican crisis primarily in the 
realm of ‘great power’ politics, loses sight of the real forces behind the general outcry 
against the French annexation of Corsica in 1768.
History of Corsica and Genoa up until 1720
Corsica has been dominated by a number of invaders throughout its history. These 
include the Etruscans, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Ostrogoths, 
Byzantines, Lombards, Saracens, Aragonese, Pisans and even the Papacy. Corsica 
constantly changed hands throughout the centuries, lacking an effective unifying 
authority to rule the island. The Genoese Republic secured possession of the island 
during the mid fifteenth century, ruling until 1768. France briefly gained possession of 
the island from 1553-1559 during the last bout of the Italian wars (1494-1559). 
Although subsequently returned to Genoa at the end of the war, French rule was never 
entirely forgotten. Italian historian Franco Venturi has written that Genoa was a city 
“that had been for centuries a centre and symbol of seafaring cosmopolitanism”.83 The 
Genoese Republic was at her height during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
However, she suffered relative decline during subsequent centuries. The historian 
Thomas Kirk in his book Genoa and the sea 1559-1684 (2005) argues that this decline 
was due to Genoese reliance on foreign fleets during the seventeenth century, 
especially Spain. Kirk believes that as “the big European monarchies grew more able 
at tapping their vast resources, the city-state became outclassed”.84 Other mercantile 
powers, such as the Dutch and the English became the dominant trading powers in the 
Mediterranean. Genoa was never able to compete with these global commercial 
powers. Genoa was reduced to being of “little more than regional importance by the 
late seventeenth century”.85 When studying the history of Corsica, perhaps the most 
important note of interest for this chapter is that Britain had no connection to the island
prior to 1720. This situation would change drastically during the eighteenth century, 
mainly due to the Corsican revolt. 
83 Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, xv.
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With the decline of Genoa, Corsica became one of the only remaining symbols of 
imperial prestige. However, Thadd Hall, a historian writing in 1971, has noted that the 
desperate attempts to hold the island were “another symptom of the Republics 
decline”.86 Hall argues that the Genoese viewed Corsica “as a colony and did not 
attempt to make the island part of the Republic”.87 The majority of eighteenth-century 
commentators on Corsica agreed that Genoese rule of the island was inefficient, 
oppressive and uninspired. The great Corsican revolt that broke out in 1728 was the 
first of a series of rebellions to erupt. British interest in the island only began to 
materialise when a number of newspapers started to contain information concerning 
the revolt. Fighting on Corsica was at times the only war of note occurring in Europe; 
it therefore made interesting news. News on Corsica appeared sporadically in a number
of newspapers, usually within the ‘foreign’ sections. The news was typically gathered 
from post received from both Holland and France. However, it was up to the editors to 
decide which articles of news made the papers. Information on Corsica was often 
repeated and shared in a number of different newspapers. The news articles on Corsica 
were usually brief and sometimes contradictory. 
British newspapers began to report on Corsica as early as 1731 with the intervention of
Imperialist troops on the island. The ‘Imperialists’ referred to the Holy Roman Empire.
The Holy Roman Empire was a confederation of German states dominated by the 
Emperor in Vienna. The 13 November edition of the Daily Advertiser reported that the
Genoese minster at Vienna desired a reinforcement of Imperial troops in Corsica “to 
subdue sooner the rebels there”.88 The paper also reported that the Genoese minster had
complained ‘loudly’ to the British ministers of state in Vienna. He described that 
“several neighbouring nations had furnished the rebels with large quantities of 
ammunition and provision”.89 Which neighbouring nations had furnished the supplies 
remained unknown; Britain was certainly a suspect. This was a typical example of a 
British newspaper article devoted to the Corsican revolt; the news was based on 
conjecture or ‘advice’ gained from imported foreign mail. This was the first instance of
86 Thadd Hall, France and the Eighteenth Century Corsican Question, (New York: New York 
University Press, 1971), 6.
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British interest in the Corsican revolt. It raised the question of Britain selling arms to 
the Corsicans for profit rather than any other motive.
The History of Corsica 1730-1748- first British involvement
With the increase in newspaper coverage on the island, two anonymous publications 
appeared in 1739 and 1743 respectively. These two sources provided for British 
readers a far more detailed picture of events on Corsica. I will now give a brief 
overview of these documents. There are two important questions to ask before looking 
at these sources. The first question is why study these writings? Both were published 
as books in several editions, and were extensively advertised in many British 
newspapers. Entire sections were printed in several British newspapers. The 6 
November 1746 edition of the General Advertiser for example contained large 
segments of the 1739 publication, A General account and description of the island of 
Corsica.90 Some seven years after its publication, the book was still referred to as a 
source of authority on Corsica. Both sources helped to define British opinions and 
ideas of the island. The second question to ponder was why these works were 
published anonymously? The main reason was due to the royal proclamation issued on 
the 24 July 1736. Boswell in his Account of Corsica noted some twenty years after, 
that this proclamation (which was still in force) was attained by the Genoese minister 
in London. It prohibited “any of his majesty’s subjects from furnishing provisions or 
assistance to the malcontents of Corsica”.91 To publish any works concerning the 
Corsican Revolt was somewhat dangerous; anonymity remained the only option for 
any interested in the island. What can be gathered from the issuing of this royal 
proclamation was that certain British subjects were already assisting the Corsican 
rebels. The two anonymous publications will bring more light to the actions of these 
certain Britons’ during the 1730s.  
The first pamphlet that will studied is A General account and description of the island 
of Corsica (1739). A General account of Corsica attempted to provide a more reliable 
account of events occurring on the island. Previously, knowledge of the Corsican 
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revolt was dependent “upon Gazettes, and accidental information”.92 With the increase 
of coverage in the newspapers, Corsica had become a “natural curiosity”.93 The writer 
claimed that the information gathered was from the “first reports”; these had been 
“well attested, at least confirmed over and over in the publick accounts”.94 The writer 
was still reliant on similar documents to those used by British newspapers. Within the 
preface, the writer claimed that the purpose of the document was not to argue for or 
against the Corsican Revolt. This sentiment was contradicted by the rest of the preface.
The preface described that Corsica had been “long inured to a state of subjection and 
slavery, under an oppressive commonwealth”.95 The late appearance of ‘publick spirit’ 
in the natives of Corsica made them “stand distinguished in the annals of the present 
age, [and] has turned the eyes of all Europe towards that small spot of ground”.96 The 
writer clearly favoured the Corsican cause, which had become a well known topic 
across Europe. The ‘natural curiosity’ in the island of Corsica was the appearance of 
‘liberty’. This was a recurring theme of interest for many British writers on Corsica 
during the eighteenth century, for whom there was an intrinsic ‘link’ between British 
and Corsican liberties.
With the beginning of the Corsican revolt in 1728, the writer described that the 
Genoese had given the Corsicans ‘significant’ occasion for insurrection. The Genoese 
viceroys of the island, during their commissions, advanced “their private fortunes, on 
the spoils of their fellow creatures”.97 The viceroys only had a two year commission on
the island and were usually from the lower strata of Genoese aristocracy. Their 
commission on Corsica was an opportunity to make easy money. The Corsicans first 
declared that they wanted a king of their own to reside among them. They opposed the 
authority of the Genoese Doge, who was also crowned King of Corsica when elected. 
The writer ‘applauded’ the constancy of the Corsicans in this sentiment, “as every 
brave and virtuous people must be thought to deserve”.98 These qualities of the 
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Corsicans alluded to those had by the ancients, such as the Romans or Spartans. This 
connection would later be brought up more vividly by both Rousseau and Boswell. By 
1731, the Corsicans had almost reduced the entire island to complete obedience. 
However, this changed when Imperialist troops were sent to the island in 1731. Genoa 
was still officially a fief of the Holy Roman Empire. Therefore the Emperor placed 
Genoa under his protection. By 1733 there were some 12,000 Imperialist troops on the 
island. The Corsicans were able to procure ‘honourable’ terms by laying down their 
arms. The Imperialist commander recognised the difficulty of defeating a people “who 
took up arms in defence of their liberties”.99 The author was attempting to have English
readers recognize the strength of liberty when founding a nation. This was the true aim 
of the author when writing this book. The author was attempting to change the 
preconceived conceptions of Britain as the defender of Protestantism. 
Linda Colley’s book Britons: forging the nation 1707-1837 (1992) argues that 
“Protestantism lay at the core of British national identity” throughout the eighteenth-
century.100 A General account of Corsica was one of the earlier works attempting to 
change the idea that protestantism was the main characteristic of Britain’s national 
identity. Religion was no longer the main battle line for nations in Europe; liberty 
would become the new source of conflict. By writing the history of Corsica, the author 
hoped for readers to identify the similarities between British and Corsican histories. 
Both were islands fighting for their liberty; Britain had ‘won’ their battle whilst 
Corsica was still engrossed in combat. When describing Corsican liberty, the writer 
was really talking about British liberty. The author described one event in 1735, to 
typify the major differences between the Corsicans and the Genoese. Genoa had raised 
6000 militia to go to Corsica. The Genoese though “could get but fifty to go”.101 Such 
“terror did the resolution of a brave people, struggling for liberty, strike in the breasts 
of a company of dastardly slaves”.102 The ‘bravery’ of the Corsicans was contrasted to 
the ‘slavery’ of the Genoese. There could only be one victor. The illustration of a 
people devoted to liberty was intended for British self-understanding. This marked a 
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change of interest in the island from a British perspective. Liberty rather than profit 
became the main point of curiosity. 
A General account of Corsica devoted the final passages of the book to one of the most
extraordinary affairs in the history of Corsica: the arrival of Baron Theodore Von 
Neuhoff, later known as King Theodore I. King Theodore was the first and last king of 
Corsica (excluding the Doges). There was a major increase in British newspaper 
articles devoted to news of Theodore’s activities. The Weekly Miscellany was one of 
the more prominent newspapers to dedicate articles to this subject. The 31 July 1736 
edition attempted to ascertain the intentions of Theodore. They informed readers that 
they needed to wait longer “before we make any further observations on this important 
subject”.103 British interest in Corsica had reached new heights during Theodore’s short
reign on the island; it had now become an ‘important’ subject. In a matter of 
conjecture, British newspapers seemed far more interested in the Corsican Revolt when
an important individual leader appeared. This was also apparent in the later fascination 
with Pasquale Paoli. 
Theodore’s arrival on the island on 15 March 1736 marked the first major British 
involvement on Corsica. Perhaps more extraordinary, as noted in A general account of 
Corsica, was that Theodore arrived on an “English vessel from Tunis”, with a pass 
from the British consul there.104 What was the intention of the British during this 
episode? Was this a private enterprise by the English captain, or a genuine British 
attempt to secure Corsica through Theodore? It was also reported that two English 
ships had brought supplies to the Corsicans a year earlier in 1735. A general account 
of Corsica contained a letter, later published in several British Newspapers, from 
Baron Neuhoff to an ‘Irish Gentleman’ in England, dated 12 April 1736. Theodore 
explained that he came aboard the Ship “Richard”, commanded by a Captain Ortega. 
The most important note of mention in Theodore’s letter was that he had made certain 
‘measures’ “to obtain the friendship of the maritime powers”.105 The maritime powers 
referred to the two allied nations; Britain and Holland. Theodore believed that with the 
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assistance of these nations, he would “be able to resist the efforts and forces of all the 
powers of Europe”.106 Theodore alluded to the strategic importance Corsica had in the 
Mediterranean. Its location would enable a naval power to potentially dominate the sea
routes in the Western Mediterranean. 
 It was unlikely that Theodore’s support came directly from the British government. 
Theodore’s arrival on a British ship prompted the issuing of the royal proclamation in 
July 1736, forbidding any British subjects from assisting the rebels of Corsica. The 
author of A General account of Corsica noted that the British King sent orders to seize 
the British ship that carried over Baron Neuhoff, and also called for an account from 
the consul of Tunis, for his part in the affair.107 It can be gathered that the ‘affair’ was 
down to some private individuals. The issuing of the royal proclamation also suggests 
that certain British subjects had already been involved in aiding the Corsican rebels, 
especially in supplies. What stimulated these British individuals to provide aid to these 
rebels? The hope for profit seemed to be the primary motivator.
The reign of King Theodore was farcical in reality. His ‘reign’ lasted less than six 
months before he left for Leghorn, on mainland Italy in November 1736. His retreat 
was due to “some important affairs he had to transact in Italy, to facilitate the entire 
conquest of Corsica”.108 He was later arrested in Holland due to some unresolved debts.
However, Theodore’s arrival in Corsica on a British ship concerned the French 
government. The French court feared British or Spanish interference on the island; 
Corsica was located close to the south of France. French troops would later intervene 
on the island in 1738, in support of their Genoese ally. A General account of Corsica 
ended its narrative at this point. The pamphlet never advocated any British intervention
on the island, in response to the French. The whole work was more of an ‘ode’ to the 
Corsican fight for liberty, rather than actively seeking British action in Corsica. The 
pamphlet was also discreetly challenging the commercial selfishness of Britain. 
Through her greed and exploitation of Corsica, Genoa had driven the inhabitants of the
island to open revolt. The Corsicans, imbued with the spirit of liberty, would always 
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overcome the corrupt and commercial Republic of Genoa. Thus, Britain should base 
her foreign policy on new principles: the protection and advancement of liberty across 
the globe, rather than commercial greed.
The history of Theodore I King of Corsica  (1743)
The second major anonymous publication to come out during the 1730s-1740s was 
The history of Theodore I King of Corsica (1743). The History of Theodore wanted to 
provide a “genuine and impartial account of the life and adventures of so extraordinary
a person as Baron Neuhoff certainly is”.109 The author throughout this work could 
barely hide their overwhelming admiration for Theodore, despite their claims of 
providing an ‘impartial account’. Similarly to A general account of Corsica, the book 
attempted to provide clear information of events on Corsica, which were “produced to 
public view”.110 The author praised the resolution of the Corsicans to “defend their 
liberties”, in order to “enjoy the blessings of society”.111 The Genoese had previously 
forbade the advancement of industry and agriculture in Corsica, in order to control 
their commercial activities. The Corsicans, as a free nation, were no longer “resting in 
rocks and caves” but now had “houses and lands; from a state of indigence, they are 
raised to a prospect of riches”.112 Liberty enabled the progression of a nation. The only 
way they could survive as a free nation however, was with Theodore as their king.
 
The History of Theodore was written during the War of the Austrian Succession (1742-
1748), which defined its content. The war saw an alliance of Britain, Austria and 
Sardinia battle against a coalition of France, Spain, and later Genoa after 1745. 
Theodore von Neuhoff made another attempt to expel the Genoese from Corsica in 
1743. The history of Theodore described that the would-be-king came to a certain 
‘court’, “where he met a much better reception than he had received elsewhere”.113 
This ‘court’ was of course Britain. The author had to be careful when detailing British 
activity, especially concerning their actions in the ongoing conflict. On 18 January 
1743 Theodore arrived on the shores of Corsica, once again aboard a British squadron. 
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He issued a proclamation to reassert his ‘noble’ resolution “of driving the common 
enemy out of the kingdom”.114 In reality, the British officers were merely attempting to
gauge how much support Theodore had on the island. Theodore then returned to 
Tuscany after ten days of patrolling the waters around Corsica. The History of 
Theodore was written shortly after these events had occurred, when there was a distinct
possibility that Theodore, with British support, could become King of Corsica. The 
conclusion was defined by this sentiment: the author believed that there soon may be a 
second part written, as an “account for King Theodore’s...wonderful accession to the 
Corsican Throne”.115 The author’s admiration for Theodore seemed to cloud the reality 
of the situation. 1743 was the last time Theodore would visit Corsica, before dying in 
London in 1756. He was an adventurer for the romantics rather than a true sovereign 
for Corsica. The Corsicans would only gain a true leader with the introduction of 
Pasquale Paoli in 1755.
Was the arrival of Theodore on Corsica in 1743 an attempt at British intervention? The
short answer is no. British activity on Corsica during the War of the Austrian 
Succession was usually limited as acting in an auxiliary role to her Sardinian and 
Austrian allies. This was also the case when the British fleet, acting in conjunction 
with Sardinian troops and Corsican rebels, bombarded the towns of Bastia and Saint-
Florent in November 1745. There was nothing to suggest that the British government 
had any concrete interest in Corsica during this period. The main problem for the 
Corsican rebels before 1750 was their ‘tag’ as ‘insurgents’. Even the pro-Corsican text 
A General account of Corsica labelled the Corsicans as ‘malcontents’, as did most 
British newspapers. Support for the Corsican rebels against a ‘sovereign’ power could 
present problems about what entailed ‘sovereignty’. The British government at this 
time also suffered similar insurgency problems with the Jacobite rebellion in 1745-
1746. Thus, the British government was reluctant to intervene during this period. 
Rousseau and Paoli: the growth in the ‘popularity’ of the Corsican cause
Pasquale Paoli (1725-1807) first arrived on the island on 29 April 1755. He was soon 
elected General-in-Chief of the Corsican nation. By 1756, the Genoese had been 
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reduced to holding a few strongholds on the coast. Paoli was different to any previous 
Corsican chief. He attempted to create an independent Corsican Republic. Peter 
Thrasher has argued that Paoli had a policy of ensuring “that the Corsican cause was 
known to the outside world throughout the period of Corsican independence”.116 This 
was also apparent with the increased British newspaper coverage of Paoli’s activities. 
The Public Advertiser on 10 November 1755 noted that the Corsican rebels had found 
in Paoli a chief “of much greater abilities than they could ever boast before”.117 As 
previously noted, the British newspapers seemed fixated on a leader or figurehead. The
9 November 1764 edition of the Gazetteer contained the extract of an English 
gentleman at Corsica. Who this ‘English gentleman’ was remains a mystery; Boswell 
did not travel to the island until a year later. Perhaps the author was a British naval 
officer; they had visited the island in the past. We can only speculate over their 
identity. The letter described that the ‘firmness’ of Paoli was ‘astonishing’, and that he 
continued to “exhibit a composure that might do honour to the greatest general”.118 
British newspapers were continually providing positive press on Paoli and his 
activities. The letter claimed that the ‘brave islanders’ had sworn that they would “not 
survive the loss of their liberty”.119 The Corsicans were being portrayed as ‘brave’ 
defenders of their liberty. This sentiment was identifiable with British ideals of liberty.
The man who made Corsica a far more known subject across Europe was Rousseau. 
Rousseau was one of the most prominent Enlightenment thinkers during the 1760s. His
works The Social contract and Emile: Or on Education (both published in 1762), were 
popular throughout Europe, and were translated into a number of languages. Rousseau 
became infamous for these works, and both were subsequently banned in Paris and his 
home town of Geneva. The banning of these works only helped to enhance their 
popularity, particularly in England, where they were translated in 1763. Rousseau’s 
famous quote concerning Corsica in the Social Contract in 1762, as previously noted, 
helped to put the island on the map. Rousseau believed that Corsica was a small 
country of ‘noble’ savages who would one day ‘astonish’ the world. 
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Rousseau’s positive language regarding Corsica captured the attention of a number of 
prominent Corsicans. The most prominent was Matteo Buttafoco (1731-1806), a 
Corsican military officer in the service of Paoli. Buttafoco wrote a letter to Rousseau 
on 31 August 1764, in which he noted that Rousseau had in Social Contract 
“mentioned the Corsicans in a very favourable manner”.120 Buttafoco informed 
Rousseau that Corsica was “capable of receiving a good system of legislation”, but 
required “a legislator; it requires a man of your principles”.121 The ‘Corsican nation’ 
wished for Rousseau to “become the sage counsellor who should devise the means of 
preserving that liberty, which it has cost so much blood to acquire”.122 Buttafoco 
wanted Rousseau to draft a constitution for the fledgling Corsican Republic. Rousseau 
replied to Buttafoco on 22 September 1764, that it was “superfluous” to “try to excite 
my zeal for the company that you offer me”.123  Rousseau held the Corsican cause 
close to his heart. He gathered from Buttafoco’s letter that he only wished for a 
‘political institution’ for Corsica, and concluded that the Corsicans “already have a 
civil law of the body”. Paoli had already instituted a number of civil laws for Corsica. 
Therefore, it became a question of “tracing a form of government that relates to it”.124 
Rousseau required from Buttafoco a complete collection of Corsican laws. In a 
subsequent letter sent to Buttafoco on 15 October 1764, Rousseau expressed his belief 
that by the next spring, “I might propose my first ideas in a provisional form, and after 
three years my plan (for a) complete institution”.125 The ‘provisional form’ of 
government Rousseau spoke of was his Constitution project for Corsica. Rousseau 
required from Buttafoco: “all that concerns Mr. Paoli”, a “good map of Corsica”, the 
“history of the nation”, and “all that makes the national genius”.126 In another letter 
sent on 10 November 1764, Buttafoco informed Rousseau that he would send three 
packets of collections/information regarding Corsica to him within the coming 
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months.127 This information would form the basis for Rousseau’s Constitution project 
for Corsica, drafted in 1765. 
Rousseau’s Constitution project for Corsica was the first part of a draft intended to lay 
down the constitutional framework for the Corsican Republic. Rousseau believed that 
the Corsican people were “fortunately disposed by nature to receive a good 
administration”.128 The advantageous location of Corsica offered for Rousseau 
reasonable hope that the Corsicans would be “able to become a flourishing people and 
to make their mark in Europe”.129 Boswell in his Account of Corsica would expand far 
more upon the natural strengths of Corsica, particularly for Britain. Rousseau believed 
his Constitutional project was the best way to “shape the nation to fit the 
government”.130 Rousseau saw himself as a Solon character who would legislate for the
Corsicans. The degeneracy of other governments was due to the separation of “the 
body which governs and the body which is governed”.131 The establishment of a ‘good’
constitution for Corsica in contrast “can begin at the beginning, and take steps to 
prevent degeneration”.132 The ‘savage’ nature of the Corsicans meant that development
of their institutions could start from scratch. Due to their undeveloped nature, the 
Corsicans had “not yet adopted the vices of other nations”.133 For Rousseau, everything
depended upon a good constitution, which would provide “all the stability of which it 
[Corsica] is capable”.134
What Rousseau presented in his Constitution project for Corsica was a society based 
entirely upon agricultural produce. This stemmed from his belief that “no one who 
depends on others and lacks resources of his own, can ever be free”.135 Rousseau 
followed this same principle in the realm of foreign policy. Alliances only bind the 
weak to the strong and not the other way round. Rousseau advised the Corsicans to 
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“depend on yourselves only”, as they had done throughout their history.136 Rousseau 
firmly believed that “rules drawn from your own experience are the best by which to 
govern yourselves”.137 By studying Corsica’s own situation, Rousseau believed that the
island was “incapable of growing rich in money”; therefore it should “try to grow rich 
in men”.138 Power was derived from population, which was “more real than that 
derived from finance, and is more certain in its effects”.139 This idea was based upon 
Rousseau’s belief in the superiority of the ancients over the moderns.
 
Rousseau idolised ancient Rome and particularly Sparta. The latter was a small Greek 
state, whose power was based entirely upon its martial strength. The ‘superiority’ of 
the ancients shaped Rousseau’s opinion that “a state rich in money is always weak, and
a state rich in men is always strong”.140 Rousseau hated ‘corrupt’ modern commercial 
societies, which based their wealth and strength upon finance. Rousseau believed that 
finance provided an unstable foundation for a state. Manpower was always in ‘public 
view’, and therefore a more ‘real’ demonstration of power. The only way to ensure this
increased manpower was through agriculture. Agriculture promoted population and 
increased birth rate. Rousseau was of the opinion that in the countryside, families had 
more children than city dwellers.141 Working in the countryside prevented “disorder 
and vice”; women were more chaste, with less habits of pleasure which allowed them 
to “produce more children”.142 Here Rousseau clearly had the early Roman Republic as
his model. Each Roman citizen would work on the land, and provide military service 
when a crisis arose. Perhaps most importantly for Rousseau, was his belief that 
peasants were “more attached to their soil than are townsmen to their cities”.143 
Working on the land incited greater patriotism within the citizen soldiers of the 
republic. Rousseau would expand further upon this “ardent love of country” within his 
later work, Considerations on the government of Poland (1772).144 For Rousseau, 
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“agriculture is the only means of maintaining the external independence of a state”.145 
Tilling the soil was the “true education of a solider”, which made men “patient and 
robust”.146 Only by emulating the ancients could a nation become great. Rousseau 
followed a simple maxim; “commerce produces wealth, but agriculture ensures 
freedom”.147 It may be better to have both, “but they are incompatible”; therefore an 
agricultural society was the best future for Corsica.148
Rousseau’s belief that Corsica should become an agricultural society, was also based 
upon the islands own circumstances. The form of government for Corsica must be the 
“least expensive, since Corsica is poor”.149 The least costly administration in general 
was “the republican, and in particular the democratic state”.150 This type of 
administration was favourable to agriculture, as power is “not being entirely at any one
point”, and was “dispersed equally throughout the territory”.151 The democratic system,
however, needed to be modified due to the size of Corsica; “a purely democratic 
government is suitable to a small town than to a nation”.152 Therefore Rousseau 
suggested a mixed government for Corsica, where “people assemble by sections rather 
than as a whole”.153 The work of administration should be conducted by a small 
number of ‘enlightened men’, with the island populated equally between twelve 
regions. Corsica was blessed with a lack of nobility, which still existed in the majority 
of European states. This was an advantage for Corsica, which enabled for no 
distinctions, save “for merit, virtue and patriotic service”.154 Equality was the main 
strength of Corsica. 
Rousseau drew important parallels between the situation of Corsica and that of 
Switzerland, which was also a republic, and for the most part a “poor and sterile 
country”. Switzerland was a nation full of hard-working independent people, who had 
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“harmony in council and courage in battle”.155 This enabled them to defend their liberty
from the “most warlike troops of Europe”. This was the model Corsica “should follow 
in order to return to your original estate”.156 The example of Switzerland however, also 
served as a warning to the potential problems that could face the Corsican Republic. 
The Swiss became mercenaries, and “became oppressors of the liberty of others”.157 
The introduction of commerce, industry and luxury destroyed the virtues that same life 
had engendered”.158 Rousseau’s advice to the Corsicans was clear; avoid commerce, 
and focus on agriculture, in order to become independent from any other nation. The 
illustration of Switzerland served as a testament to this. 
Rousseau’s Constitution project for Corsica was the first draft of an incomplete 
project, which he abandoned after the French invasion of Corsica in 1768. Rousseau’s 
Constitution project for Corsica was heavily influenced by The Social Contract. His 
later work Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772) completely contrasted 
with Rousseau’s proposed Constitution project for Corsica. Within his Considerations,
Rousseau argued that it was “the ardent love of country”, or patriotism for their state, 
which turned the Spartans “into beings above the level of humanity”.159 Rousseau again
referenced the example of the Spartans, in order to reinforce his arguments about 
patriotism. Patriotism had played an important part in Rousseau’s Constitution project 
for Corsica; although it featured far more prominently in his Considerations on the 
Government of Poland. There are some obvious differences between Corsica and 
Poland. Poland was a large state; Rousseau’s aim in his Considerations on the 
Government of Poland was to give “the constitution of a great kingdom the vigour and 
stability of that of a small republic”.160 Rousseau was reflecting upon the long held 
view that the type of government depended upon the size of the state. The size of 
nations was for Rousseau the “first and principal source of the misfortunes of the 
human race”. Small states- Republics or monarchies- “prosper merely by reason of the 
fact that they are small”.161 Republics in particular needed to be small, as citizens 
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needed to watch over one another.162 In order to accommodate for a Republican style of
state in Poland, Rousseau argued that a federal government was “the only one which 
combines the advantages of large and small states”.163
Perhaps the most notable difference between Rousseau’s proposed government of 
Poland to that of Corsica was the role of liberty. Rousseau’s Considerations on the 
Government of Poland exhibited a greater deal of caution and conservatism than his 
Constitution project for Corsica. Rousseau argued that the price of liberty could be 
much more ‘austere’ “than the yoke of tyrants”.164 Rousseau recommended caution 
when freeing the common people of Poland. Precautions and time were needed for this
enterprise. Rousseau warned the Polish nobility, to “not free their [common people] 
bodies until after you have freed their souls”.165 Rousseau was far more cautious 
regarding the effects of liberty, which was “a food easy to eat, but hard to digest”.166 
Why did Rousseau’s proposed constitution for Poland contrast so much with his earlier
work for Corsica? Rousseau was writing from the experiences of the earlier 
Constitution project for Corsica. He had seen the eventual conquest of Corsica in 
1769, which crushed any hopes and dreams he had for the island. Ultimately, Corsica 
and Poland were very different nations, set in completely different circumstances. 
Poland was a more established and larger state, with its own already existing 
constitution. Corsica in contrast was a relativity young state, which needed a new 
constitution drafted. For Rousseau, Corsica held the promise for future glory, whilst 
Poland needed to regain their past greatness. 
The Constitution project for Corsica drafted by Rousseau was never used by Buttafoco
or Paoli. Why was this the case? Paoli had already developed a unique democratic 
form of government for Corsica, which will be described in the section concerning 
Boswell’s Account of Corsica. Rousseau himself candidly admitted that “my ideas 
differ prodigiously from those of your nation”.167 Buttafoco was to an extent working 
independently from Paoli, during his contact with Rousseau: he believed that Corsicans
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would remain wretched “if a beneficent hand did not conduct them to happiness by a 
wise political code”.168 Clearly, Buttafoco did not believe that Paoli could wholly 
reform the ‘ignorance’ of the Corsicans. Buttafoco seemed somewhat jealous and 
fearful of the ‘exorbitant’ authority Paoli had on the island. Buttafoco revealed to 
Rousseau that Paoli’s advice was of very great weight, and “always decisive of the 
general voice”.169 He did however admire Paoli, and admitted that “yet he had abused 
no part of his authority”.170 Eventually, Buttafoco himself would later betray Paoli, 
when he became an officer in the French army during their invasion of Corsica in 
1768.
 Buttafoco wanted Rousseau himself to visit Corsica. Rousseau declined due to 
‘fatigues’ and ‘other obstacles’ preventing him from going to Corsica.171 Was it really 
the case that Rousseau could have perhaps become the legislator of Corsica, if he had 
visited the island? Boswell mentioned this episode in his Account of Corsica. Boswell 
wrote that Rousseau would never have become a Solon figure for the island. Rather, it 
was the case that “Paoli was too able a man to submit the legislation of his country to 
one who was an entire stranger to the people, the manners, and in short to everything in
the island”.172 Paoli had wished simply to employ Rousseau to record the ‘heroic’ 
actions of the Corsicans. What was clear was that both Buttafoco and Paoli had both 
hoped to use Rousseau’s prestige and fame to enhance Corsica’s position in Europe. 
Nevertheless Rousseau remained an avid supporter of the Corsican Republic, 
promising that “for the rest of my life I shall never be more occupied” than with 
Corsica; every other business was “entirely banished from my mind”.173
Catherine Macaulay’s  A short sketch of a democratical form of government  (1767)
Rousseau was not the only writer who provided allusions between the ancient republics
and Corsica. Catherine Macaulay (1731-1791) was an English historian, who between 
1763-1783 published her most famous work, The History of England from the 
Accession of James I to the Revolution. Divided into eight volumes, the first volume 
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was published in 1763 and made Macaulay a well known writer within Britain. She 
was also a known republican writer, who became a supporter of the radical John 
Wilkes during the later 1760s. Her only work concerning Corsica was A short sketch 
of a democratical form of government, published in 1767 as an attachment to her 
pamphlet,  Loose remarks on certain positions to be found in Mr. Hobbes 
philosophical rudiments of government and society. In her Loose remarks, Macaulay 
focused upon the aspects of monarchy discussed in Hobbes’ famous work, Leviathan 
(1651). Macaulay argued that Hobbes preferred a monarchical state before all others; 
however, this assertion was “contradicted by the only civilized societies in ancient 
history, Viz. The Greeks, from whom alone we can learn ancient prudence”.174 
Macaulay, similarly to Rousseau, used the examples of the ancient Greeks and Romans
to support her arguments on political theory. For Macaulay, political equality was 
essential for the laws of good government; one could never “exist to perfection without
the other”.175 Macaulay’s discussions on monarchy in Loose remarks contrasted 
directly with her discussions of Republicanism in the second part of the publication, A 
short sketch of a democratical form of government. A short sketch was purposely 
published as the secondary section to the Loose remarks: Macaulay intended to 
contrast Hobbes’ writings on monarchy to her proposed republican form of 
government. In A short sketch, her letter to the “renowned Paoli” on the “important 
subject of Corsican liberty” was intended as a challenge to the established arguments 
of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan on monarchy.176 
Similarly to Rousseau’s Constitution project for Corsica, Macaulay’s Short Sketch 
intended to draft a democratic form of government for the new Corsican republic. For 
Macaulay, only a democratic system, rightly balanced could “secure the virtue, liberty, 
and happiness of society”.177 Macaulay, like Rousseau, drew heavily upon ancient 
examples to support her republican version of government. This was based upon the 
belief that the ancient states such as Athens, Rome and Sparta were superior to any 
‘modern’ state. The ancient and modern dispute was a series of intellectual debates 
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within a variety of fields including literature, philosophy, intellectual history, science 
etc. Macaulay in particular drew heavily upon the example of the Roman Republic. 
This was most evidenced in the form of republican government she envisaged for 
Corsica. She believed that two orders in state were necessary; namely the senate and 
the people. Macaulay firmly believed in a well-constituted senate, who were to be the 
wise “guardians” of public liberty, and were not to accede fifty men.178 The second 
order of state were the “representatives of the people”, who should not be under two 
hundred and fifty men. These were to be elected from the several districts and cities, 
into “which this island may be divided”.179 The senate would meet thrice a week, and 
the representatives of the people would meet at stated times, or when the necessity of 
office requires.180 The affairs of commerce, and all matters relative to the state and 
executive powers of government, were to be “determined by the representative body”, 
after they were first debated in the senate.181 Despite using romanized language to 
describe the different parts of government, it was clear here that Macaulay was 
following the example of the Houses of Parliament. The senate was like the House of 
Lords, who kept the representatives of the people/House of Commons in check. The 
representative assembly did not have the power of determining peace and war, 
imposing taxes and the making and altering of laws, until “these subjects have been 
first debated by the senate”.182 
Despite Macaulay’s claim of drafting a democratic from of government, she was in 
reality promoting the British constitutional system. The senate were to be filled by the 
‘wisest’: generals, admirals, civil magistrate and officers of every important post.183 
The checks and balances of the British system were clearly recreated within the system
Macaulay decreed for Corsica. However, the representative assembly as described by 
Macaulay was open to all men. This was the most democratic element of Macaulay’s 
prescribed government for Corsica, albeit in an oligarchical system. There were very 
few writers who adhered to a democratic system in its entirety. Whilst writers such as 
Rousseau and Macaulay adopted democratic elements within their proposed 
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governmental systems, they never advocated a democratic state of the style of ancient 
Athens. Rousseau himself was against democracy. This was most evident in his 
Considerations on the government of Poland, when he was describing the composition 
of his proposed senate for Poland. Rousseau argued for a limit to the amount of 
deputies within the senate, as too many “might make too much commotion in the state 
and approach too near a democratic tumult”.184 Rather, Rousseau favoured the 
proportion of senators to be decreased, in order to avoid this outcome. Rousseau 
preferred an oligarchic state, with democratic elements included within the system. A 
pure democracy was always out of the question, for both Rousseau and Macaulay; it 
only produced anarchy. 
Macaulay used the Roman Republic as an example of a defective form of Republican 
government, much in the same way Rousseau had used Switzerland. Macaulay argued 
that balance was a key tenet for her proposed Corsican constitution. Two important 
articles were needed in order to prevent the slide into ‘corruption’; namely the rotation 
of all offices and the fixing of the division of lands on a proper balance.185 Here 
Macaulay adhered firmly to the model provided by the Roman Republic. She argued 
that the Roman Republic “might perhaps have stood to this day” if there had been a 
rotation of offices, and a balance in the agrarian structure.186 The prolongation of 
commands of Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar were unnatural, which led to the 
concentration of too much power in the hands of one man. To prevent such 
concentration of power, rotation of office was crucial. The whole senate would change 
once in three years; a third of the chamber would be changed yearly. The vacant posts 
would be supplied from the body of representatives, and they in turn supplied from the 
people. No member of the senate or representative body would be capable of re-
election under the space of three years.187 This for Macaulay would prevent the rise of 
a Caesar like figure. Macaulay included an article allowing for a dictator in ‘extreme 
circumstances’; their term of office however was limited to one month.188 
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Macaulay believed that the imbalance in land ownership was the biggest single cause 
of the fall of the Roman Republic: an agrarian structure fixed on a proper balance 
would have “prevented that extreme disproportion in the circumstances of her 
citizens”.189 This gave the weight of power to the aristocratic party, which in turn led to
civil war and anarchy. Anarchy in turn “produced its natural effect, viz. Absolute 
monarchy” of the emperors.190 To solve this issue, the balance of land must favour the 
popular side. The landed and personal effects of every man would be equally divided 
at his decease, between his male heirs.191 Interestingly Macaulay excluded female heir-
ship, in order to prevent an aristocratic accumulation of property.192 Despite being a 
woman, Macaulay advocated for Corsica a male dominated republic. Only men had the
right to vote and stand for office. Here however Macaulay simply followed the model 
of the Roman Republic; women representation was simply unrealistic during the mid-
eighteenth century.
Macaulay’s republican government was heavily based upon the ancient Roman model. 
It was to be primarily an agricultural society, with each citizen a land owner, much like
Rousseau’s proposed model. This model seemed to be based upon the arguments 
raised by the physiocrats, and their attempts to reform France during the 1760s and 
1770s. However, Rousseau himself was known for his criticism of the physiocrat 
system, and in particular, his rejection of “the idealism of the physiocratic system with 
its reliance on the goodwill of a ‘despot’ to restore the natural order of societies.”193 
More importantly for both Macaulay and Rousseau, was that they viewed the 
Corsicans as ancient Roman citizens, who could emulate the ‘great’ achievements of 
the Roman Republic. Rousseau himself was not against commerce in general. 
Rousseau “subscribed, in the cases of Poland, Corsica and Switzerland, to the idea of 
closed commercial state”.194 In the case of Corsica, he advocated an agricultural society
based upon the islands own circumstances and parameters. Macaulay hardly mentioned
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commerce within her Short sketch, instead focusing upon a predominately agricultural 
society for Corsica. 
Macaulay herself noted that her A Short sketch was but “the rough sketch of that only 
form of government which is capable of preserving dominion and freedom to the 
people”.195 She planned further correspondence with Paoli, and would next treat the 
subjects of the militia, police and the education of youth.196 Ultimately, Macaulay 
argued for the necessity of an unrestricted power lodged in some person, capable of the
arduous task of settling such a government. She believed Paoli to be the most capable 
candidate of this “high employment” as the legislator of the new Corsican Republic.197 
Macaulay believed that Paoli had the opportunity of “immortalising” his name, and 
may be ranked “among the foremost of mortals, with Timoleon, Lycurgus, Solon and 
Brutus”.198 Ironically, Macaulay’s praise of Paoli’s status seemed to contradict her 
warnings against an all powerful individual within a republic. Paoli’s role however was
to legislate the new constitution, and then to stand down, once the new government had
been formed. Macaulay later thanked Boswell for transmitting to her “agreeable 
intelligence” that her A Short sketch “has met the approbation of the Corsican chief 
Paoli”.199 Boswell had sent Macaulay’s A Short sketch in a package to Paoli in early 
1768. Macaulay thanked Boswell, as she had no idea the pamphlet “would ever come 
to the hands of that illustrious modern worthy”.200 Macaulay made it clear to Boswell 
that the work was incomplete, in part due to “the laborious fatiguing work which I am 
now upon”; the eight volume History of England. What Paoli made of Macaulay’s A 
Short sketch remains unknown. Paoli had already legislated his own form of 
government for Corsica, as illustrated in the next section. Whether Paoli would have 
used some of Macaulay’s ideas will never be known, especially following the French 
invasion of Corsica in June 1768. Both Rousseau and Macaulay were heavily 
influenced by the ancient connotations of republicanism, when describing Corsica.  
Both advocated a primarily agricultural society for the relatively undeveloped island. 
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Rousseau and Macaulay represented the third stage of British interest, where they 
described the Corsicans as modern Romans, worthy of admiration.  
James Boswell and his  Account of Corsica  (1768)
Rousseau’s praise of Corsica was the reason for James Boswell’s visit to the island. 
Boswell was in the midst of completing his tour of Europe. This was something many 
young British gentlemen usually did during the eighteenth-century. What made 
Boswell so different was his visit to the relatively unknown isle of Corsica in 1765. He
was the first British man to visit and stay on the island for a long period (almost a 
month). More importantly, he wrote his Account of Corsica some three years after 
returning to England. Katherine Turner believes that Boswell’s Account of Corsica put 
the island “firmly on the map for British readers”.201 Turner notes that the account was 
“widely and enthusiastically reviewed in its appearance”.202 It went through some three
editions and four translations before 1800. The Account of Corsica was certainly the 
most important publication on the island of Corsica in Britain, during the eighteenth-
century. For many British readers, it was the only book of authority on Corsica: its 
importance cannot be underestimated. What is certain was that Boswell’s visit to 
Corsica gave him a cause to fight for, as well as a literary reputation. Boswell’s 
Account of Corsica represented a change from the previous works of both Rousseau 
and Macaulay. Rousseau and Macaulay suggested a republican form of government for
Corsica, independent from outside influence. They recommended an economy based 
entirely upon agricultural produce. Boswell in contrast focused far more upon the 
commercial potential of Corsica. He was the first to argue that Britain should seek an 
alliance with Corsica, in order to aid their commercial development.
Boswell’s Account of Corsica was divided into two main sections; the first part was a 
natural and political history of the island. The second part was the Journal of his tour 
and meeting with Paoli. I will now focus on the first section of Boswell’s book. In the 
preface Boswell explained that he derived some of his materials from two French 
books on Corsica. He also gained much material from Mr Burnaby’s tour to Corsica in 
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1766. Burnaby allowed for his own tour of Corsica to be “freely interwoven” into 
Boswell’s account.203 These sources were added to help complete the history section of
Boswell’s book. Boswell concluded his preface by noting that the book was “my little 
monument to liberty”.204 The question however remained; what entailed liberty? 
‘Liberty’ meant for Boswell “health of the mind”, and enabled a “full exercise of our 
faculties”.205 Boswell believed that liberty was ‘natural’ and ‘dear’ to mankind; it was 
“indispensably necessary to our happiness”.206 Here Boswell recited the general British
interest in the cause of ‘liberty’. The world was ‘roused’ by the mention of liberty, and 
the “gallant achievements of those who have distinguished themselves in the glorious 
cause”.207 
Boswell recalled that Rome and Athens were both bastions of liberty, forever known. 
In more ‘modern’ times, the spirit of liberty was found with the Swiss and Dutch; 
proof of this could also be “found in the annals of our own country”.208 Boswell argued
that this spirit of liberty was shared among these countries, including Britain. A more 
distinguished example of liberty “exists in the island of Corsica”.209 Boswell expanded 
the importance of Corsica to worldly proportions; a sentiment typical throughout his 
Account of Corsica. More importantly, Boswell attempted to provide an unbreakable 
link between Britain and Corsica; the ‘undefeatable’ cause of liberty. Boswell alluded 
to the struggles suffered previously by both the Dutch and Swiss; both states were 
“assisted by powerful nations in the recovery of their liberties”.210 In the Dutch case, 
England was one of those ‘powerful nations’ who had assisted them in their war 
against the Spanish. Boswell clearly hinted that England should again help a nation 
fighting for its liberty. Boswell also used this comparison for another reason; although 
Corsica in her struggle for liberty had been “single and unsupported”, she had 
“weathered the storm”.211 This made her account more ‘favourable’ and remarkable, 
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which would surely “interest the generous in its favour”.212 Those ‘generous’ Boswell 
spoke of were the British people. The main question that needs to be asked is what 
kind of intervention did Boswell wish from Britain? Did he envisage an alliance with 
Corsica, or for the island to become a British territory?
The first chapter of Boswell’s account focused on the natural history of Corsica. Many 
previous works had emphasised the natural strengths of Corsica. Boswell’s aim was to 
argue that Corsica’s natural strength made her a viable ‘base’ for Britain in the 
Mediterranean. For example, he noted that the harbour at Porto Vecchio was a 
‘spacious harbour’ some five miles long, “capable of containing a very large fleet”.213  
The account of the harbours of Corsica showcased how advantageous “an alliance with
this island might be to any of the maritime powers of Europe”; or more specifically 
Britain.214 Here Boswell clearly favoured an alliance with Paoli’s Corsican republic. 
The British navy would be able to use Corsican ports to harbour their fleets. This was 
important considering that parts of Corsica “might be formidable to France” being 
located close to the coast of Provence.215 Boswell was identifying for Britain the 
strategic importance of Corsica; something which the French ministry knew well. 
Inland Corsica was largely ‘uninhabited’, being covered mostly by woods. The 
majority lived in small villages, similar to certain cantons in Switzerland and some 
parts of ancient Germany.216 Boswell was always attempting to provide parallels 
between Corsica and other historical nations famed for their liberty. More specifically, 
Boswell usually recalled ancient examples in an attempt to glorify Corsica. He drew a 
“comparison between Corte and Lacedaemon”; both were capital cities built upon 
acropolises.217 Boswell’s comparison of Corsica to Sparta was clearly influenced by 
Rousseau, whom he admired. The general description of Corsica showed that it was a 
“country of considerable importance”.218 Boswell alluded to the fact that Homer’s 
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description of Ithaca “may be well applied to Corsica”.219 By recalling Homer, Boswell
attempted to portray Corsica in heroic proportions.    
Boswell followed this chapter by reciting the revolution’s Corsica had undergone 
throughout their history. Boswell attempted to portray the history of Corsica since the 
time of Roman rule, as one where “that spirit of liberty, which tyrants call rebellion, 
was ever breaking forth”.220 Corsica’s history was marred by occupation; liberty would 
eventually emerge with the introduction of Paoli’s republic. Boswell agreed with many
eighteenth-century commentators that the Genoese “were the worst nation to whom 
Corsica could have fallen”.221 Their mighty misrule of the island had already been 
recorded by numerous other contemporary writers. Boswell wrote that the Corsicans 
could not be governed “but by a state, of which they stood somewhat in awe, and 
which, by humanity and proper encouragement, might have conciliated their 
affections”.222 The state which Boswell spoke of can be construed to be Britain, who, 
through her shared ideas of liberty would be able to guide Corsica to reach her 
‘potential’. 
Did Boswell believe that only British rule of the island would enable the Corsicans to 
‘advance’ from their ‘violent’ savage stage? Boswell mentioned that in 1746, two 
Corsican envoys approached the Earl of Bristol, who was the ambassador to the court 
of Turin. The Corsicans proposed that “Corsica should put herself entirely under the 
protection of Great Britain”.223 The Earl replied that it was not “then the time to enter 
into any treaty with them”.224 By mentioning this incident, Boswell attempted to show 
that the prospect of British protection over Corsica had been previously raised. 
Boswell had planted the seed of thought entertaining this prospect. British protection 
of the island was the future which most appealed to Boswell; Corsican freedom would 
be maintained, and British influence could be properly established.
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Boswell’s description of the history of Corsica built up to one crucial moment: the 
arrival of Pasquale Paoli. In the preface of his Account of Corsica, Boswell described 
that publicly bestowing praise on a character makes the person appear to be “a cringing
parasite, or a fond enthusiast”.225 Boswell however had no apprehensions when 
inscribing his book to Paoli; his virtues were “universally acknowledged”.226 Boswell’s
Account of Corsica in general was more of an ode to Paoli than a history of Corsica. 
Paoli’s arrival on Corsica was the turning point in the Corsican’s battle for liberty. The 
historical section of Boswell’s Account of Corsica recorded Paoli’s activities as a 
statesman. The Journal would provide a more personal portrait of the man. 
Paoli, when he came to the island on 15 July 1755 found only “disorder and 
confusion”. Unlike previous chiefs, Paoli attended to the administration of the island in
order to implement the principals of democratic rule.227 One of his first acts was his 
attempt to abolish the practice of the Vendetta. The right of private revenge was 
something which had plagued the Corsicans; the Genoese actively encouraged it in 
order to enhance their own rule. Paoli was able to gradually bring “strict exercise of 
criminal justice” in order to abolish the practice.228 Boswell argued that “the Corsicans 
are naturally humane”; however like other southern nations, they were “extremely 
violent in their tempers”.229 This was caused by the effects of a warm climate; or so 
was believed by many eighteenth-century writers. The main picture Boswell attempted 
to present was that Paoli had ‘civilised’ the Corsicans. He prepared the Corsicans “for 
the reception of laws” by cultivating their minds.230 This was implemented by the 
university he founded at Corte in 1764, and the institution of proper schools in every 
village of the Republic. Paoli was presented by Boswell not only as a war leader, but as
an enlightened hero. Boswell argued that Paoli laid the foundations for a future victory 
over the Genoese, by providing “stability to the civil constitution of his country”.231 
The last chapter of Boswell’s history of Corsica focused on Paoli’s administration of 
the island. Paoli’s republic was the ‘result’ of “these (aforementioned) exertions in the 
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cause of liberty”; her history had been developing for this moment.232 When describing
the government of Corsica, Boswell made constant comparisons to Holland; a more 
well known Republic to English readers. This enabled Boswell to more easily explain 
certain parts of the Corsican constitution. For example, Paoli held the office of General
for life, which for Boswell held a similar role to the Stadtholder of Holland. Boswell 
commented that the Corsican government was looked upon “as the best model that 
hath ever existed in the democratical form”.233 Sparta in contrast had had a “nervous 
constitution” that was “deficient in gentleness and humanity”.234 Boswell recalled the 
general interest (and his own) in Sparta brought about by Rousseau. Boswell argued 
that the militia were “the true strength of a free nation”; the Corsicans had both Spartan
martial glory and a ‘humane’ democratic government.235 Boswell attempted to portray 
Corsica in a far more sympathetic light to his British readers than that of Sparta.
Boswell also argued that Corsica was “certainly designed by nature to be strong at sea, 
having so many good harbours, and so much excellent timber”.236 They were however 
not yet skilled in ship building, nor had enough money to employ proper artificers. 
Boswell expected to see “the Corsicans distinguished... as a commercial nation”.237 
Trade always flourished in the most republican nations; Boswell referenced De Witt’s 
Interest of Holland (1662) to support his argument. By portraying Corsica as a 
potential commercial hub, Boswell attempted to raise British government interest in 
the island. By identifying Corsica’s potential importance as a naval base, Boswell 
could prompt British intervention on the island in the rebels favour. Here, Boswell 
alluded to the original British interest in Corsica; its strategic importance. The British 
could be relied upon to act if there was a reasonable profit involved. Such was the 
commercial nature of the British Empire during the eighteenth-century.
Boswell’s attempts to persuade Britain to intervene in Corsica were at their most 
unabashed in his concluding notes on the history of Corsica. Here he revealed the true 
purpose of his account:
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“Nothing has cast a greater damp upon the improvements of Corsica, than the king of
Great Britain’s proclamation after the late peace, forbidding his subjects to have any
intercourse with that nation”.238
Thus, Britain’s non-involvement with Corsica had hindered the very development of a 
democratic nation. Boswell noted that he could not “take upon to say” the reasons for 
this proclamation; they were behind the veil of government secrets.239 This seemed to 
be the crucial problem for Boswell when promoting the cause of Corsica. The majority
of people could be persuaded, yet the government could not; its intentions were always
a mystery to the public. Boswell asserted that “a good correspondence with Corsica 
would be of no small advantage to the commercial interest of this country” especially 
on account of the fish trade and British woollen manufactures.240 If not for the 
proclamation, Boswell argued that during the last war (Seven Years War), the 
Corsicans could “have had several of our stoutest privateers in their service” which 
would have given the Corsicans authority at sea.241 Such aid was ‘worthy’ of a people 
“who have done much to secure to themselves the same blessings” of government and 
liberty found in Britain.242  
The shared spirit of liberty between Britain and Corsica was supported by a reference 
from an Encycopedie section. The Essai de crit, sur le Prince de Machiavel (first 
written by a young Frederick the Great in 1739), claimed that the “Corsicans are a 
handful of men, as brave and determinate as the English”.243 I was able to find and 
confirm Boswell’s reference in Frederick’s work Essai de crit, sur le Prince de 
Machiavel, which was published anonymously and released by his friend, the famous 
Voltaire (1694-1778). Boswell believed that the Corsicans had similar manners to the 
ancient Germans, as described by Tacitus (56-120) in his On the mores of the Germans
(also translated as On the origins and geography of Germany). Tacitus described that 
the “whole community” of ancient Germans would gather to discuss the main affairs of
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state, after first being considered in advance by the chiefs.244 Montesquieu in his Spirit 
of the laws (1748) expressed that “the English have taken their idea of government 
from the Germans”; the House of Lords was like the council of Germanic chiefs, first 
considering the issues subsequently debated in the House of Commons.245  
Ultimately, the overarching similarity between these examples was liberty. Boswell 
commented that the Corsicans, “as lovers of liberty, must naturally have a respect for 
the British, as indeed is the case”.246 He hoped that “other views will prevail in the 
councils of this nation”.247 Boswell was directly challenging the British stance on 
Corsica, and prompted his readers to do so too. Britain’s sovereign was, after all, 
“animated with genuine sentiments of liberty”, and thus possessed of every virtue to 
make his own people happy.248 Surely the king “would naturally wish to extend his 
beneficence” to the Corsicans.249 Britain should offer protection to other peoples 
fighting for their liberty. The Corsicans were “gloriously striving for the best rights of 
humanity”.250 Boswell directly questioned his readers as to whether they could “be 
indifferent as to their success”.251 For Boswell, the answer was an unmitigated no. 
Journal of a tour to that island and memoirs of Pascal Paoli
Boswell’s history of the island was similar to the other publications previously cited, 
merely providing a more up to date version for British readers. The second section of 
Boswell’s book was far more unique. His Journal of a tour to that island provided an 
in-depth and personal description of affairs in Corsica. Boswell described that he “had 
full leisure and the best opportunities to observe everything, in my progress through 
the island”.252 His journal was one of the best sources to record the normal lives of the 
Corsicans during the rule of Paoli. Boswell wrote of his astonishment at “how little the 
real state of Corsica was known, even by those who had good access to know it”.253 An
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officer of the British navy, who had visited the island, said to Boswell that travelling 
across the island ran the risk of “going among these barbarians”.254 This was the view 
point Boswell attempted to rectify. 
Boswell’s journal described the Corsicans at a far more personal level, somewhat 
approachable and familiar for many British readers. Boswell recorded that the bee-
keepers of the island “seemed much at their ease, living in peace and plenty”.255 The 
Corsicans were normal people with simple professions or roles. Boswell stressed the 
simplicity of Corsican lives, describing the people as having “nothing, and yet 
possessing all things”.256 These were a people comparable to the ancient Spartans or 
Romans. Boswell recalled that some Corsicans complained to him of their poverty; he 
replied that “they were much happier in their present state than in a state of refinement 
and vice”.257 Boswell was heavily influenced in this sentiment by Rousseau. Boswell 
was presenting a moral message to his British readers; beware the vices of luxury.
The most crucial section of Boswell’s Journal was his meeting with Paoli. The Journal 
was the crux of Boswell’s entire account, with the character of Paoli at its centre. 
Boswell later used this biographical style of writing in his Life of Samuel Johnson 
(1791). Boswell’s history of the island chronicled the background to the events 
recorded in his Journal. Upon first meeting Paoli, Boswell described that he had “come
from seeing the ruins of one brave and free people; I now see the rise of another”.258 
The ‘brave’ and ‘free’ people Boswell spoke of were the ancient inhabitants of Rome, 
which he had visited before coming to Corsica. The idea that the Corsicans could 
potentially become a new Rome was constantly stressed by Boswell. Paoli however 
stated that the Corsicans had no chance of replicating Rome; “their situation, and 
modern political systems, rendered this impossible”.259 The character of Paoli served as
the foil and guide to a younger naïve Boswell; similar to the role played by Mentor to 
Telemachus in Fenelon’s The Adventures of Telemachus, son of Ulysses (1699). This 
image only served to enhance Paoli’s inspirational character. 
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Ultimately, Boswell attempted to depict Paoli as a Roman hero- a Corsican 
Cincinnatus. Paoli was “wedded to his country, and the Corsicans are his children”.260 
This patriotic conviction was typical of a stoic Roman or Spartan. This patriotic zeal 
was also promoted by Rousseau, and was highlighted in his later work Considerations 
on the government of Poland (1772). Boswell believed that Paoli “lives in the times of 
antiquity”.261 Paoli as a young man “would form his mind to glory” not by reading 
“modern memoirs…but Plutarch and Titus Livius”.262 What purpose was served by 
describing Paoli as an ancient hero? Many British readers were most probably aware of
the classical texts, which remained a staple part of eighteenth-century education. 
Readers could identify with these ancient figures, and therefore with Paoli. Perhaps the
most intriguing description of Paoli is that of his dreams or future visions. Boswell 
mentioned that this was a mysterious circumstance in Paoli’s character, which was 
universally believed in Corsica. Boswell responded by arguing that Paoli had 
propagated this opinion “in order that he might have more authority in civilizing a rude
and ferocious people”.263 Whether this was truly the case remained questionable. 
However, this rather ‘strange’ aspect of Paoli’s character had to be explained in some 
way. This section showed that Boswell had included all of his notes and recordings 
from his Journal, as this segment in fact hindered Boswell’s portrayal of Paoli as a 
noble and enlightened hero. Boswell decided to include all aspects of Paoli’s character.
 
Boswell in his Journal also noted his discussions with Paoli on Britain. Boswell 
claimed that he “did everything in my power to make them [the Corsicans] fond of the 
British, and bid them hope for an alliance with us”.264 Paoli spoke ‘highly’ “on 
preserving the independency of Corsica”, and would “not submit ourselves to the 
dominion of the greatest nation in Europe”: Britain.265 This sentiment seems to indicate
that Boswell believed in an alliance with Corsica, rather than dominion. Boswell 
recorded that Paoli “seemed hurt by our treatment of his country”.266 Boswell recalled 
the proclamation which prevented British aid to the Corsicans, denouncing them as 
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rebels. Boswell illustrated the Corsicans as the victims of harsh treatment from the 
British government. More specifically, Boswell attempted to make his readers question
how the British government could treat a ‘hero’ such as Paoli so unfairly. Boswell 
wrote that Paoli “showed his great respect for the British nation, and I could see he 
wished much to be in friendship with us”.267 Despite Britain’s indifferent relations with
the Corsicans, Paoli still wished for an alliance. Boswell concluded that Paoli was “one
of those men who are no longer to be found but in the lives of Plutarch”; he was an 
ancient hero, in an eighteenth-century world.268
 Conclusion: Rousseau and Boswell the intellectual basis for ideas on Corsica?
The development of British opinion on Corsica from 1728 to 1768 can be divided into 
four distinct phases. The first phase was interest primarily in profit; the selling of arms 
and supplies to the island. This was typified by the support provided to Theodore Von 
Neuhoff. Corsica was rich in natural resources that could be exploited. Corsica also 
had many natural harbours suitable for large ships. The strategic importance of Corsica
was a theme which never truly disappeared. Boswell on several occasions in his 
Account of Corsica (1768) identified for British readers the great commercial 
advantages that could be gained from an alliance with Corsica. Britain could always be
relied on to attempt to gain any commercial profit. The second phase saw the 
illustration of the Corsicans as a people devoted to liberty, which was an attempt to 
gain British self-understanding. The two anonymous publications A General account 
of Corsica (1739) and The history of Theodore I (1743) best represented this phase.
 
Rousseau’s Constitution project for Corsica and Macaulay’s Short sketch represented 
the third phase of British interest in Corsica. Both attempted to draft a Republican 
Constitution for a potentially independent Corsica. The Corsicans were portrayed as 
ancient Roman/Spartan citizens who were defending their liberty. These citizens would
work the land and would fight in times of crisis. The Corsicans were ancient heroes, 
somewhat out of place in the modern world. Rousseau’s depiction of the Corsicans as 
ancient Roman citizen soldiers provided a lasting image for many Britons. Throughout 
the eighteenth century in Britain, Corsica was continually portrayed as a modern 
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Rome. Commerce was the one area where Boswell diverged from his idol Rousseau. 
Boswell’s Account of Corsica was designed for a British audience. Britain was the 
most powerful commercial nation in the world. Boswell himself, in contrast to 
Rousseau, was a firm believer in the strength of trade and commerce. This line of 
argument developed into a fourth and final phase, in which British intervention on the 
island was advocated, in order to defend liberty. Boswell was the main campaigner for 
this approach. The idea of British intervention raised a number of key issues. Should 
Britain adopt a foreign policy supporting liberty around the globe? Boswell was a firm 
believer in this policy; he advocated a military alliance with Corsica, in order to defeat 
the tyrannical Genoese, and later the French. The intrinsic link between British and 
Corsican liberties created far stronger bonds between nations. Boswell wanted Britain 
to become the protector of small states threatened by foreign invasion. This had been 
done previously with both Holland and Switzerland.  
The Corsican Revolt raised questions over the nature of foreign policy that Britain 
should adopt. These debates would be brought into public focus with the French 
invasion of Corsica in 1768. There was a huge public outcry following the invasion, 
which has since been dubbed as the ‘Corsican crisis’. What position would the British 
government take? To the disappointment of Boswell and the majority of public 
opinion, the government did next to nothing to stop the invasion. However, the ideal 
that Britain was the protector of small states influenced public opinion far more than 
first anticipated. Failure to intervene led to the fall of the Duke of Grafton’s ministry in
1770. Debates over the nature of Britain’s foreign policy would continue into the late 
eighteenth-century. With the growth of the British Empire, there were was a crisis of 
identification. What type of Empire should Britain become? One which defends the 
liberty of small states, or an Empire devoted entirely to commerce and commodities?
Perhaps most importantly Rousseau (Macaulay less so) and Boswell provided the 
intellectual basis for British opinion on Corsica throughout the eighteenth century. 
Their writings would be constantly referenced by many subsequent British writers on 
Corsica. They created an idea of what Corsica was, and more importantly, the strengths
the island could provide for Britain. The main problem was the fact that both Rousseau
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and Boswell described an idealized version of Corsica. Boswell in particular painted 
the image of the Corsicans as freedom loving heroes, devoted to defending their 
liberties. Paoli was described by many as a modern Homeric hero. These images were, 
however, were contrary to reality. David Abulafia’s book The Great sea: A Human 
History of the Mediterranean (2011),describes eighteenth century Corsican society as 
inward looking, ‘isolated’ and ‘conservative’.269 The British began to ‘imagine’ that 
Corsica “possessed untapped potential as a naval base”.270 This idea was based upon 
Boswell’s Account of Corsica, which remained the main source of information for 
many Britons throughout the eighteenth century. Boswell’s book, however, merely 
provided a romanticised version of Corsica. Abulafia argued that Corsica offered little 
in terms of naval facilities, and far fewer products for trade than any other island in the 
Mediterranean.271 However, the image of Corsica portrayed by Rousseau and Boswell 
would persist throughout the eighteenth century: only the eventual British occupation 
of Corsica in 1794 would dispel this image of the island, as illustrated in the final 
chapter. 
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The Corsican crisis in British politics 1768-1769
In February 1768, James Boswell published his Account of Corsica. Within the 
account, Boswell wrote that during wartime, the Corsicans were as “furious as lions; 
death is esteemed nothing, nor is any power sufficient to make them yield against their 
inclination”.272 Boswell believed that the Corsicans were great warriors incomparable 
to any contemporary nation. Boswell’s Account was very popular upon its release and 
propelled the previously obscure island to fame within Britain and, raised a number of 
issues concerning Britain’s relationship with Corsica. The first chapter examined 
Boswell’s attempts to seek an alliance with Corsica, by interceding with the British 
government. Boswell’s plan however was complicated by the fact that the Corsicans 
were considered ‘rebels’ by their Genoese sovereigns. The focus of the debate changed
with the French invasion of Corsica in May 1768, after Genoa transferred sovereignty 
of the island to France. What action would Britain take concerning the invasion? 
Arguments for and against intervention in Corsica developed over the next two years. 
This chapter will look in depth at these debates during the period 1768-1770. The 
Corsican issue became entangled within the wider political deliberations plaguing the 
weakened Duke of Grafton ministry. To what degree did the Corsican issue become 
used by the opposition to attack the government? The lack of government action over 
Corsica was against the perceived ‘popular’ will. I will explore the extent the Corsican 
crisis caused the collapse of the Grafton ministry in January 1770, or whether it was 
merely one of several issues to afflict the government. More importantly, was the 
failure of Britain to intervene in Corsica the initial chapter for the eventual fall of the 
First British Empire?
This chapter will look in depth at the arguments that were made for and against 
intervention in Corsica, between 1768 and 1769. It will also observe the development 
of the ideas that informed the debates during the Corsican crisis. The first section will 
study the influence Boswell’s Account of Corsica had on the debates which followed, 
particularly with writers advocating intervention in Corsica. The second section will 
present the main arguments promoting intervention into Corsica. This will be done by 
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examining the major published works on Corsica during this period, as well as 
newspaper articles on the issue. The final section will investigate the arguments against
intervention in Corsica, culminating with the government’s position on the issue. Why 
did the British government do nothing to aid the Corsicans despite the public outcry 
against it? I will attempt to answer the question within this chapter. 
The influence of Boswell in developing the argument for intervention in Corsica: 
February 1768- May 1768
Boswell’s Account of Corsica was very popular upon its release. It went through some 
three editions and four translations before 1800. Its effects were even felt in France. 
William Henry Nassau de Zuylestein (1717-1781) the Earl of Rochford and British 
ambassador to France, reported that the Duc of Choiseul (Chief Minister of France 
1758-1770) was aware that Boswell’s Account of Corsica “had made a great noise; that
he ordered it to be translated here (Paris), and that it would soon be published”.273 
Rochford noted that the publication of Boswell’s book in France could be for “no other
intent than to show the French of what importance Corsica is”.274 Boswell’s Account of
Corsica more importantly propelled Corsica to the top of the British news agenda. The 
vast increase in newspaper articles on Corsica from 1768 to 1770 was staggering. On 
average, more articles were written about Corsica in one month in 1768 or 1769 than in
the entire year of 1767. Corsica became one of the main topics of significance during 
these years. An example of Boswell’s influence was seen in the 4 April 1768 edition of
the Gazetteer. The newspaper claimed some letters from Corsica seemed to determine 
that nothing was more ‘eagerly’ desired by the islanders than “the establishment of a 
legal power over them, on the model of the British Constitution”.275 It was hoped that 
this action would give Corsica “more weight and consequence in the eyes of all 
Europe”.276 The Gazetteer promoted Boswell’s idea of pursuing an alliance with 
Corsica. However, the article went further suggesting that the Britain’s constitution 
should be established as Corsica’s constitution. This idea derived from the belief that 
the English constitution, established in 1688-1689, was the most superior in the world. 
The main aim of Boswell’s Account of Corsica was to repeal the proclamation made 
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by the British government in 1763, which forbade any British subjects “to have any 
intercourse with that nation”.277
At the Peace of Paris in 1763, which ended the Seven Years War (1756-1763), a clause
was added preventing any British intervention in favour of the Corsican rebels. This 
was done according to French interest and that of her ally Genoa. The 17 May edition 
of the Gazetteer asked what principle of policy “are we prohibited to have any 
intercourse with them [Corsica]”?278 Trade was meant to be the “great object” of 
Britain.279 The writer of the article referenced Lord Lyttelton’s ‘masterly history’ The 
History of the Life of Henry the Second (1767–1771) to support their argument. George
Lyttelton (1709-1773) was perhaps most famous for his ‘patriot’ politics during the 
1730s, and his opposition to Robert Walpole (1676-1745), the first Prime Minister. 
Lyttelton was also a known supporter of the Corsican cause. In a letter sent to Boswell 
dated 21 February 1768, Lyttelton commented that the government should “have 
shown more respect for Corsican liberty, and [I] think it disgraces our nation”.280 
Lyttelton’s History of Henry the Second was his life’s work, which he engaged with 
intermittently for some thirty years. Lyttelton argued that Henry II (1133-1189) was 
glad to have a trade treaty with the Muslim king of Valencia and Murcia. Henry II’s 
reflection was that a “treaty of commerce, which might open to his people any new 
source of wealth, was equivalent to a conquest”.281 Examples within Britain’s past were
constantly used by English writers to justify any course of action or lack thereof 
regarding Corsica. The writer of this article expanded on Boswell’s argument 
concerning Corsica’s economic importance. However, the writer viewed these 
commercial benefits entirely from a British perspective.
French invasion of Corsica May 1768: Beginning of the Corsican crisis
Before May 1768, the aim for those writing on Corsica had been to promote trade and 
an alliance with the islanders. The nature of debates about Corsica changed when 
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Genoa transferred sovereignty of the island to France on 15 May 1768. French troops 
invaded the island over the following months. The stakes were raised; should Britain 
risk war with France to protect the Corsicans? Debates over Corsica became split 
between those who advocated for and against military intervention. I will now focus on
the writings promoting intervention on Corsica. One of the first major published 
writings on the issue was the anonymously published A Letter to the Right 
Honourable, The Earl of Shelburne (1768). In Boswell’s correspondence, Joseph 
Cawthorne claimed to “have written several pamphlets particularly two or three 
letters”, including the Letter to the Earl of Shelburne.282 Cawthorne claimed to have 
been ‘animated’ by Boswell’s “generous example”, in favour of the “brave but 
neglected and oppressed Corsicans”.283 Cawthorne also claimed to have written an 
essay, signed ‘Cosmopolite’ and published in Boswell’s British Essays in Favour of 
the Brave Corsicans (1769). This, however, contradicted Boswell’s notes, which 
claimed that particular essay was written by his good friend Sir John Dick, consul to 
Leghorn.284 What also should be noted is the reason why Cawthorne wrote to Boswell. 
Cawthorne claimed that he was in a “starving condition”; despite being “personally 
unknown” to Boswell, he implored for some “little pecuniary assistance to relive a 
distressed compatriot”.285 Cawthorne attempted to appeal to Boswell through a shared 
interest and support for the Corsican rebels. We simply cannot trust Cawthorne’s claim
that he was the author of A letter to the Earl of Shelburne. Hence for this particular 
chapter, I shall refer to the author anonymously.
William Petty (1737-1805) the Earl of Shelburne, was Secretary of State for the 
Southern department in the Grafton Ministry. The writer, who styled themselves as 
‘The Author’ stated that ministers were meant to be the ‘guardians’ of the state and 
“ought to be inspired with the passions of the community”.286 This sentiment suggested
that there was a perceived split between the government and the ‘common people’ 
regarding Corsica. The British government appeared to show a disconcerting lack of 
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interest in the Corsican issue. The writer recognised this perception, and intended to 
rectify it, by writing a letter directly to one of the leading ministers of state. Ironically, 
as Shelburne’s later actions would show, he was one of the few ministers of state who 
wanted intervention in Corsica. Perhaps the author wrote directly to Shelburne, simply 
because they believed that the Mediterranean area “belongs to your Lordships 
department in the state”.287
The main issue for the writer was the Mediterranean trade, which required “immediate 
attention”. The author used the Newfoundland trade as an example to illustrate their 
argument. The writer explained that the fisheries at Newfoundland were “inexpressibly
valuable to Great Britain”.288 They estimated that the export of pilchards and red 
herrings brought an annual acquisition of 136,000L to the treasury.289 These two 
branches of fishery depended “almost entirely upon our commerce to the 
Mediterranean seas”.290 Therefore, if Britain lost control of the straits trade to France 
“we should lose that part of our Newfoundland trade too”.291 The writer attempted to 
make Shelburne aware of the far ranging effects the loss of the Mediterranean trade 
could have on Britain’s commerce. Loss of the Newfoundland trade would also affect 
Dartmouth, which “depends entirely upon the Newfoundland fishery”, as would both 
Bristol and London.292 Commerce was an interconnected system; the loss of one area 
of trade would affect another. The Newfoundland trade was “threatened by the 
invasion of Corsica, and the sovereignty of the Mediterranean seas ceded to the 
French”.293 The strategic importance of Corsica required the utmost attention. Control 
of the island could determine who commanded the entire Mediterranean trade. 
The author criticised persons of the higher order and their “sleepy disposition”.294 They
criticised the minsters “dreaming of a general peace, so suitable to their want of 
national virtue”, which made them “thoughtless in activity”.295 This was one of the first
major attacks of the government’s policy regarding Corsica. Their ‘inactivity’ was seen
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as a sign that ministers had no “national pride” and therefore they were the “shame to 
all such Britons”.296 Many Britons believed that weakness of action by any government
regarding foreign policy meant they were unpatriotic. Numerous British writers during 
this period still recalled the impressive victories gained during the recent Seven Years 
War. The author argued that Shelburne was of opposite character to these ministers, 
who could justify to state: “I have an honest fame”.297 This was the main reason why 
the writer addressed their letter to Shelburne.
The Letter to the Earl of Shelburne also contained a far more obvious anti-French bias 
than any previous British writings on Corsica. This was principally due to the French 
invasion of Corsica in May 1768. France was the primary adversary of Britain during 
the eighteenth century. They were different not only through religion, but also their 
varying political systems. Many Britons believed that France’s arbitrary government 
that had to be opposed at all costs. This was in contrast to the boundless advantages 
provided by the British constitution. Both nations had fought a series of wars 
throughout the century, and after the end of the Seven Years War many Britons 
thought it only a matter of time before hostilities resumed. Therefore, any strategic 
advantage that could be gained over the enemy during the peacetime was highly sought
after. Corsica in French possession was a grave threat to British interests. This was 
reflected in the Letter to The Earl of Shelburne, when the writer argued that Corsica in 
French hands added “so much power to our enemy”.298 Any gain by France was 
perceived to be a loss for Britain. The writer recognised that Shelburne was eager “to 
promote the vast designs of this superior trading Kingdom” against the House of 
Bourbon and allies.299 The ‘House of Bourbon’ or the ‘family compact’ referred to both
France and Spain. The author of the Letter to The Earl of Shelburne even went so far 
as to claim that the Spaniards “differ only in name with Frenchmen”.300 English writers
believed that Spain would always follow French foreign policy, so there was no need 
to differentiate between the two nations. The Author saw the cessation of Corsica as a 
“great act of hostility against Great Britain” and any other power concerned about 
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commerce and peace in Europe.301 France was a “monster” of “ignorance and 
insolence, ambition and venality, stupidity and subservience”.302 French involvement in
Corsica made the island a major issue in Britain.
What did the writer of the Letter to The Earl of Shelburne believe should be done 
regarding Corsica? They wished for Shelburne to support the ‘great measure’ for “the 
preservation of Corsica” and to assist “the Corsicans immediately”.303 This would be 
achieved by immediately “revoking the prohibition of commerce with Corsica”.304 The 
writer referred to the prohibition made by the British government in 1763 which 
banned any aid or contact with the Corsican rebels. Revoking the probation would 
enable Britain to supply “the Corsicans with the necessary ammunition and money”.305 
Many individual Britons had already adopted this measure: Subscriptions of money 
and arms were sent by many Britons during 1768 and 1769. Government support 
however would provide a far greater quantity of arms and money. The author then 
suggested that the government send “a squadron of observation” to aid Corsica in the 
Mediterranean rather than a ‘powerful fleet’.306 The writer referred to ‘previous 
embarrassment of ventures’ as the reason for not sending a ‘powerful fleet’ to Corsica. 
What ‘embarrassments’ the author was referring to is difficult to determine. The writer 
stopped short of recommending the landing of British troops on the island to aid the 
Corsicans. They believed the brave islanders were “animated with the noble spirit of 
true patriotism”, and therefore did not need any other support beyond what was 
recommended. 307 Such was their faith in the fighting spirit of the brave Corsican 
patriots. 
Perhaps most interesting was that the author hoped to find in Shelburne support “as 
warm in the cause of Corsica, as others have been in that of Hanover”.308 Hanover was 
in personal union with Britain after George I of Hanover became king of Great Britain 
301 Letter to The Earl of Shelburne, 40.
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in 1714. The writer argued that Hanover “costs much and produces nothing to Great 
Britain” in contrast to the numerous commercial advantages that could be gained with 
Corsica.309 Support of Corsica would enable Shelburne to make his name “as illustrious
in the annals of all European nations as that of the victorious Marlborough”.310 The 
author referred to a time when Britain was the main player in European politics during 
the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1714), led by the victorious general, the Duke of 
Marlborough (1650-1722). The writer wished for Britain to play such a role again.
The author concluded his Letter to The Earl of Shelburne with ominous predictions for 
the future. France, Spain and Austria, with the aid of Tuscany and Naples, would in 
due time “swallow up the little potentates of Italy, and entirely abolish and take 
possession of them”.311 Even the Pope’s ecclesiastical domain was under threat from 
the Bourbon powers. The writer believed that Britain should form a ‘powerful 
confederacy’ with the Pope, King of Sardinia, Duke of Savoy, the Venetians and the 
Corsicans, to counter the Bourbon compact. They seemed to endorse a policy 
promoting the existence of small states, in order to “preserve the peace of Europe 
permanently”.312 Britain had historically supported small states such as Portugal and 
Holland in order to counterbalance the power of her domineering neighbours. What 
was more surprising was that the writer argued for a connection with the Pope. This 
seems to go against the Protestant spirit endorsed by the 1688 Revolution.313 The 
author justified this ‘unusual’ connection by explaining that mutual interest “is the 
strongest tie and the surest bond of national friendship”.314 The author argued that it 
was no more “unnatural or incongruous to be connected politically with the pope” than
with any other power.315 Interest or commerce should dictate British policy with 
foreign powers. However, using the case study of Corsica, I argue that something else 
also dictated British policy from 1760: the promotion of liberty and the British 
constitution across the globe.
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The ‘Corsican crisis’: a tool for the opposition of government?
A letter to The Earl of Shelburne illustrated that there was a perceived separation of 
ideas between the British literate classes and the government. The government’s 
inaction over the French invasion of Corsica irked many writers and supporters of the 
island. Opposition writers began to use Corsica as a way to attack the government. The
Earl of Chatham (or William Pitt the elder) was the actual Prime Minister at this time, 
although due to ill health, the Duke of Grafton was the acting Prime Minister 
(becoming the Prime Minister in November 1768). The Grafton ministry in 1768 was 
not in the best condition, facing a number of other issues besides Corsica. There was 
major unrest in the American colonies, caused primarily by an increase in taxation 
following the Seven Years War. This was directly linked to another major problem 
faced by the government: the growth of the national debt. Britain amassed large war 
debts following the Seven Years War and the British government had attempted to pay 
them off by directly taxing the American colonies for the first time. 
Many writers during the eighteenth century expressed fears over the growth of 
Britain’s debts, particularly during the 1770s with the outbreak of the American 
Revolutionary War.316 There was a general belief that Britain’s debts were a sign of 
weakness, foreshadowing greater disaster in the future. The other major issue at the 
time was the divisive John Wilkes, a libertine and self-proclaimed champion of “the 
middling and inferior class of people, who stand in most need of protection”.317 Wilkes 
was imprisoned at Kings Bench Prison in May 1768, for a seditious libel made against 
the content of the King’s Speech which had endorsed the Peace of Paris treaty in 1763.
Wilkes had originally fled to Paris, only to return in 1768 to stand for parliament. 
Despite his election as member for Middlesex, he was still imprisoned and 
subsequently expelled from Parliament. Wilkes, in a letter to his Middlesex supporters,
claimed that he would petition parliament in the hope of a “redress of all my 
grievances, which have arisen from various acts of arbitrary power exerted by the 
316 See Richard Price’s “Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution”, and Anne-
Robert Turgot’s “Letter from M. Turgot” in Richard Price and the Ethical Foundations of the American
Revolution, for best illustration of the arguments against Britain’s debt during the American 
Revolutionary War.
317 Annual Register or a view of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1763, 6th ed. (London: 
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ministers”.318 For a nation that prided itself on liberty, the greatest fear was that the 
government could become the antithesis to what Britain was supposed to stand for. The
treatment of Wilkes encapsulated those fears. 
The major opposition newspapers used the Corsican issue on many occasions to 
illustrate the weakness of the government in matters of foreign policy. News about 
Corsica appeared within the foreign sections of the newspapers, usually under the 
heading ‘London’. This generally meant the source of the item rather than its actual 
subject. News on foreign items was frequently gathered from the post imported from 
both France and Holland into London. Jeremy Black’s book The English Press in the 
Eighteenth Century (1987) deals specifically with foreign policy news that appeared in 
British newspapers. Black notes that British newspapers “clearly regarded reports 
about foreign affairs as of the greatest importance”.319 Most newspapers attempted to 
provide the best possible ‘foreign advices’, yet the question remains: to what degree 
can we trust the content of eighteenth century British newspapers? They often 
contained contradictory reports and were sometimes subject to error. Editors accepted 
that the necessity of printing items as they arrived could lead to mistake, and would 
sometimes note their scepticism about certain items in circulation, but would leave it to
the reader to judge an article’s authenticity. For this particular chapter, the newspapers 
are a medium for gauging the public discussion of Corsica during this period. Black 
noted the importance of foreign news “in the politically sensitive debates over foreign 
policy that occupied most of the country”.320 There was a partisan nature to most of the 
political press, as newspapers would provide favourable reports according to their own 
political values. This will be illustrated with the case of Corsica.
The Westminster Journal was one of the main opposition papers in 1768. Its 11 June 
edition claimed that the ‘brave Corsicans’ had offered to submit to the British 
government: “Thane (however) refused their submission, calling those glorious sons of
liberty, a rebellious and factious people”.321 ‘Thane’ referred to the old name for a 
318 Annual Register or a view of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1768, 5th ed. (London: 
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nobleman in Anglo-Saxon England. If the government were willing to abandon the 
Corsicans, it proved that “Thane will sacrifice every virtue to the idol of arbitrary 
power”.322 This sentiment highlighted the perceived corruption within the political 
system, exemplified by the treatment of John Wilkes. The 25 June edition of the 
Westminster Journal bemoaned the lack of British action regarding the French 
invasion of Corsica. The paper argued that England “busies herself so much in affairs 
of no moment, that she has not time to spare to consult the benefit of nations”.323 
Britain’s internal problems were distracting the nation from its main purpose: the 
protection of allied small states abroad. The 1 October edition of the Westminster 
Journal compiled a number of letters from Leghorn. ‘Leghorn’ referred to Livorno, the
nearest port to Corsica in mainland Italy (see appendix 1). These letters indicated that 
the French possess “very great advantages over the Corsicans”.324 Despite France’s 
considerable military advantage, the newspaper nonetheless hoped “for the 
encouragement of liberty and bravery, and the discouragement of tyranny and 
oppression in all parts of the world”.325 The article believed that Britain should lead the
promotion of liberty across the globe. Corsica was used as an example where the 
British government had not lived up to this ambition. More specifically, it had failed 
aid a fellow brother nation of liberty. This gave the impression to many opposition 
newspapers that the British government secretly supported arbitrary government.
The most famous opposition items to appear during the period 1768-1770 were the 
Junius letters. The Junius letters were published in the Public Advertiser from January 
1769 to September 1771. Each letter was usually signed with the name Junius, the 
middle name of Lucius Junius Brutus, who overthrew the Roman Kings of antiquity. 
There has been considerable speculation as to the Junius’ identity. The most widely 
accepted culprit is Sir Philip Francis (1740-1818), a Whig politician and a clerk of the 
War Office from 1762 until 1772. For this chapter however, the identity of the author 
is not our concern. The impact of the Junius letters was certainly widely felt, and many
newspapers and writers referenced them. The Junius letters epitomized the general 
grievances against the government during this period. In the first letter, Junius argued 
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that “while the national honour is firmly maintained abroad, and while justice is 
impartially administered at home, the obedience of the subject will be voluntary, 
cheerful, and, I might almost say, unlimited”.326 The problems facing the government 
boiled down to two fundamental issues: the failure of foreign policy concerning both 
America and Corsica, and the perceived corruption of the political system (epitomized 
by Wilkes). Loyalty for an Englishman meant “a rational attachment to the guardian of
the laws”.327 The protection of the Britain’s political system and the maintenance of 
liberty were the most important ideals for law abiding Englishmen.
Where does the Corsican issue feature within the Junius letters? Corsica was 
referenced in Junius’ criticisms of the government on several occasions. However, the 
Corsican issue was usually listed among many other problems plaguing the 
government. In Junius’ third letter to the Public Advertiser on 7 February 1769, Junius 
listed that “the assertions of the colonies have been alienated... Corsica shamefully 
abandoned... commerce languishes” and “public credit is threatened with a new 
debt”.328 Corsica was merely a tool to attack the government’s foreign policy. 
Opposition to the government, and the Duke of Grafton in particular, preoccupied most
of the Junius letters. The twelfth letter of Junius published in the 30 May 1769 edition 
of the Public Advertiser, devoted the most attention to the Corsican issue. Junius, 
addressing Grafton directly in the letter, argued that the French had seen the 
weaknesses in a distracted British ministry, and were therefore justified in “treating 
you with contempt”.329 Junius stated to Grafton that Britain either could suffer the 
French to make an acquisition of Corsica, “the importance of which you probably no 
conception of”,or oppose them by underhand management.330 This referred to the 
discreet support of Corsica through arms and supply, which Junius believed had 
disgraced Britain in the eyes of Europe. The image Britain presented of itself to other 
nations in Europe was important for many Britons. Strong decisive measures would 
increase her prestige, and therefore her diplomatic position. The transition from 
indiscreet assistance to more decisive measures was ‘unavoidable’. Junius concluded 
326 “Junius to the Printer of the Public Advertiser”, Public Advertiser, 21 January 1769, Issue 10681.
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that if the government had acted with more surety, Corsica could have been saved 
“without expense or danger”.331 The actions of the British government in Corsica came 
from a position of weakness rather than strength. Junius epitomized the main 
opposition writers during this period, who used the lack of action over Corsica as a tool
to criticise the government.
James Boswell:  British Essays in Favour of the Brave Corsicans
Boswell was the champion of the Corsican cause in Britain. A visit to Corsica in 1765 
had a profound impact on the young Boswell giving him a cause to fight for and 
sparking his literary career. His second major publication during this period was his 
British Essays in Favour of the Brave Corsicans (1769) where he attempted to 
reinvigorate the Corsican cause in Britain. The illustration on the front page of the 
book encapsulates the point Boswell wanted to make. The image (see Appendix 2) 
shows Britannia holding her shield over the head of Corsica as her protector. The 
words underneath the image highlight the message: Magna Britannia Corsican 
Protegit. Within the preface, Boswell explained that the “wise” in many foreign courts 
had foreseen the fall of Corsica to France and “its consequences, and have wished to 
interfere before it should be too late”.332 However, all the nations of Europe “have 
fixed their attention on Great Britain, as the power most concerned” of the actions of 
her rival and “constant enemy”.333 Boswell’s Essays, in contrast to his Account of 
Corsica, focused far more on the threat posed by France. This is only natural given that
his Account of Corsica was written before the French invasion of Corsica. 
Boswell claimed that France, with the conquest of Corsica, would acquire “command 
of the Mediterranean trade, and [is] preparing, in the most effectual manner, for a 
successful war”.334 An attack on Corsica was almost like an assault on Britain itself; 
Corsica was merely the first step for France to rebuild her strength following the Seven
Years War. These predictions would ultimately prove correct with the French 
intervention in the War of American Independence (1775-1783) only six years later. 
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Corsica was for Boswell an important object “hitherto overlooked by our ministry”.335 
He noted the distractions in the colonies and the “divisions and lawless riots at 
home”.336 The constitution, which gave union and firmness to the whole body of the 
British Empire, had not much “vigour” left. In contrast to those at “the helm of our 
state”, many writers on Corsica had shown that “the spirit of Britons is not yet gone 
from them”.337 Boswell acknowledged the divergence in opinion that had occurred 
between the government and opposition writers on Corsica, and it no longer 
represented their views on the matter. Boswell referenced letters from the city of 
London, written to the Earl of Hillsborough and Earl of Chatham which shared the 
“same laudable zeal for the Corsicans” as himself.338  He also included the previously 
discussed Letter To The Earl of Shelburne as a further example of this ‘zeal’ for the 
Corsican cause. 
Boswell explained that some of the essays gathered were written by himself, some by a
‘highly respectable’ gentleman and a friend involved in politics. Many of those writing
on Corsica, including those I have already covered, remained anonymous. This was 
mainly due to the aforementioned proclamation of 1763, forbidding Britons from any 
contact or aid to the Corsicans. Anonymity remained the only option for many wishing
to write in favour of the Corsican cause. Boswell however remained the obvious 
exception: perhaps his fame and eminence prevented his persecution. Boswell noted 
that a greater part of the essays were written by “persons unknown to me”.339 During 
my research, I managed to find a number of the essays used by Boswell, published in 
certain British newspapers. Boswell accumulated a large collection of essays in order 
to offer a complete a cross-section of the arguments and debates on Corsica. The aim 
of the essays was to vindicate “the people of Great Britain from a charge of inattention 
or pusillanimity, which the people do not deserve”.340 To Boswell, the government did 
not represent the true opinion of the British nation concerning Corsica.
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A glance at the contents page of Boswell’s collection of essays shows a broad range of 
arguments and ideas concerning Corsica. The majority of the essays were written in 
1768 by a wide variety of writers, none of whom gave their actual names. However, 
they usually named themselves after their occupation or where the essay was written. 
This can give us a clue to the background and occupation of the writers involved. For 
example, one writer called themselves ‘An English Merchant’, and another left their 
initials A.A of Parliament-Street, which suggested someone of a political background. 
The essays cover a wide range of arguments promoting intervention in Corsica, 
including: the commercial and trade benefits possessed by the island; the desire to 
prevent France gaining an important strategic advantage over Britain; and the 
aspiration to aid a fellow brother of liberty against tyrannical rule. The first issue has 
already been covered at length in this chapter, so I will focus on the essays covering 
the latter two issues.
I shall begin with the essays arguing that Britain’s primary objective should be to stop 
France from gaining the island of Corsica. I have already briefly discussed the anti-
French sentiment found in A Letter to The Earl of Shelburne. This stemmed from the 
belief that Britain and France were eternal enemies, locked in perpetual warfare. Essay 
III argued that the acquisition of Corsica by the French “would justly alarm 
mankind”.341 Corsica under French rule would “facilitate the universal monarchy which
the house of Bourbon has so long pursued”.342 The language of ‘universal monarchy’ 
would be familiar to Englishmen at the beginning of the eighteenth century, during the 
reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715). Many Englishmen believed that since Louis XIV’s 
reign, France had held designs for the domination of Europe. The acquisition of 
Corsica would make “France mistress of the Mediterranean”.343 Attacks on Toulon by 
Britain usually distracted the French fleet; the acquisition of Corsica meant that this 
was no longer possible. France would then be able to ‘double’ their efforts against 
Germany and Holland. The writer, calling themselves Monitor, compared the French 
conquest of Corsica to the acquisition of Lorraine in 1766. These two acquisitions 
confirmed that France was once again building her strength following the disastrous 
341 Boswell, “Essay III”, British Essays, 11.
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Seven Years War. Monitor estimated that Lorraine would provide France with some 
30,000 extra fighting men and Corsica 40,000.344 The means by which the writer 
calculated these statistics remain unclear. However, the statistical ‘evidence’ served a 
purpose: France with Lorraine and Corsica was undeniably stronger. The fear of the 
French acquiring Corsica was ever linked to the commercial consequences of the 
conquest for Britain.
Opposition to French imperialism overlapped with the other major reason for 
intervention in Corsica: the protection of liberty. Essay VIII compared both French and
British attitudes to Corsica. The writer argued that the nation was ‘alarmed’ at the 
inactivity of the English ministry toward Corsica. Whilst France “patronises tyranny” 
England must “protect liberty”.345 According to the writer, it was “glorious to succour 
the oppressed than oppressors”.346 The writer argued that Britain should pursue a 
foreign policy that entailed the protection of liberty across the world, and warned that 
any delays by the British government would promote “indifference and disregard for 
the cause of liberty, and fear the honour of the nation, which will be generally and 
violently resented by the public”.347 Liberty was intertwined with the ‘honour’ of the 
nation. The writer argued that the public invariably supported the cause of liberty 
around the world. Good policy required the “most diligent and spirited attention to 
satisfy the inclinations of the people”.348 If the “administration suffers liberty to be 
oppressed, both at home and abroad”, the only result would be the “total annihilation 
of all popular respect”.349 The writer acknowledged the growing gulf between the 
public’s ‘inclinations’ and the policy of government. The protection of liberty should 
be the main endeavour for all British foreign policy. 
In Essay II, the author who called themselves ‘An English Merchant’ argued that 
examples in Britain’s history highlighted occasions when the country had assisted 
fellow nations of liberty. Queen Elizabeth’s policy of aiding the United Provinces 
helped “us to support the balance of Europe, and maintain our own liberties from 
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French slavery”.350 French tyranny was the antithesis of British liberty. The aid to 
Holland was an example of where sovereign power could be used “to interfere in 
support of the privileges of their neighbouring people”, according to “the law of nature
and nations”.351 Liberty and its protection were linked to the very laws of nature. This 
particular essay was written in April 1768 before the French invasion and the writer, 
addressing the Genoese, argued that they could not object Britain aiding the Corsicans,
when they themselves had “broke through all their privileges and all the laws of 
humanity”.352 This sentiment implied that Britain could intervene when a sovereign 
power threatened the liberties and privileges of their subject peoples. By what means 
could Britain define when a foreign nation betrayed the privileges and liberties of their 
subjects?
The Corsicans, according to ‘An Englishman’, “are a brave generous people, and like 
Englishmen, struggling for liberty”.353 Boswell had already argued that Corsica’s 
liberty was similar to Britain’s. The writer of Essay X determined that “upon the same 
principle on which this brave nation (Corsica) has acted, was the Revolution (in 1688) 
founded; which freed as from arbitrary power and superstition”.354 Corsican liberty was
identical to that enjoyed by “the glorious patriots of 1688”.355 The author hearkened 
back to a more pure form of liberty enjoyed in Britain. Englishmen who enjoyed “the 
blessings of that transaction” were “bound to convince half the world, by supporting 
Corsica, that we, the children of those men, are not unworthy to reap the harvest, that 
by their virtue and abilities they have left us”.356 If Britain did not aid Corsica, they 
would have betrayed the principles which the Revolution of 1688 had been founded 
upon, and diminish the nation’s prestige in the eyes of Europe. Britain was founded 
upon the principles of liberty and freedom, and was therefore expected by those at 
home and abroad, to act and save a fellow nation striving for liberty. 
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The final essay of Boswell’s book, Essay XX, argued that the “liberty of a whole 
nation of heroes, and the command of the Mediterranean navigation” were far too 
precious to be sacrificed.357 The writer, who called themselves Regulus, claimed to be a
“true friend of liberty”. However, control of the Mediterranean was also a major reason
to intervene on the island. The writer of Essay X also noted that any attempt to 
increase the Mediterranean trade “must be our interest to follow”.358 Despite the claims
made by many British writers that they were avid supporters of Corsican liberty, the 
commercial interests of Britain never seemed to be far from their thoughts. What must 
be remembered is that many of these essays were published in British newspapers and 
written for a wider audience: they were attempting to convince readers to support the 
Corsican cause. Any commercial advantages that could be obtained were usually 
gleefully taken up by British merchants. Britain was first and foremost a commercial 
nation, and her policy was usually dictated by that fact. An interesting question to ask 
is whether Britain would have supported a nation struggling for liberty in a backwater 
country, with no potential for commercial advantage? Would there be the same 
reaction as there was for Corsica? 
However, the ideal of liberty was itself a strong motivator for many Britons. Regulus 
in Essay XX argued that war had been declared against liberty, and the British “who 
glory in their principles of freedom, are determined to support it”.359 An attack on any 
fellow brother nation of liberty was an assault on Britain itself. Regulus commented 
that it was in Britain’s character to react against France. Rome and Carthage “were as 
much rivals as Britain and France are”.360 The writer concluded by writing that any 
future war with France “may be as glorious to Great Britain as the last [Seven Years 
War]”.361 The possibility of a ‘glorious’ war with France was one that was not relished 
by many other Britons, as will be explored in the latter sections of this chapter.
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A Eurocentric British foreign policy?
Before looking into the arguments against intervention in Corsica, I would like to bring
to the attention of the reader some of the broader ideas behind British attitudes to 
foreign policy during the eighteenth century. Within Boswell’s British Essays, one 
particular essay raised far broader questions concerning British foreign policy. The 
writer of Essay IX called themselves ‘A.A, from Parliament-Street’. This suggested 
someone from a governmental background, who immersed themselves with the key 
political problems facing the British state. The writer ‘A.A’ commented that Britain 
had experienced for many years “that liberty which the Romans once gloried in”.362 
The many conquests by Britain in the Seven Years War “made the name of Britain to 
be respected by every foreign power”.363 Britain was a modern Rome and was “revered
in every quarter of the globe”.364 However, “discontent dwells in the breasts of many”, 
as those in Britain cast a “jealous eye on the extensive continent across the Atlantic”.365
The writer referenced the continuing problems with the American colonies, and argued
that they were caused by the jealousy of Britain regarding America’s superior form of 
liberty. Corsica was now ‘rearing up’ its head in Europe and “struggling for liberty”.366 
The writer argued that British attentions surely must be diverted from America, to the 
cause of a naturally “brave and warlike people” similar to both Rome and Britain 367. 
The writer noted that recently, an opulent merchant in London had left a considerable 
fortune to Corsica for “no other motive but a regard to liberty”.368 These ‘patriotic 
actions’ distinguished “the man, the patriot and the true friend of liberty”.369 Corsica 
rather than America should become the main focus for British foreign policy.
Essay IX in Boswell’s book raised two important issues: the wish for a more 
Eurocentric foreign policy: and the idea that Britain was in perpetual decline following
the Seven Years War. I shall deal with each issue in detail, starting with the 
historiographical debates on Britain’s role in Europe during the eighteenth century. 
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Doohwan Ahn (combining with Brendan Simms) recently wrote an article called 
European Great power politics in British public discourse, 1714-1763 (2013). Ahn 
argues that foreign policy within eighteenth century Britain “drove most aspects of 
domestic policy”.370 There was a ‘primacy of foreign policy’ within parliamentary and 
pamphlet debates, which demonstrates “the salience of the issue”.371 Jeremy Black also
argues that foreign affairs similarly dominated many articles in Britain’s newspapers.372
Ahn agrees with Black of the “centrality of European over colonial and maritime 
concerns”.373 The public’s preoccupation with foreign policy, especially with Europe, 
was a legacy of the seventeenth century, when the maintenance of the European 
balance of power was “essential to the preservation to their own liberty and 
security”.374 In 1694, the licensing act was allowed to lapse “effectively ending 
censorship”.375 This created an immediate boom in journalism, and a “new appetite for 
commercial and diplomatic news”.376 The newspapers could hold parliament to account
over matters in Europe, eventually developing into a situation where the political 
nation “owned English grand strategy”.377 More importantly, ministries rose and fell 
over how well the king or the political nation “felt they had performed in the strategic 
sphere”.378 This was particularly relevant for the Corsican issue, and the question of 
whether the failure to intervene in Corsica led to the collapse of the Grafton ministry.
 
Ahn notes that from the early to mid eighteenth century, British policy and politics 
were “largely shaped by the European states system”.379 He comments that from 1749 
to 1763 with the end of the Seven Years War, it has been “commonly accepted that 
colonial concerns were coming increasingly to the fore”.380 This went against the 
‘Eurocentric’ focus of many Britons during the eighteenth century. For his research, 
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Ahn composes a pamphlet discourse based on Eighteenth century sources online, 
compiling some 155,000 volumes. These are then divided into graphs, by searching a 
common topic or denominator of each pamphlet, such as Jacobinism, constitution etc. 
Using this method, Ahn, argues that during the eighteenth century “the centrality of 
European concerns in British public debate is beyond question” as far as pamphlet 
literature is concerned.381 The Corsican issue may be viewed as an attempt by many 
British writers, avidly interested in foreign affairs, to turn the focus of the government 
away from America and back into Europe.
If there was an attempt by British writers to bring the focus of foreign policy back into 
Europe, why then was this the case? Perhaps the answer lies in the second major issue 
raised in Essay IX of Boswell’s book. There was a belief during the 1760s that Britain 
was in decline following the Seven Years War. Many writers revelled in the ‘glory’ 
gained during that war, and by which Britain became the most dominant power in 
Europe. The 1760s however, brought about major problems, particularly the debt 
raised during the war. This caused many problems in the American colonies, when 
Britain attempted to raise a variety of different taxes in order to pay off war debts. 
Also, as illustrated by many of the opposition writers studied, the lack of British action
regarding Corsica highlighted a major weakness of the government and the nation.
 
Brendan Simms in his book Three victories and a Defeat (2007), argues that British 
foreign policy suffered a number of reversals in the five years following 1768, when “a
number of bastions across Europe”, such as Corsica, Sweden and Poland, “had 
fallen”.382 All were widely perceived to have “profound implications also for Britain’s 
naval security”.383 The fall of Corsica to France was the first step towards the ‘decline 
of the First British Empire’ according to Simms. The conquest of Corsica by France 
also “symbolised and hastened Britain’s general European decline”.384 However the 
greatest damage was “to Britain’s status as a great power”.385 These were the fears 
allayed by many British writers before and after the conquest of Corsica. Simms writes
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that the principal courts on the continent were “convinced that Britain was entirely 
focused on the colonies, as well as domestically unstable”, and therefore “no longer 
thought her alliance worth having”.386 This would have profound implications during 
the War of American Independence (1775-1783), when Britain found itself facing a 
colonial rebellion and a coalition of European powers led by France, without any major
European ally of note. Why then did the government not intervene in Corsica? 
Against intervention in Corsica: Attacks on Boswell
Not all newspaper reports and pamphlets were endeared to the Corsican cause. When 
searching for published works regarding Corsica in Britain, I found that the majority 
generally supported the islanders’ cause. However, there was a considerable vocal 
minority opposed to intervention in Corsica. I will now look at the main arguments 
advocating for Britain to remain detached from Corsican affairs. Those who sought to 
attack the validity of the Corsican cause would inevitably assail its main advocate: 
James Boswell. One of the more infamous pamphlets criticising Boswell on Corsica 
was William Kendrick’s An Epistle to James Boswell (1768). William Kendrick was 
one of the more notorious writers during the eighteenth century, often criticising and 
libelling his fellow writers and their works. The title to the pamphlet however was 
deceiving. Boswell himself later met Kendrick in April 1772. Boswell commented in 
his journal that Kendrick “once wrote an 18d pamphlet against me, but principally 
against Mr Johnson, though it was entitled A Letter to James Boswell”.387 Samuel 
Johnson (1709-1784) was an essayist, a lifelong friend of Boswell and one of his great 
influences. Johnson would become the main subject of Boswell’s famous biography 
The Life of Samuel Johnson (1791). Kendrick’s pamphlet questioned the morals and 
sentiments of Dr Johnson; Boswell was attacked merely by association. Why then 
study Kendrick’s work? The Epistle was written in the midst of a flurry of publications
on Corsica, and therefore cannot be ignored as a source criticising Boswell and in 
some regards, the Corsican cause. 
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The main section of Kendrick’s pamphlet focused on criticising Samuel Johnson’s 
essay Idler 089, regarding physical evil and moral good. I shall now briefly discuss 
Kendrick’s concluding notes from this section. Kendrick’s main criticism concentrated
on Boswell’s claim made in the Account of Corsica, that he would send some of 
Johnson’s works to Paoli at a future date. Kendrick believed it wrong for a ‘brave’ 
people to “exchange the substance for the shadow”.388 The Corsicans, a people already 
imbued with the proper principles of liberty, would be inhibited by the ‘poison’ of 
Johnson’s works. The postscript to the Epistle was far more relevant to discussions on 
the Corsican issue. Kendrick criticised Boswell’s attempts to compare Corsica to 
Britain. He noted that Boswell, in his Account of Corsica, had revealed two 
controversial Corsican practices: the Vendetta and trial by torture. These were two 
notions “too shocking to the humanity and generosity of Englishmen”.389 Such 
barbarous sentiments, according to Kendrick, “will never prevail in England”.390 The 
Corsicans were still a barbarous backward nation. Kendrick also noted Boswell’s 
“mistaken notions of liberty”,focusing on Boswell’s claim that the arts and sciences 
were the “offspring” of liberty.391 The arts and sciences had flourished in countries 
“which liberty was the same time a stranger” such as France or Russia.392  
Boswell’s liberty was based upon foreign invasion, reinforced by the examples of 
Corsica, Holland and Switzerland. Kendrick believed that Boswell had inferred that the
preservation of national liberty depended “on a perfect coalition between the lords and 
commons”.393 Kendrick however, argued that it was the reciprocal jealousy of the 
several constituent parts of government that formed “the bulwark of the 
constitution”.394 Occasional discord was “the constant guardian of public freedom”.395 
Here Kendrick referenced the argument of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) in his 
Discourses on Livy (1517), when Machiavelli described the constitutional model of the
Roman Republic. Kendrick constantly referenced other well known writers such as 
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Machiavelli and Rousseau, to reinforce his own opinions and arguments. He 
questioned Boswell’s notions of liberty and the character habits of the Corsicans. 
Could a barbarous people really be compared to the refined and humanitarian British? 
The British Newspapers-arguments against intervention 1768-1769
There were a number of arguments made in the British newspapers against intervention
in Corsica. The anonymous writer of an article in the 30 June 1768 edition of the 
Gazetteer argued that “the importance of that island, I think, has been greatly 
exaggerated”.396 This stemmed from the belief that any islands which “can give but 
little augmentation of wealth, are seldom an augmentation of strength to a nation, that 
has not a powerful naval force”.397 French occupation of the island would “render it 
more easy to be attacked by a maritime power” such as Britain.398 If France had no 
strong naval force to hold the island, what about a maritime nation such as Britain? 
The writer maintained that the loss of Minorca for example, would be “hardly any 
inconvenience to us”.399 Britain would be able to maintain its superiority in the 
Mediterranean “by our fleets and cruisers, to defend our trade there, and annoy that of 
our enemies”.400 The French regardless would be unable to draw many “commercial 
advantages from the island” of Corsica.401 French ‘vanity’ and ‘arrogance’ would make
them detested on the island. During the first breach between France and Britain, the 
Corsicans “would throw themselves under our protection” and Britain then would have
a more “just title to declare ourselves their defenders”.402 The writer questioned 
Corsica’s commercial and strategic importance for Britain. Britain did not need to 
intervene on Corsica immediately, but could wait for a moment of French weakness.
Corsica was not the only major foreign issue in British political discussion during the 
years 1768-1769. In 1769, the January 6th edition of the Gazetteer commented that 
some “shallow politicians” had thought it “strange” England had not taken the side of 
the Corsicans in their “present dilemma”.403 The reason however appeared ‘obvious’: 
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“it would seem unnatural to draw the sword in defence of a foreign state, at a time 
when the rod of correction is holding over the heads of our American brethren”.404 The 
writer of this section clearly placed American issues and affairs above Corsica. They 
considered the Americans their ‘brethren’, but not the Corsicans. The writings of 
Boswell and others attempted to portray the similarities between British and Corsican 
liberties. However, the Corsicans were still considered to be rebels. In fact, many 
British newspapers still referred to them as ‘malcontents’, even those writing in 
support of the Corsican cause. As I have already mentioned, Kendrick in his Epistle 
argued that the Corsicans were ‘barbaric’ compared to the civilised Britons. 
The other major arguement put forward in the 6 January edition of the Gazetteer, was 
that American issues were more important for Britain than Corsica. The 1769, 17 
January edition of the Public Advertiser contained the extract of a letter from Paris to a
gentleman in London, dated 23 December 1768. The French writer argued that it was 
easy “for men to see the faults of others, while blind to their own”!405 The Corsicans 
were not as remote from the French as the Americans were to England. Britain had 
been ‘abusing’ France for reducing the Corsicans. However, Britain was “about to 
make slaves of a much greater number of those British Americans”.406 The French 
writer argued that Britain had “no true idea of liberty, or real desire to see it flourish 
and increase”.407 This sentiment attacked the very core of British ideals of liberty. The 
only liberty Britain seemed to value was “the liberty of abusing your superiors and of 
tyrannizing over those below you”.408 The newspaper was attempting to make readers 
aware of the apparent hypocrisy of Britain concerning Corsica. Ultimately, Britain was
a commercial Empire whose record of liberty toward subject nations was questionable.
The article also attacked the heart of Boswell’s and other pro-Corsican writer’s ideals 
concerning British liberty, and its extension across the world. The newspaper was 
using the well known Corsican issue to make people aware of and foment opposition 
against Britain’s actions in America. America ultimately took precedence over Corsica.
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Anti-intervention argument: a defence of the government
Debates over the Corsican issue divided the nation into two camps. The opposition 
fervently argued for intervention in Corsica, especially when it became apparent that 
the government would not assist the island. It was only natural for an alternative bloc 
to appear. A certain number of writers published works in the British newspapers 
supporting the government’s actions concerning Corsica. Whether these writers were 
paid by the government is difficult to say. The anonymity of most of the writers makes 
it difficult to ascertain their background and motives behind writing on the Corsican 
issue. In 1769, an article was published in the 23 March edition of the Public 
Advertiser; written by someone who called themselves Seneca, after the first century 
Roman philosopher. Seneca argued that during 1768, “times were full of trouble”; 
revolt “threatened in our colonies, division in the court”.409 The nation was full of 
‘sedition’ and ‘faction’. The factious and ungrateful colonies had “thrown off their 
allegiance to a mother”.410 However, the resolution and wisdom of his Grace the Duke 
of Grafton “quelled the tumults in America”. 411 Despite the many problems of the 
nation, the Duke had guided Britain through tough storms. 
Seneca also admired the perceived contempt with which the Duke of Grafton had 
treated the clamours of “a few incendiaries about the island of Corsica”.412 The writer 
viewed the Corsican issue as an attempt by the opposition to cause sedition in an 
already troubled state. The contempt Grafton had for Corsica was “proof of good sense
as well as an attention to the real interest of the nation”.413 The ‘real interest’ of the 
nation was dealing with sedition and faction within Britain and America. Intervention 
in Corsica was altogether impossible because the nation was “exhausted by the 
enormous expenses of a former war, Great Britain is in no condition to enter upon 
frivolous pretexts into another”.414 The Corsican cause was treated as a ‘frivolous’ 
issue with no meaning or substance for Britain. More importantly, the expenses and 
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debt incurred from the Seven Years War left Britain in a vulnerable state. It was one of
the main reasons why Britain attempted to change the tax laws in America.
The 24 May edition of the Public Advertiser also bemoaned the “deluded rabble” and 
“depravity of ambitious men”.415 The writer, who called themselves Humanus, believed
Grafton had “acted in such a manner as will in the end rescue your countrymen” from 
dreadful accusations of enemies and sedition.416 This article was written in a similar 
manner to the previously mentioned writings by Seneca, and could possibly have been 
written by the same person. Humanus hoped Corsica would continue to be supported 
by Britain “in that manner which wastes the forces of our enemies, without embroiling 
us in war”.417 Humanus did not want Britain to foolishly be dragged into a European 
wide war, a sentiment widely held in certain quarters in Britain during the later 1760s. 
Britain had no major ally of note, and could not afford a major war with France. There 
was a feeling among some in the opposition that France was to be appeased with the 
conquest of Corsica, following its disastrous losses during the Seven Years War. To 
what degree these claims are true can only be answered within the last section of this 
chapter, by studying the Duke of Grafton’s own writings.
Autobiography and political correspondence of Augustus Henry, 3  rd   Duke of Grafton
The only way to ascertain the thoughts and actions of the government regarding the 
Corsican issue is by studying the writings of the then Prime Minster, the Duke of 
Grafton. The Duke of Grafton, known as Augustus Henry FitzRoy (1735-1811), wrote 
his Autobiography and Political Correspondence many years after the events in 1804. 
This will be the principal source for this section, combined with the letters of the 
Southern secretary, the Earl of Shelburne, and those of the French ambassador, the Earl
of Rochford. Grafton wrote that he had arranged all important papers on public 
transactions, to create “a kind of memoir of my life”.418 Grafton inserted whole letters 
as well as other authentic documents into the work, which he hoped would make the 
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Autobiography acceptable “to the accurate and curious historians”.419 Grafton’s 
Autobiography could be construed as an apology and justification for the actions and 
decisions he made as Prime Minister. However there is no reason to dismiss this source
merely as an apology. In fact the importance and authenticity of the materials used 
make it a valuable source indeed. Grafton had on hand many letters and documents 
unlikely to have otherwise survived today. The Autobiography more importantly 
captured Grafton’s own ideas and opinions during the events he wrote about.
Grafton dedicated three chapters of his Autobiography to his years as Prime Minister. 
In those chapters, he only devoted seven pages to the Corsican crisis. The rest covered 
the revolt in the American colonies and the major problems within the British cabinet. 
The lack of coverage summed up Grafton’s attitude of the Corsican affair: it was a side
note to the real issues of state. When referring to the French invasion of Corsica, 
Grafton wrote that any accession of territories to a rival kingdom “could not be 
palatable to our government, nor to the nation”.420 Here Grafton expressed the general 
sentiment of the British nation regarding France. However, he could never believe 
“that the possession of Corsica would add to the crown of France, the degree of 
advantage, which many were industriously giving out”.421 Grafton, similar to other 
writers against intervention, questioned the commercial and strategic importance of 
Corsica. 
It is interesting to consider the extent to which Corsica actually improved the wealth of
France. Corsica certainly did not become the commercial centre it had been modelled 
out to be. However, Grafton had misunderstood the popular perception of the island. 
He recognised its importance to the nation, but failed to realise that any failure to act 
on the island was perceived in many quarters as a sign of the governments weakness. A
strong, active foreign policy was a prerequisite for any successful British government 
during the eighteenth century. Grafton commented that the Duc de Choiseul may have 
been wicked enough “to plunge his country into the horrors of war” through his 
‘restless ambition’.422 However, “our consciences would never have allowed as to 
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advise, on this occasion, a recommencement of hostilities”.423 There was a real 
reluctance, particularly from the government of the time, for another war with France 
to break out so soon after the last. This was down to two reasons. The first was an 
understanding that Britain’s finances were still fragile after the Seven Years War, and 
the risk of any war over Corsica was too great. The second was the sense of 
appeasement regarding France. Grafton himself commented that the Duc of Choiseul 
and the French nobility were “impatient to retrieve the honour and credit of their arms, 
which had been so frequently tarnished in the late war, both by land and sea”.424 
Whether Grafton himself believed in appeasement with France remains difficult to 
determine. What was clear was that any reluctance by the ministry to intervene in 
Corsica meant opposition writers could accuse the government of appeasing France. 
This was unacceptable for patriotic Englishmen.
The main action of the government regarding Corsica was, according to Grafton, to 
object to the French invasion short of declaring war. Lord Rochford was the 
ambassador at Paris in 1768. In a letter sent on the 13 May 1768, Shelburne informed 
Rochford of the need to determine the “differing reports” regarding Corsica.425 
Shelburne believed that it was ‘obvious’ what French intentions were: the annexation 
of Corsica.426 The transference of Corsica from Genoa to France was by a secret treaty, 
and British cabinet ministers had only began to suspect French intentions in May 1768.
Shelburne informed Rochford that he would soon be able to inform him of the views of
the other ministers regarding Corsica, “as soon as they can meet for that purpose, 
which has hitherto been only prevented by a necessary attention to Home affairs at the 
opening of parliament”.427Clearly, Corsicans affairs were considered less important 
than that of Wilkes’ agitations and the American colonies. Shelburne himself was one 
of the only cabinet ministers who promoted an active, aggressive policy regarding 
Corsica. He was a student of the Earl of Chatham and of his aggressive foreign policy 
during the Seven Years War. Shelburne, like Chatham, was fearful of the Bourbon 
powers, and their potential revival in strength following the Seven Years War. 
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Rochford was instructed to put the Duc de Choiseul “off from the plan he had 
formed”.428 
Rochford had reported to Grafton that during the month of May before the invasion, 
the Duc de Choiseul’s language had ‘softened’, and at one time was “confident that he 
should have succeeded”.429 A week later however, the Duc of Choiseul had taken up 
the former tone for invasion. Lord Rochford, in a private letter to Grafton, believed this
change in tone was down to the imprudent declaration made by the Lord Mansfield, a 
‘great law lord’ then in Paris. At one of the French Minister’s tables, Mansfield stated 
that “the English ministry were too weak, and the nation too wise to support them in 
entering on a war for the sake of Corsica”.430 Many opposition writers argued that the 
British government should have acted more strongly in pressuring the French not to 
invade Corsica. Grafton placed this down to the imprudent declaration by the Lord 
Mansfield. Mansfield however reflected the general attitude of the British government 
regarding Corsica. Whether the Duc of Choiseul had changed his mind regarding the 
invasion of Corsica remained unlikely. However, Mansfield’s declaration allayed 
many doubts that Britain would not intervene in support of the Corsicans. 
Rochford’s correspondence with Shelburne offered another reason why the French 
knew that Britain would not risk going to war over Corsica. In a letter to Shelburne 
dated 2 June 1768, Rochford explained that the Duc of Choiseul was “very much 
surprised that we imagined they wanted here to go to war”.431 Choiseul was very 
reluctant to go to war with Britain, and claimed to Rochford to be “personally invested 
for the continuance of peace”.432 Even as late as the 30 June 1768, Rochford described 
to Shelburne that the Duc of Choiseul was “greatly agitated” over the potential of a 
war with Britain. Rochford stated to Shelburne that there was nothing the French court 
dreaded “so much as this moment as a war, and that there is scarce anything they could
do to avoid it”.433 Clearly, Choiseul and the King Louis XV (1710-1774) were 
“mortified beyond measure” to find that Britain “had a mind to make Corsica a pretext 
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for beginning a war”.434 Rochford however informed Shelburne that the French would 
not now retract their forces from Corsica. Rochford was confident that if Britain “insist
it (threat) with firmness”, the French might back down.435 Rochford noted in an another
letter sent to Shelburne – dated the 14 July – that since the French ambassador to 
England, Count Chatelet, had arrived in Paris the week before, “the minds of the 
people here are a little quieted”; the expedition to Corsica would be continued.436 In a 
later letter to Shelburne, dated 21 July 1768, Rochford noted that “the storm which 
seemed to threaten him (Choiseul) is blown over”.437 He wrote that Chosieul appeared 
visibly more satisfied, and remarked that it was “astonishing since count Chatelet’s 
arrival here, how the language of everybody has changed”; it had become public 
knowledge that Britain “shall not engage in a war on account of their expedition to 
Corsica”.438 Clearly, the Count Chatelet had gained assurances from the ministers in 
London, that Britain would not fight a war with France over Corsica. This was the 
main reason why Chosieul’s demeanour had changed. 
Britain’s ministry was rife with division. Technically, Chatham was still the Prime 
Minister until November 1768 when he resigned, but his illness in 1768 meant that 
Grafton was de facto Prime Minster. Shelburne, and to a lesser extent Grafton wished 
to support the Corsicans. But they were opposed by the ‘Bedford’ party, headed by the 
Lord Weymouth, who were against “taking any steps which may disturb the general 
tranquillity and peace”.439 Affairs in America also aggravated the situation, with many 
in the ministry keen to avoid a war with France whilst there were problems in the 
colonies. It was clear that Chatelet had private assurances from Lord Weymouth and 
other members of the cabinet, that Britain would not go to war with France over 
Corsica. The Lord Mansfield’s ‘imprudent declaration’, as described by Grafton, 
provided further support to the fact that Britain would not intervene in Corsica. 
Choiseul was aware of the divisions within the British cabinet. Therefore any 
subsequent threats by Shelburne or Rochford were meaningless. Shelburne himself 
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was disliked by many members of the ministry, including Grafton. Shelburne would 
resign in October 1768, thereby ending any attempts from within the government to aid
the Corsicans. If the British cabinet had showed a more united front in regard to 
Corsica, perhaps they could had prevented the French invasion through determined 
diplomacy.
The British government originally sent the agent John Stewart to Corsica, in order to 
ascertain the intentions of the French and the capacity of the Corsicans for resistance. 
Stewart left England in May 1768, but did not reach Corsica until August that year, 
making many stops. Grafton recommended an old acquaintance, Captain Dunant – a 
Genevan – to travel to Corsica via a quicker route. Grafton’s letter to Dunant stated 
that the British government wished to be informed of the general disposition of 
General Paoli with regard to the French invasion.440 Paoli, in his letter of response to 
the British government, dated 24 July 1768, called himself the “dèfendre et coserver la 
libertè de sa patrie”.441 Nothing in Paoli’s conference with Captain Dunant “marked the
smallest indication of dejection”.442 Paoli was confident of the “general support of his 
nation”443, but what he lacked was arms, artillery and supplies. With a succour of arms 
furnished to him, “he should be able to defend himself for a considerable time”.444 The 
problem for the British government was the aforementioned proclamation of 1763, 
banning any British aid or contact with the Corsican rebels. However, a change in 
circumstances had altered the conditions which the proclamation was made, namely 
that the Genoese had surrendered their rights of the island to France. The proclamation 
was aimed at defending Genoese interests, not French. Therefore the order of council 
was no longer regarded as a force. Grafton commented that a moment was not lost “in 
supplying most of the articles requested by the Corsicans”.445 Grafton and the 
government enjoyed the expectation of “seeing France baffled in her scheme”; they 
were however vexed to find “General Paoli himself obliged to give way” in May 
1769.446 Grafton believed this was “through the backwardness of his followers, and 
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perhaps also the treachery of some, in whom he had too much confided”.447 Treachery 
certainly in played a part in the Corsican defeat at Pontenuovo on 9 May 1769. Many 
subsequent British newspaper reported that certain sections of Corsican troops had 
absconded on the battlefield. 
What Grafton’s Autobiography highlighted were the major divisions that dogged 
Britain’s ministry. The ministry Grafton inherited from the Earl of Chatham after his 
resignation in November 1768 was a coalition. Within the footnotes, the editor of 
Grafton’s Autobiography Sir William Anson commented in 1898 that the Earl of 
Shelburne had wanted a bold policy regarding Corsica while the Duke of Bedford’s 
party had wanted peace at any price. Grafton himself wanted a ‘half and half’ “but 
wholly indefensible line of action”.448 According to Anson, Grafton’s attempts to 
supply the Corsican rebels with arms showed “at once his wishes and his 
powerlessness”.449 Grafton was walked a tight rope with his ministers, as he attempted 
to appease both sides. In the end, he had showed his own weaknesses as Prime 
Minister, and felt sense of failure regarding his role over the Corsican issue. 
Ultimately, the Corsicans were outnumbered and out-gunned, and faced a professional 
French army; no amount of supplies sent would change that fact. Only the support of 
the British navy and perhaps a British expeditionary force may have saved the 
Corsican rebels. For Grafton, war was always out of the question, and therefore his 
rather limited attempts to supply the Corsicans showed weakness, not strength. Corsica
was debated during the November 1768 parliament. The motion for correspondence 
with France relating to Corsica “produced a long discussion upon the affairs of 
Corsica” in parliament.450 However, the motion was defeated by a large margin (230 
votes to 84), thereby ending any lingering hopes that any British aid might be sent to 
Corsica.451
447 FitzRoy, Autobiography, Duke of Grafton, 209.
448 FitzRoy, Autobiography, Duke of Grafton, 209.
449 FitzRoy, Autobiography, Duke of Grafton, 209.
450 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. XVI, 1765-1771, ed. William Cobbett, (London: 
Printed by C. Hamsard, 1813), 475.
451 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History, vol. XVI, 475.
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Concluding notes
There was a clear separation in the years 1768-1769 between the governments polices 
and the popular will. Generally the Corsican cause was widely supported in Britain and
embraced by the majority of the British literate classes. The idea that Britain and 
Corsica were fellow brothers of liberty was the strongest motivating factor behind 
many Britons writing on, and even providing subscriptions of money and arms in 
support of the Corsican cause. The idealism behind Britain’s foreign policy changed 
during the 1760s. At the start of the eighteenth century, there was a strongly held belief
that Britain was the protector of Protestantism in Europe. This ideal was enforced by 
the Glorious Revolution in 1688, and the subsequent conflicts against the Catholic Sun 
King Louis XIV. But there was a change in ideology during the Seven Years War as 
Protestantism became a less important factor within European politics. The idea of 
liberty, and the desire to spread Britain’s form of government across the world, 
replaced Protestant idealism. The case study of Corsica highlighted this change. 
Corsica, despite being a Catholic country, was believed to be more similar to Britain 
than any other nation in Europe at the time. This was due to Corsica’s liberty and form 
of government.  
The idealism of liberty would also be seen during the next decade with the American 
Revolutionary war. Many British writers would support the American cause as fellow 
brothers of liberty, fighting against their own arbitrary government. The other primary 
motivator was the commercial and strategic importance of Corsica. Britain was first 
and foremost a commercial empire. Despite the general support of liberty by writers 
such as Boswell, the commercial and strategic importance of Corsica was never far 
from their minds and consistently mentioned in their writings. What was clear was that
this liberal idealism was a veil for the expansion of the British Empire. Empires have 
always needed an idea to drive and justify their expansionism, and Protestantism was 
simply replaced by a support for liberty. However, to simply suggest that those 
supporting the Corsican cause were really rampant imperialists betrays the very 
ideology that formed them. There was general support for the Corsican cause among 
many Britons. Corsica’s fight against the tyrannical French only further cemented 
British beliefs in the brave Corsican heroes. The mass subscriptions gathered suggested
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that support for the Corsican cause was genuine. The idealism of liberty cannot be 
underestimated in shaping the thoughts and ideas of Britons who supported the 
Corsican cause.
Despite the mass popular support for the Corsican cause, the government did very little
to support the islanders. Popular pressure could do little to sway the desire within the 
cabinet to avoid war with France. Britain was in debt and vulnerable following the 
Seven Years War. It was impractical and impolitic to intervene in favour of the 
Corsican rebels; the risks were far too great. Domestic sedition and problems in the 
American colonies took up the majority of the government’s time. The 1760s also 
marked a change within British foreign policy. The first half of the eighteenth century 
had seen Britain adopt a Eurocentric policy, epitomized by the dual monarchy with 
Hanover. However, after the Seven Years War, Britain’s attention was fixed upon 
America, due to the problems there and fear of losing the valuable colonies. This led to
the perception that Britain was no longer a European power. The failure to intervene in
Corsica highlighted this change in policy. However, British interest in Europe did not 
diminish during these years, as illustrated by the works of both Brendan Simms and 
Doohwan Ahn. To what degree did the Corsican issue contribute to the fall of 
Grafton’s ministry in 1770? The main problem presented by Corsica was the 
perception of failure. The opposition soon immersed themselves in supporting the 
Corsican cause. Corsica became one of the major topics used to attack the government.
The Grafton ministry was certainly unpopular during these years; its failure to support 
the Corsicans only exacerbated this unpopularity. 
The Corsican crisis was one of many issues faced by the Grafton ministry. The 
problems with the American colonies, the debt and the major domestic sedition, in part
caused by John Wilkes, combined to bring down the Grafton ministry. The issues 
themselves however did not cause the Grafton’s fall, but rather the administration’s 
failure to deal with them. To what degree was the failure to intervene in Corsica the 
first step toward the fall of the First British Empire? Perhaps the most important result 
to come from the French conquest of Corsica, was the major damage caused to 
Britain’s prestige within Europe. Eighteenth century major power politics was a 
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dangerous game, and any perceived weakness within the state system could result in 
the loss of a nation’s major power status. In this particular case, Britain was no longer 
seen to be a major power in European politics, which resulted in her isolation from any
major alliance system. Britain’s’ vulnerability was most dramatically highlighted 
during the American Revolutionary War, when she was confronted with an American 
rebellion as well as a coalition of European powers led by France. The conquest of 
Corsica was certainly one of the first steps taken by France to recover from her losses 
incurred by Britain after the Seven Years War. French intervention in the American 
Revolutionary War was the next logical step to regain her own great power status. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Grafton ministry was the lack of foresight to 
realize the way the wind was blowing: the end of British rule in America.
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Paoli in Britain 1769-1789
On 14 September 1769, Pasquale Paoli (1725-1807) was a Corsican exile in The 
Hague, Holland, getting ready to board a ship to his main destination: England. Paoli 
was formerly leader of the self-proclaimed Corsican Republic (1755-1768). The 
Corsicans had declared independence against their corrupt and tyrannical Genoese 
overlords in 1728. The Corsicans elected Paoli to be their leader or ‘General’ in 1755. 
After years of hostilities, the Corsicans under Paoli reduced Genoese possessions to a 
few fortified coastal towns. In May 1768, in the face of inevitable defeat, Genoa ceded 
their rights of the island to the powerful kingdom of France. The French subsequently 
sent an invasion force to capture the island from Paoli’s Corsicans. After a year of 
hostilities, Paoli’s defeat at Pontenuovo on 9 May 1769 finally ended Corsican hopes 
of independence. The French conquest of the island was complete by June 1769 with 
the fall of Corte, Corsica’s capital. Paoli himself evaded capture on board a British 
ship, and fled to Italy. Paoli however had not given up hope for retaking Corsica back 
from the French. Only one nation in Europe had the capacity to aid him for this 
venture: Britain. Paoli’s progress across Europe to Britain received the attention of 
many prominent persons. He had made an acquaintance of Joseph II of Austria (1741-
1790) in Mantua, and met the Stadtholder William V (1748-1806) in Holland. Paoli 
had only one final destination in mind, however. On 14 September 1769, Paoli wrote a 
letter from the Hague, to his dear friend and fellow Corsican patriot Count Rivarola. 
Count Antonio Rivarola was son of the famous Corsican patriot Domenico Rivarola, 
and served as the Sardinian consul at Leghorn. Paoli informed Rivarola that “tomorrow
I leave for England. My journey has been long, but I hope with reason, that my 
apparent desire to go travelling...will affect anything”.452 
Why did Paoli chose England as his destination for exile? Paoli believed that England 
represented his greatest hope for the restoration of the Corsican Republic. Paoli and the
Corsican rebellion first gained popularity in England with the publication of James 
Boswell’s Account of Corsica, in February 1768. Boswell’s book created widespread 
interest in this previously unknown island. The previous chapter studied in detail the 
452 Pasquale Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, ed. Niccolo Tommaseo, (Florence: Gio Pietro 
Vieusseux, 1846), 181.
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‘Corsican crisis’ that occurred following the French invasion of the island in May 
1768. The French invasion made Corsica and its leader Paoli the main subject of news 
in Britain in 1768-1769. Boswell subsequently published his British essays in early 
1769. Written by a wide variety of anonymous British writers, the British essays 
contained a more prevalent anti-French bias than Boswell’s previous Account of 
Corsica. Boswell’s work was reflecting the current mood of the British public 
following the French invasion of the island in May 1768. France was Britain’s main 
rival during the eighteenth century; therefore, the Corsican issue enjoyed a great deal 
of publicity. The Corsican cause gained widespread support from the literate classes, 
particularly from the opposition in parliament, which was at this time was headed by 
the ‘Society For The Supporters Of The Bill Of Rights’ (hereafter usually referred to 
simply as ‘the society’). This group was formed in February 1769 after the expulsion 
of the radical journalist and politician John Wilkes from parliament. Members and 
associates of the Society were prominent advocates of the Corsican cause in Britain. 
Such examples included: Catherine Macaulay; and Samuel Vaughan, a major 
plantation owner in the West Indies and one of the leaders of the Society. Vaughan 
helped to organize subscriptions of money and arms gathered to aid the Corsicans 
during the years 1768-1769. The British government however refused to intervene in 
favour of the Corsicans. This resulted in the fall of Paoli and his eventual exile to 
Britain. Paoli stated to Rivarola in his letter dated 14 September 1769, that the “irons 
are heated” in England: opposition to French rule of Corsica was widespread.453 The 
mass support of the British public could prompt the government to intervene in favour 
of the Coriscans. 
On 18 September 1769, Paoli arrived at Harwich, England. Two days later, Paoli 
arrived in London to a hero’s reception. The 25- 27 September edition of Lloyd’s 
Evening Post noted that the public was ‘impatient’ to see the ‘celebrated’ Paoli. Their 
desire to see him was so great, that the house where he resided was “continually 
crowded by great numbers of people”.454 Paoli believed that the popularity of the 
Corsican cause would prompt the British ministry to help expel the French from 
Corsica. This chapter will study the full extent of the reaction to Paoli’s arrival and 
453 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 181.
454 ‘Postscript: London’, Lloyd’s Evening Post, 25-27 September, 1769, Issue 1908.
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exile in Britain, as he epitomised the Corsican cause, focusing on both the 
government’s and the opposition’s (including the Society For The Supporters Of The 
Bill Of Rights) positions concerning Paoli. I will show that the period from late 1769-
1772 was crucial to the future of the Corsican cause in Britain. There was a marked 
change in support; roles were reversed and the government became the primary 
benefactors of Paoli, whilst the opposition gave him the cold shoulder. Paoli’s 
objectives and aims for Corsica, would subsequently change and alter during his 
twenty years of exile in Britain. Popular support for the Corsicans dwindled over time, 
causing Paoli to become more and more reliant upon governmental financial support.
The main aim of the chapter is to chart the support for the Corsican cause in Britain 
from 1769-1789. The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section 
studies the reaction to Paoli’s arrival in Britain from 1769-1772. The second section 
studies the Corsican cause in Britain from 1772-1789, when support for Paoli became 
far more muted. The Corsican crisis became a more distant affair, and America became
the main focus of foreign policy. This section will also study the impact of the 
American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) upon the Corsican cause in Britain. With 
the outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1778, why was there no attempt to 
invade Corsica, then a French possession? More crucially, did the Corsican exiles 
headed by Paoli have any real chance of gaining British governmental support? 
Ironically, the greatest chance for Paoli’s restoration to Corsica, came not from Britain,
but France, with the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789. The latter 
events provide the epilogue to this chapter.
Post ‘Corsican Crisis’: Boswell and popularising the Corsican cause in Britain
The French conquest of Corsica in June 1769 did not mean the end of the Corsican 
cause in Britain. On the contrary, British writers loved to support the defeated Corsican
cause. In 1771, ‘A Lady’ wrote The Conquest of Corsica, by the French. A Tragedy. 
The play was set during the French invasion of Corsica from 1768 to 1769. In the first 
scene, the senators gathered at Corte, the capital of Corsica, in preparation for the 
coming war. The senators placed their country’s welfare in the hands of Paoli, whose 
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“conduct still is so upright and clear, and all his actions are so nobly great”.455 Paoli 
epitomized the Corsican character for British audiences, and was seen to be the 
example for others to follow. Every Corsican citizen was “bound for to defend his 
liberty and country”.456 Any Corsican ‘abhors’ the idea of submission, and rids it from 
their ‘soul’. The tragedy was a typical British portrayal of the Corsican struggle, where
the heroic Corsican militia was eventually overwhelmed by the ‘common robber’ 
France. The Corsicans, especially Paoli, were held as people of intrigue and interest by
many Britons; they represented an ancient Roman past long lost.
The most public showcasing of the defeated Corsican cause was Boswell’s jaunt as a 
Corsican soldier, at the Shakespeare Jubilee in Stratford-upon-Avon, September 1769. 
The event received much coverage in British newspapers and magazines. Boswell 
himself wrote an account of the affair in the September 1769 edition of the London 
Magazine. At the ball, “one of the most remarkable masks upon this occasion was 
James Boswell; in the dress of an armed Corsican chief”.457 Boswell wore “a short 
dark-coloured coat of coarse cloth...his cap or bonnet was of black cloth; on the front 
of it was embroidered in gold letters, viva la libertà”.458 He received the Corsican 
uniform from Paoli, after his visit to Corsica in 1765. Boswell was clearly attempting 
to build up his own popularity, and perhaps even to boost further sales of his Account 
of Corsica. At the same time, Boswell remained dedicated to the Corsican cause, and 
that of liberty itself. Boswell was genuinely infatuated by Paoli and the Corsican fight 
for liberty. During the Corsican crisis, Boswell had gone as far as to organise a 
shipment of arms to be sent to Corsica.459 The speech Boswell gave in the character of 
a Corsican chief highlighted his continuing faith in the Corsican rebellion:
“But let me plead for liberty distrest [sic],
And warm for her each sympathetic breast:
455 The Conquest of Corsica, By the French, A Tragedy. By a Lady, (London: Printed for the Author, 
1771),  4.
456 The Conquest of Corsica, 12.
457 James Boswell, ‘An Account of the armed Corsican Chief at the Masquerade, at Shakespeare 
Jubilee, at Stratford-upon-Avon’, London Magazine, or Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer, September 
1769, 455.
458 Boswell, London Magazine, September 1769, 455.
459 Charles Gascoigne to James Boswell, 24 January 1769, in The General Correspondence of James 
Boswell, 1766-1769, vol. 2 1768-1769, 137. The invoice of iron ordinance shipped by the Carron 
company amounted to 30 guns, 2917 round shot and 5020 grape shot.
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Amidst the splendid honours which you bear,
To save a sister island! Be your care:
With generous ardour make us also free;
And give to Corsica, a noble jubilee!”460
Boswell described Corsica as a ‘sister island’ to Britain, emphasising the similar forms 
of liberty and government of the two islands: there was a bond of kinship between 
Britain and Corsica. Boswell wanted Britain to intervene and set Corsica free from 
French tyranny and occupation. Only then could Corsica have a ‘noble jubilee’ and 
celebrate a reign of freedom and liberty similar to Britain. Boswell’s speech and 
Corsican dress certainly had the desired effect: he commented that “as he came into the
room he drew universal attention”.461 He had made Corsica a major topic in the public 
domain. Boswell wanted to popularise the Corsican cause in part because he knew that 
Paoli himself would soon be arriving in Britain. The conquest of Corsica (1771) 
concluded the tragedy on a positive note. Paoli, in his ‘doomed’ exile chose to come to 
an island where still “liberty is sacred held, the people yet are free- England, Happy 
England”.462
British foreign policy 1763-1775
Before his arrival in Britain, Paoli believed he could exploit public opinion in favour of
the Corsican cause. This was most evident in Paoli’s letter to Count Rivarola, dated 14 
September 1769. Paoli commented that London’s newspapers were writing of the 
welcome he had received at Europe’s various courts. They remarked that Paoli should 
stay in the Hague, in order to “avoid the crowds” in England.463 Paoli wanted to utilize 
the mass popularity for the Corsican cause in England to his favour. Paoli’s perception 
of England changed after his arrival in London on 20 September 1769. In another letter
sent to Count Rivarola, dated 23 September 1769, Paoli noted that the English “are 
divided beyond belief, and the spirit of faction has taken among the people against the 
ministry”.464 The England Paoli had entered was suffering from a major domestic 
crisis. The roots of the crisis could be dated from the Seven Years War (1756-1763). 
460 Boswell, London Magazine, September 1769, 456.
461 Boswell, London Magazine, September 1769, 455.
462 The Conquest of Corsica, 42.
463 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 182.
464 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 182.
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The greatest problem faced by Paoli was the general reluctance of the ministry to 
engage in another major European war: during the Seven Years War Britain had 
amassed a massive debt to achieve the conquest of Canada and to fund other military 
activities. This reluctance was the primary reason why the British government did little
to aid the Corsicans during the French invasion of Corsica in 1768-1769. A 
disinclination to engage against France or Spain was also highlighted during the 
Falklands Crisis in 1770. Negotiation rather than war summed up successive 
ministries’ foreign policy from 1763-1775. 
Throughout the 1770s, the North ministry adopted a similar foreign policy to that of 
Grafton during the Corsican crisis. Perhaps the best illustration of this policy was 
published in the 21-24 May 1774 edition of the Middlesex Journal. The Middlesex 
Journal contained an excerpt from the parliamentary debates and sessions in the House
of Commons. Newspapers were forbidden to report upon House of Commons debates 
as they happened. However, they were able to report on the debates after the actual 
events; some newspapers contained entire speeches from the House of Commons 
discussions. The Middlesex Journal contained the debates following Lord North’s 
speech which opened the budget earlier in the year. North claimed that the opposition 
constantly berated the ministry, claiming that the government “should have gone to 
war for Falkland’s Islands; you should have gone to war for Corsica; you should have 
gone to war for the good of Poland”.465 The failure to act over Corsica was only one of 
many examples used to criticize the ministry. Corsica was the first in a string of 
considered failures in British foreign policy following the Seven Years War. Poland 
was subjected to the First Partition in 1774, in which much of her territory was taken 
by Russia, Prussia and Austria. Poland was left in a weakened and vulnerable state 
following the partition, forever subject to their more powerful neighbours. The 
partition destroyed the perceived ‘balance of power’ in Eastern Europe. There was a 
fear within Britain over the increased capacity of the partitioning powers, particularly 
Russia. Britain’s lack of action concerning the affair was seen to be a sign of 
weakness; a lack of clout in the diplomatic playing field of great power politics.
465 ‘ House of Commons’, Middlesex Journal, 21-24 May 1774; Issue 804.
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The idea that Britain’s great power status was under threat was consistently raised 
during the 1760s and 1770s. Britain’s inactivity for many commentators only 
compounded Britain’s weakness. North bemoaned the fact that many had criticised the 
ministry for their failure to go to war over a variety of issues, such as Corsica and the 
Falkland’s Islands. He maintained however, that any war for these places would have a
probable expense of some sixty/seventy millions more of debt “in order to gain a 
barren rock, not worth sixpence”.466 This attitude was the main reason why the 
government would not take action concerning Corsica. Despite its potential for wealth, 
the island was deemed merely to be a ‘barren rock’, not worth the heavy expense of 
war. North’s speech contained a general reversion against war itself. North believed 
war to be the “very reverse of every principle of oeconomy”.467 One year’s war would 
exhaust all the savings of ten years peace. Britain’s commercial system was best 
preserved in peace time. This attitude of the ministry meant it was extremely 
improbable Paoli would find the British government willing to fund an expedition to 
recover Corsica. 
North’s attitude concerning foreign policy was not the only argument raised during this
period. The following Middlesex Journal issue, dated 24-26 May 1774, contained 
Edmund Burke’s reply to Lord North’s speech. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was a 
political theorist, writer, and Member of Parliament. He was a member of the 
opposition to North’s government, and later supported the American revolutionaries. 
Burke was also a known associate of Paoli through his connections with Boswell. 
According to Burke, North had essentially told parliament that national honour does 
not consist in being “the bust meddlers in every European quarrel”.468 This sentiment 
reflected the idea that Britain had moved away from a Eurocentric foreign policy. 
Burke believed that North had “severely condemned the whole system of British 
politics from the Revolution” in 1688.469 There was a genuine fear, particularly from 
the opposition, that the ministry had turned away from the principles set by the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689. The Supporters of The Bill of Rights for example, 
were named after the ‘Bill of Rights’ legislation, passed in 1689. Burke argued that 
466 Middlesex Journal, 21- 24 May 1774.
467 Middlesex Journal, 21-24 May 1774.
468 ‘House of Commons’, Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774; Issue 805.
469 Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774.
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North had his ‘system’ of foreign policy, although he was not the author of it. It was a 
system of blindness and infatuation “held forth as an excuse for that conduct which 
saw Corsica seized in one part of Europe, and Poland dismembered in another, with the
most torpid indifference”.470 Burke criticised the entire conduct of British foreign 
policy following the Seven Years War. By having that little busy spirit of inter-
meddling, both Corsica and Poland “might have been prevented (from falling) by mere
force of negotiation”.471 The abandonment of the foreign policy practised up until the 
Seven Years War was the primary reason why both Corsica and Poland had been lost. 
Burke held that there was a respectable idea of Britain, “once the refuge and 
protectress of distressed nations”.472 Burke concluded that the time will come, when the
new system “will be seen in all its impotence and folly, and when the balance of power
is destroyed”.473 These words were prophetic, when the disastrous American 
Revolutionary War broke out a year later after these debates, and Britain found 
themselves facing a European coalition, with no ally of note. However, the question 
remained: would Corsica be within British strategic thinking during any future war 
between Britain and France?
Arrival of Paoli in Britain September 1769: the initial reaction
Paoli’s progress across Europe en route to Britain received the attention of many 
prominent persons. Certain British writers were somewhat wary of Paoli’s eventual 
arrival in Britain. In the 14 September edition of the Gazetteer, the writer calling 
himself ‘A hater of mischief’ wrote of the “malevolence and destructive principles” of 
the sectaries and republicans in Britain.474 The British government was not in the 
healthiest condition: the Duke of Grafton’s ministry (1768-1770) was severely 
weakened by its perceived inability to act over the Corsican issue. Grafton (1735-
1811) was in charge of a fractious ministry, which he had inherited from his 
predecessor, the Earl of Chatham (1708-1778). This was coupled with the agitation 
created by John Wilkes (1725-1797) and the ‘Society For The Supporters Of The Bill 
of Rights’. John Wilkes was a radical journalist and politician, who famously was 
470 Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774.
471 Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774.
472 Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774.
473 Middlesex Journal, 24-26 May 1774.
474 ‘For the Gazetteer’, Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 14 September 1769; Issue 12648.
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charged with writing a seditious libel upon the King’s speech, following the Peace of 
Paris in 1763. Wilkes remained in exile in France for years, until returning to Britain in
1768. He was elected to the Middlesex constituency in the same year of his return to 
Britain. Wilkes was imprisoned in the King’s bench prison on 10 May 1768 after his 
election victory, and was eventually expelled from parliament in February 1769, on the
grounds that he was an outlaw when he returned. The Society For The Supporters Of 
The Bill of Rights was formed after Wilkes’ expulsion from parliament. The Society 
felt that Wilkes encapsulated traditional British liberties, and the rights of voters. This 
was evidenced in an address Wilkes gave to his constituents of Middlesex in 
November 1768, delivered from his prison cell. Wilkes proclaimed himself to be “a 
faithful guardian of the civil and religious liberties of the people of England, strenuous 
and unwearied in my endeavours to destroy all the remains of despotic power among 
our freeborn countrymen”.475 Wilkes’ belief that the current ministry was a corrupt 
tyrannical body, was a view similarly held by the Society. 
The Society was originally formed to pay off the mounting debts accumulated over the 
years by Wilkes and believed that King George III (1738-1820) had used his royal 
prerogative to invade the rights of electors and their representatives. They named 
themselves after the Bill of Rights of 1689, which was originally legislated to place 
limits upon the King’s power. The Society aspired restore the principles of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, which, in their opinion, embodied true British 
liberties. ‘A hater of mischief’ believed that this opposition group excited every artifice
of mischief “under the specious garb of right of liberty”.476 The writer claimed that the 
Society was becoming acquainted with Paoli in Holland, and that they intended to 
“retard” his arrival “till they were prepared to received him in that manner which will 
best promote their machinations”.477 There was a genuine fear that Paoli would simply 
become an instrument of the opposition. Many republican writers and members of the 
Society had previously been the most zealous English champions of Paoli and the 
Corsicans. ‘A hater of mischief’ wrote that the “fomenters of rebellion” would convert 
Paoli, whom they “denominate their hero in the cause of freedom, to become a 
475 Annual Register or a view of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1768, 5th ed. (London: 
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seditious demagogue and incendiary to outrage”.478 During the Corsican crisis, 
Corsica’s liberty and democratic form of government, were the primary factors that 
motivated British writers to espouse their cause. In September 1769 however the 
situation had changed: liberty and the cause of freedom was now strongly identified 
with the opposition. Before Paoli had set one foot in England, he had already become 
embroiled in British the political debates. Whether he could remain a political neutral 
remained uncertain. 
Paoli arrived in England on 18 September 1769 at Harwich. Two days later he arrived 
in London.  Paoli was certainly popular with the elite gentleman of England. For 
example, Lord Lyttelton (1709-1773) had become a well known supporter of the 
Corsicans after Boswell had written to him of the matter in 1768. Lyttelton, in a letter 
to Boswell dated 3 October 1769, wrote that he was “proud as an Englishman that he 
[Paoli] has chosen England for the place of his retreat”.479 He also wanted Boswell to 
tell Paoli that “he has not a warmer admirer in all this kingdom than me”.480 This 
sentiment was typical of those who admired Paoli and the Corsican cause. Paoli’s 
progress and activities in England were studiously noted during these early months, 
especially by the newspapers. The 20-22 September edition of Lloyd’s Evening Post 
commented that Paoli had waited upon the Duke of Grafton at his house in Arlington 
Street, and had now taken a house up in Dover Street.481 The 21-23 September edition 
of the London Chronicle noted that Paoli had been visited by the Duke of Queens 
borough and other members of the nobility.482 Within the postscript, the London 
Chronicle noted that the previous Thursday Paoli had visited the Marquis of 
Rockingham (1730-1782), a former prime minister, at his house, and within the next 
week, he would be introduced to the royal family; Paoli was frequently visited by the 
most important members of state.483 
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479 ‘Lord Lyttelton to James Boswell, 3 October 1769’, The General Correspondence of James 
Boswell, 1766-1769, vol. 2 1768-1769, ed. Richard Cole, (London: Yale University press, 1997), 246.
480 ‘Lord Lyttelton to Boswell, 3 October, 1769, 246.
481 Lloyd’s Evening Post, 20-22 September 1769;Issue 1906.
482 London Chronicle, 21-23 September 1769; Issue 1993.
483 London Chronicle, 21-23 September 1769.
109
 The 27-29 September Edition of the Lloyd’s Evening Post recorded that on 28 
September, Paoli was at court and introduced to the king. Afterwards, Paoli was 
recorded to have had a long conference with both the king and the Duke of Grafton. 
What were Paoli’s intentions during these negotiations? Clearly, as the 23-26 
September edition of the Middlesex Journal noted, Paoli had visited England not 
merely to satisfy his curiosity, but to consult the ministry for a “plan of expelling the 
French from Corsica, in case of any future rupture between them and Great Britain”.484 
Paoli’s intentions had changed after arriving in England. In a letter to Count Rivarola, 
dated 23rd September 1769, Paoli noted that the English were “intrigued” by both 
“America and Wilkes”, and therefore divided.485 The British ministry believed that 
Paoli had attempted “to excite the crowds”, to use for his own advantage.486 The 
ministry feared that Paoli’s influence could be used to excite opposition against 
themselves. Paoli informed Rivarola that this was not the case; “I’m not English” and 
“my only aim is to Corsica”.487 Paoli was not interested in involving himself with the 
domestic politics of Britain: gathering British support in order to regain Corsica from 
the French was his only aim. However, as he himself noted, it would be “difficult to 
find such a stopgap between people particularly fiery and suspicious”.488 Paoli also 
mentioned to Rivarola that “I do not know how to bring myself: I’ll do what I can and 
for the common cause and to keep my personal decorum”.489 The question for Paoli 
was whether he could maintain his political neutrality? As he mentioned to Rivarola, 
“it is difficult to maintain the confidence of all”.490 
The Samuel Vaughan controversy, October 1769
Paoli’s discussions with the ministry gained a wide range of criticism, especially from 
the Society For The Supporters Of The Bill of Rights. The same Middlesex Journal 
edition of 23-26 September that had noted Paoli’s meeting with the king also believed 
it remarkable that Paoli was visited by the same political party who had issued the 
proclamation in 1763. The Proclamation of 1763 had previously forbade any Britons 
484 ‘London’, Middlesex Journal or Chronicle of Liberty, 23-26 September 1769, Issue 76.
485 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 182.
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from having any relations with the Corsican rebels. In contrast, Paoli had not “the 
gratitude to pay any visit to those friends of liberty who voluntarily subscribed” and 
remitted to him “many thousands of pounds”.491 The Middlesex Journal was a well 
known opposition paper, named after the constituency Wilkes was elected to in 1768. 
The article concluded that the efforts of the ‘friends of liberty’s’ were “fruitless in 
supporting a man who has deserted the cause”.492 Only a few months earlier, the 
writers of the Middlesex Journal had been the unabashed supporters of Paoli: now they
were attacking his person and character. How did this situation come about?
Paoli’s fallout with the Society began with Samuel Vaughan. Samuel Vaughan (1720-
1802) was a prominent Wilkite activist and founding member of the Society.  He was 
one of the zealous ‘friends of liberty’ who had promoted the Corsican cause during the 
French invasion of the island. His previous support for the Corsicans led Boswell to 
write a letter to Vaughan, dated 22 September 1769. Boswell wanted to introduce Paoli
to Vaughan, as he was “one who so generously exerted himself for the brave 
Corsicans”.493 Vaughan replied to Boswell in a letter dated 26 September 1769, 
informing Boswell that “as much as I have admired and revered the late distressed 
patriot, I equally despise a vain-glorious sycophant”.494 This remarkable change in 
opinion from Vaughan stemmed from Paoli’s courtship with Grafton and the ministry. 
Vaughan’s personal opinions upon the matter were more deep rooted, however. 
Several months after the events, Vaughan most likely wrote An Appeal to the public on
behalf of Samuel Vaughan; in a full and impartial narrative with the Duke of Grafton 
(1770). The title gave away the intention of the pamphlet. Vaughan was involved in a 
high profile court case with the Duke of Grafton concerning “an attempt to corrupt a 
prime minister”.495 Vaughan was a very wealthy man who owned plantations in the 
West Indies. It was alleged that Vaughan, who had purchased the office of clerk to the 
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supreme court of Jamaica in 1765, had in June 1769 offered Grafton £5000 for the 
reversion of this office to the lifetimes of his three sons.496 Vaughan’s eldest son, 
Benjamin Vaughan (1751-1835) was later a political ally of Lord Shelburne. Perhaps 
most famously, Benjamin was one of the commissioners who helped to negotiate the 
Treaty of Paris in 1783, which ended the American Revolutionary War (1775-
1783).Ultimately, Samuel Vaughan’s case was never brought to trial. However, the 
case left a lasting blot upon his public reputation. This in turn prompted the publication
of the pamphlet to defend Vaughan’s name and honour. The Appeal to the public also 
contained the correspondence between Vaughan, Boswell and Paoli. The pamphlet 
claimed that “there cannot be a doubt the ministry were acquainted” with the following
correspondence, as it was “happening at the very time that Mr. Vaughan was 
threatened with a prosecution”.497 Vaughan believed that Paoli had provided evidence 
for Grafton. Paoli’s involvement with the ministry had led Vaughan to believe that 
Paoli was an instrument of the ministry, and therefore involved in the case against 
himself.
Paoli refused to involve himself with any particular political party: he was only 
interested in gaining support for the Corsicans. As previously mentioned, Paoli 
claimed that his ‘only aim is to Corsica’. Vaughan believed that Paoli would embrace 
the opposition. The ministry had done little to aid the Corsicans during the French 
invasion of that island. Therefore, Vaughan could not understand why Paoli would be 
willing to work with the ministry. Vaughan was one of many to believe that Britain 
was on the decline following the Seven Years War. Many writers prophesied the 
decline and fall of the British Empire. One of the most prominent was David Hume 
(1711-1776), a Scottish philosopher, historian and writer. Hume’s Essay’s Moral, 
Political and Literary (1758) dealt with a wide range of subjects.  His essay Of Public 
Credit dealt specifically with the issue that Britain would need to “mortgage the public 
revenues, and to trust that posterity will pay off the incumbrances contacted by their 
ancestors”. 498 Britain’s public debt was based exclusively upon the “confidence of its 
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riches”.499 Hume believed that the practice of public debt was “ruinous beyond all 
controversy”, and could only lead to Britain suffering “poverty, impotence, and [being]
subject to foreign powers”.500 Hume believed that only two events could result from the
building of public credit; “either the nation will destroy public credit, or public credit 
will destroy the nation”.501 When speaking specifically upon foreign affairs Hume 
thought that, due the huge public debts, it would be difficult for Britain to maintain the 
prodigious power obtained during the recent wars, “where we have so much exceed, 
not only our own natural strength, but even that of the greatest empires”.502 The wars 
fought during the eighteenth century had resulted in Britain becoming the pre-eminent 
power in Europe. However, this dominance was under direct threat due the major 
public debts gained from these wars. Hume wrote that “our foreign enemies may be so 
politic as to discover that our safety lies in despair”.503 There was widespread fear that 
Britain’s main enemy France, would eventually outstrip Britain in military and 
economic strength. Hume blamed this situation upon public credit. The ‘absurd’ 
system of contracting debt, was “almost infallibly abused in every government”, and 
was not patronized by ‘great’ ministers.504 The government was directly responsible for
the fostering and growth of public debt. Hume wrote that the balance of power in 
Europe, was regarded by our grandfathers, fathers and ourselves as “too unequal to be 
preserved without our attention and assistance”.505 But our children, the next 
generation, “weary of the struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down 
secure, and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered; till, at last, they themselves 
and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror”.506 This was the gloomy 
picture Hume painted for Britain. 
Government indifference to the ‘oppression’ of their neighbours was clearly evident to 
many Britons in the 1760s and 1770s. This was highlighted by the debates concerning 
Lord North’s speech opening the budget in 1774. The ‘loss’ of Corsica and Poland 
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were perceived to indicate Britain’s decline as a world power. The 29 August 1775 
edition of the Morning Post followed Hume’s argument concerning the decline of 
Britain following the Seven Years War. The author of the article, who called 
themselves ‘Crito’, complained of the “sacrifice of our national honour and dignity” 
which “had taken place in every transaction of foreign politics from 1760 to this 
day”.507 The blame was laid solely at the feet of the ministry. Vaughan believed that the
ministry’s corruption and weakness were also highlighted in the case presented against 
himself. Vaughan’s opposition to Grafton and the ministry was at a political and 
personal level. Vaughan wrote the Appeal to the Public in order to defend his public 
credentials. Despite the claims made against him, Vaughan would not, even at this 
critical juncture, “suppress his sentiments, however repugnant to those in power”, 
which he felt most probably “contributed not a little to the persecution raised against 
him”.508 Vaughan’s personal situation and political beliefs contributed to his harsh 
censure of Paoli. It is only within this context, that Vaughan’s subsequent letters 
between himself, Paoli and Boswell can be understood: Vaughan perceived Paoli to be 
an instrument of a ministry which had failed the British nation.
The next letter in the correspondence was a letter from Mr Frederick, on behalf of 
Paoli, to Samuel Vaughan, dated 29 September 1769. Frederick Neuhoff (1725-1797) 
claimed to be the son of the late Theodore Neuhoff (1694-1756). Theodore was a 
German nobleman who had been crowned King of Corsica in 1736 and had reigned 
very briefly. Frederick had published his own Memoirs of Corsica (1769), and quickly 
became an acquaintance of Paoli upon his arrival in Britain. Paoli apologized to 
Vaughan for not having had an opportunity “to assure him of his gratitude” for 
Vaughan’s actions regarding the Corsicans and expressed “an extreme desire to testify 
that gratitude in person”.509 Paoli was attempting to appeal to both the opposition and 
ministry: he was trying to involve himself with anyone who was interested in Corsica. 
Vaughan replied to Paoli a letter, dated 2 October 1769, “to assign his reasons, for 
passing so harsh a censure” on Paoli, in his letter to Boswell.510 Vaughan mistrusted 
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“the private manner in which he [Paoli] came from Holland to London”.511 The 
General had concealed “his abode above a week after his arrival in London”, which 
prevented Vaughan from paying his immediate compliments to Paoli.512 During the 
time of Paoli’s concealment, “the General had been in private treaty with the ministry 
separately”.513 The General, according to Vaughan, had treated with the ministry as he 
had “been informed that the opposition were composed of the dregs and refuse of the 
people”.514 Whether this was the real reason Paoli chose to gain support from the 
ministry instead from the opposition, remained doubtful. As the Corsican crisis 
illustrated, only full support from the British government could possibly enable Paoli 
to regain Corsica. Paoli, through seeking this support, was inevitably dragged into the 
political debates troubling the British polis.
Vaughan was led to conclude that “the General had been brought over by the 
ministry”, and “had deserted the noble cause of liberty”.515 Vaughan however would be
“extremely happy to find cause to alter his opinion”, and hoped that Paoli was 
“animated with the same divine spirit, and determined to stand forth, as heretofore, the 
defender of the unalienable rights of mankind.516 This sentiment highlighted the real 
intentions of the opposition for Paoli. They hoped Paoli would become the emblem of 
liberty for the opposition, and to use him as a figurehead against the ministry. Vaughan
and other opposition leaders were offended when Paoli sought the help of the 
‘tyrannical’ ministry, despite being an avid supporter of liberty. Vaughan in particular 
could not understand why Paoli would seek help from a ministry which had done so 
little for Corsica previously. The ministry had failed the British nation since the Seven 
Years War: Britain was terminally on the decline due to the misguided policy of 
successive ministries since 1763. Could Paoli expect the same ministry, which had 
failed to help Corsica against the French invasion, to provide aid for his restoration to 
the island?
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The Appeal to the Public contained two further letters between Vaughan and Boswell, 
which I also found in Boswell’s own correspondence. Boswell, in a letter of reply to 
Vaughan dated 5 October 1769, noted that he was “a little surprised with your letter to 
me”.517 Boswell wrote that Paoli spent many years at the head of a nation, having to 
deal with various courts. With this knowledge, Paoli knew “what was the conduct most
proper to promote the interests of his country, than you could do”.518 Boswell 
acknowledged that support from the ministry was the only way for Paoli to regain 
Corsica from the French. Boswell attacked Vaughan’s apparent ignorance on this 
subject. He also had seen the letter Vaughan had sent to Paoli on 2 October, “in which 
you explain yourself”.519 From this letter, Boswell described that Paoli had seen 
Vaughan’s motives and point of view, and that he had “been mislead [sic], and 
therefore heartily excuses you”.520 If Vaughan would wait upon Paoli, “he will with 
pleasure set you right, and convince you that your suspicions are without foundation 
whatsoever”.521 Paoli, according to Boswell, had wanted to explain himself to 
Vaughan, and assure that all of the opposition’s suspicions were false. 
To place Vaughan’s and the opposition’s attacks upon Paoli merely as stemming from 
misunderstanding does not reveal the full story. Paoli certainly had played a political 
game; he had avoided important opposition members such as Vaughan in order to gain 
more support from the ministry. Vaughan, in his letter of reply to Boswell, dated 6 
October, stated that he was pleased to find that Paoli and Boswell “are of opinion 
appearances gave cause for my conjectures”.522 Vaughan claimed that if he had had 
access to the general upon his arrival in the kingdom he would have advised him “to 
have joined no party whatever”.523 Vaughan believed that Paoli’s object as a foreigner, 
was “to have preserved an uniformity, consistency and dignity of character”.524 This 
statement, however, was in complete contradiction of Vaughan’s letter to Paoli on 2 
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October. As previously noted, Vaughan was outraged that Paoli had ‘deserted’ the 
noble cause of liberty by seeking the support of the ministry. He also wrote in the letter
that Paoli had refused to affiliate with the opposition, as they were the ‘dregs’ of 
society. Perhaps with hindsight, Vaughan had come to the conclusion that Paoli should
have remained politically neutral. Vaughan finally understood that if the ministry had 
offered effectual support for the recovery of Corsica, Paoli as a patriot, may have been 
induced “to suffer his personal honour to be sullied for the obtaining so great an end” 
for his people.525 However, Vaughan certainly believed that Paoli had shown far more 
public support to the ministry than the opposition. The Appeal to the Public recorded 
that Vaughan’s letter to Boswell, dated the 6 October 1769, was the last of the 
correspondence. Why the correspondence ended at this moment remains unknown. 
Whether Boswell believed that any attempt to convince Vaughan was meaningless 
remains open to speculation. Or perhaps Paoli did not believe that there was any need 
to build bridges with the opposition now that he had support from the ministry. Paoli’s 
public fallout with Samuel Vaughan triggered his condemnation from other opposition 
leaders. The next section will show the development of the oppositions arguments 
against Paoli in October and November 1769.
Evaluation of the Opposition’s argument from October to November 1769
The controversy surrounding Paoli’s arrival in Britain was formulated around a 
number of perceived insults against the opposition. Samuel Vaughan was the first 
major opposition member to publicly condemn Paoli’s affiliation with the ministry. 
Other opposition writers would follow Vaughan’s example in the months of October 
and November 1769. I will now look in detail at each of the main reasons why the 
opposition believed Paoli had abandoned the cause of liberty. The best contemporary 
summary of the controversy during these months was the pamphlet A Review of the 
conduct of Pascal Paoli. Addressed the Rt. Hon. William Beckford, Lord Mayor of the 
City of London (1770).  The writer, who remained anonymous, began by describing 
that the arrival of Paoli in Britain “hath occasioned more speculation, and given rise to 
more warm disputes, than any event which hath happened for along series of years”.526 
525 ‘Vaughan to Boswell, 6 October 1769, 250.
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The moment a ‘foreigner’ sets his foot on the “British grand”, they can expect to be 
“subjected to a severe examination”.527 A foreigner of Paoli’s stature would be felt as a 
challenge to the British establishment. Therefore his conduct would be scrutinized. The
author placed this reasoning behind the controversy surrounding Paoli’s arrival in 
Britain. The Review, according to the writer, was “very much to be wanted at this 
juncture”; the following sheets were therefore “ventured to the public eye”.528 Paoli’s 
conduct within Britain was considered to be of public importance. The Review was 
addressed to Alderman Beckford (1709-1770) for two major reasons. The first was due
to the fact that Beckford was “one of the spirited and generous committee for raising 
contributions on behalf of the brave Corsicans”.529 The second reason was that he held 
the grand and important office of chief magistrate to the city of London, “the noblest 
metropolis in the world”.530 It was to Beckford that “these sheets are addressed”; his 
position meant he “may have most considerable influence” enforcing the reflections 
made in the pamphlet.531 This sentiment however was contradictory to the writer’s 
earlier assertion, that the pamphlet was ‘ventured to the public eye’. Thus the author 
wanted the work to be directed to Beckford, but in the most public manner possible.
There was also another reason why the author addressed their writings to Beckford, 
however. Beckford was one of the major opposition members to the government, and a
known supporter of Wilkes. He was involved in one of the major perceived slights 
inflicted upon the opposition by Paoli. The 3-5 October edition of the London 
Chronicle reported that after a fortnight in England, Paoli sent compliments to 
Beckford, and wished for an opportunity to testify gratitude to the “generous care he 
had taken in support of the Corsicans”.532 The paper reported that Beckford then called 
upon Paoli on that Sunday afternoon. Paoli, however, missed the meeting. The paper 
reported that Paoli had also sent Mrs. Macaulay a message that he would visit her upon
the first opportunity. Catherine Macaulay (1731-1791) was, like Beckford, a supporter 
of the Corsican cause. Paoli had taken ‘ill’ before the arranged meeting. The London 
Chronicle reported that “Mrs Macaulay has neither seen or heard of him since, though 
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he has been out every day”.533 The article questioned whether it can “be imagined that 
the General’s sudden illness was other than political?”534 If this was true, then did it not
“prove that he [Paoli] is an abject slave in the freest country in Europe?”535 Paoli was 
certainly playing a political game: he was attempting to appeal to the ministry in order 
to gain the aid needed to regain Corsica from the French, so he could not be seen to be 
colluding with the opposition.  The 10-12 October edition of the London Chronicle 
asked whether Paoli could be seen to be less worthy “because he has not visited the 
popular prisoner [Wilkes], the female historian [Macaulay], and the patriotic 
Alderman?”536 The newspaper concluded that Paoli was patronised by the government, 
and must under their protection “entirely adopt the mode of conduct offered for his 
observance”.537 Paoli was thus drawn into the political divisions in Britain. Paoli had to
choose the side that most suited to his purposes. He had played the political game 
poorly, however, and therefore was criticised heavily for his mistakes. 
The attacks on Paoli did not merely relate to his talks with the ministry. They returned 
back to Paoli’s conduct in Corsica during the French invasion. The Review contained 
an article from the 28 September edition of the Middlesex Journal. The writer of the 
article believed it was necessary to give the world “some authentic account of the late 
amazing conquest of Corsica”.538 The main issue centered around the fall of Corte, the 
Corsican capital, in June 1769. Boswell’s Account of Corsica had given the description
that Corte was extremely difficult to take. Boswell had written of Corte’s “wonderful 
natural defences”: the capital was situated in the mountains and “may be defended with
a handful of men, against very large armies.”539 To the contrary, French accounts, 
which appeared in British newspapers in June and July, reported “hardly any 
resistance” at Corte.540 The writer asked; “where was the great Paoli”? The reports 
assured that Paoli was not within ten miles of the capital. The article claimed that Paoli
was mediating his own retreat, and “left his men to be an easy sacrifice to the 
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French”.541 Boswell’s Account of Corsica still remained the main source of information
for many Englishmen concerning Corsica, however. This became a problem for Paoli 
when he arrived in Britain. Boswell’s work hero worshipped Paoli in the most 
endearing language. The real man however would always seem to be lower than the 
standards set in Boswell’s Account of Corsica: expectations of Paoli’s character were 
elevated too high. 
The 14-16 November 1769 edition of the Middlesex Journal believed that Paoli’s 
valour on Corsica would have been better proven “by standing his ground, instead of 
turning his heels to the French”.542 Paoli should have appeared in the heart of his 
troops, defending his capital, rather than deserting it. Paoli’s late conduct in England 
“makes it plainly appear that he is no Leonidas”, the Spartan King who died with his 
men at Thermopylae in 480BC. Clearly, the writers of the newspapers had no 
understanding of the real situation during the fall of Corte. Peter Thrasher has 
commented correctly in his book Pasquale Paoli (1970), that Paoli’s defeat at 
Pontenuovo on May 4th 1769 left him with two options, either to fight a long guerrilla 
war against the French or to leave the island and find foreign aid. Paoli chose the latter,
as he had no experience in guerrilla warfare, and did not wish to subject his 
countrymen the miseries of civil war.543 Despite this, Paoli’s defeat made him 
susceptible to attacks over his conduct in Corsica.
The Middlesex Journal was the main opposition paper, and was thus where the 
majority of the scathing attacks on Paoli could be found. Opposition writers believed 
that Paoli had betrayed the cause of liberty by appealing to the ministry. The Review 
noted that “the great and worthy amongst us, and the people in general, have received 
him [Paoli] as he could wish, and will every day, be more warmly interested for him 
and his cause”.544 Despite the mass criticisms of Paoli from the opposition, I found 
many public articles concerning Paoli to be positive. For example, 3-6 November 1769
edition of the Lloyd’s Evening Post described that Paoli was invited to the Lord 
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Mayors Day entertainment, “which will doubtless bring numbers to see that great, 
though unfortunate chief”.545 Paoli was still described as ‘great’: his situation was 
considered to be ‘unfortunate’. The 17-20 November 1769 edition of the Independent 
Chronicle believed the pension Paoli was to receive from the government to be “poor 
compensation” for Britain “betraying him to the French”.546 Newspaper articles 
concerning Paoli were generally split between those supporting him, and those 
criticising him. The writings and accusations by the opposition were not necessarily 
intended as attacks directly on Paoli, but rather his affiliation with the ministry. Paoli 
was now merely a pawn caught within the political debates and arguments between 
opposition and ministry. Writers who criticised Paoli’s conduct were generally from 
the opposition. Those who supported Paoli were writers who supported the ministry. 
The writer of the Review, for example, was most definitely writing for the government,
as evidenced from his belief that it was Paoli’s “duty to restrain his feelings, to assume 
the moderation of the cabinet, and if our ministry have been wrong, to endeavour to set
them right”.547 The writer believed that the ministry could still correct its previous 
mistakes and aid the Corsicans. Thus, the Review was a defence of Paoli and the 
ministry.
Paoli’s affiliation with the ministry was the catalyst for the oppositions attacks upon 
his person, which forced him to place himself more firmly in the ministry camp. Paoli 
himself did not seem too fussed by the oppositions abandonment of the Corsicans 
cause. In a letter to his brother Clemente dated 29 November 1769, Paoli noted that 
some “wished to avail myself to fight the ministry”.548 The English, “seeing a stranger 
to the intrigues, the anti-ministerial writers lash out against me: but what does that 
matter? It makes deaf ear to these cries in London”.549 Paoli referenced the continuing 
popularity he still had amongst the masses in London. Whether Paoli’s popularity in 
Britain would remain as strong in the future was questionable, considering the fickle 
nature of the British public. Paoli arrived in England with a clear plan to gather as 
much support for the Corsican cause as possible. This is evidenced by Paoli’s letters 
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concerning France. In a letter to his brother Clemente, dated 3 November 1769, Paoli 
believed that the French “can not flatter himself to govern” Corsica; their rule would 
only result in the destruction of “the spirit of freedom”.550 Paoli maintained an anti-
French tone throughout his letters. He once complained to Count Rivarola that “I’m in 
the dark of the things in Corsica, when I should be informed with the greatest 
precision”.551 Paoli wanted constant updates regarding French rule of Corsica. Corsica 
was constantly at the forefront of Paoli’s thoughts and plans. The loss of support from 
the opposition was a blow. However, this was only of secondary importance to the 
attitude of the ministry, the support of which was far more highly sought after by Paoli.
Only British government support would enable Corsica to be retaken from the French. 
With the oppositions abandonment of the Corsican cause, Paoli was left even more 
reliant upon ministry support. Paoli’s only care, however, was for Corsica.
Paoli and the ministry 1769-1772
As previously noted, Paoli had multiple meetings with various ministers of state and 
nobility, including the Duke of Grafton. On the 26 September Paoli had a meeting with
the king. Th historian Moray Mclaren believes that Paoli’s “improbable” meeting with 
the king was due to the fact that Boswell’s book “made the figure of the General well 
known”.552 Boswell’s Account of Corsica had propelled the island to the forefront of 
public knowledge. To what extent did Boswell’s influence result in Paoli’s meeting 
with the king? It seems doubtful that the king merely wanted to meet the figure 
described in Boswell’s Account of Corsica. Paoli himself was quite clear over what his
intentions were for the meeting. In a letter to his brother Clemente, dated the 3rd 
October 1769, Paoli wrote that he was “well received by the king and queen”, and that 
several ministers had called upon him.553 Paoli hoped to “obtain something for the 
support of our exiled fellow-countrymen, if Vienna does nothing”.554 Clemente Paoli 
(1711-1794) was a priest and commander of the Corsicans during his brother’s rule of 
the island and was a constant pillar of support for his younger brother. Many Corsicans
were exiled in the Duchy of Tuscany, including Clemente. Tuscany was governed by 
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Leopold II (1747-1792), brother of the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II. The Austrian 
government seems to have provided little financial support for the Corsican exiles in 
Tuscany. Paoli hoped to gain financial support from the British government for the 
Corsican exiles. He wanted Clemente to send an accurate list of all our ‘friends’ who 
have gone into exile; “we must not be afraid of expense”.555 Paoli’s language here 
suggested that he had made some headway gaining British financial support for the 
Corsican exiles. Paoli told Clemente that the king had “spoken to me very earnestly of 
the affair”.556 Paoli believed that the eyes of the British people were “beginning to be 
opened”; they now “acknowledge the importance of Corsica”.557 Britain was obliged to
temporize regarding France for the moment; their hands were “tied at present”.558 Paoli
however believed that Britain “will be ready” for any war that may occur out with 
France.559 
War between Britain and France certainly seemed a close possibility in late 1769-1770,
especially with the Duc de Choiseul in charge of French policy. Choiseul (1719-1785) 
was France’s chief minister from 1766-1770; his primary policy was to rebuild 
France’s strength following the disastrous Seven Years War (1756-1763). More 
importantly, he aimed to do this at the expense of France’s chief rival Britain. Peter 
Thrasher, in his book Pasquale Paoli (1970) has stated that Paoli’s plan was to keep 
Corsica in the public eye, “until Choiseul’s aggressive policy produced, as Paoli 
thought it eventually must, a conflict between France and England”.560 As Thrasher 
notes, Paoli’s presence was “to remind the English politicians of the continued 
existence of the Corsican question”.561 Paoli’s aim was to gain as much support for the 
Corsican cause as possible, in the event of a future war between Britain and France. 
This sentiment was evident in Paoli’s letter to Count Rivarola, dated 20 December 
1769. Paoli noted that there was “no doubt that the occupation of Corsica by many 
powers was considered as a breach of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle”.562 He hoped at 
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the first sign of a new war between Britain and France, the point concerning Corsica 
“will be taken into account”.563 The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ended the War of the 
Austrian Succession in 1748, “was one of the principal bases on which lean the public 
right of Europe”.564 Paoli was sure that any change to the balance of power of Europe 
would concern both Britain and Austria. Austria were especially interested that the 
treaty “does not suffer the slightest alteration”.565 This was due to the House of 
Austria’s vested interest in the territories they possessed in Italy. Paoli, as previously 
noted in his letter to Clemente, believed that he was more likely to gain the support he 
needed from Britain rather than Austria.
How successful was Paoli in gaining active British governmental support for Corsica? 
He did receive a very generous pension from the British government. Various sources 
give conflicting figures, however, for the amount of Paoli’s pension. Thrasher placed 
the figure at £1200 per year.566 The 17-20 November 1769 edition of the Independent 
Chronicle recorded the amount to be £1000 per year.567 However, the most reliable 
source I found concerning the amount per year Paoli received as a pension comes from
George III’s own correspondence. The correspondence contained an ‘Account of 
money expended for foreign secret services by Lord Grantham’. The account was 
dated for the year 1782, some 10 years after the events, which gave the expense of 
Paoli’s pension as £1500 per year.568 Whether Paoli’s pension increased during his 
time in England remains unknown. Despite the obvious support Paoli had from the 
British government, however, there remained one problem for his plan; war between 
Britain and France needed to break out. Paoli himself was aware of this fact, as is 
highlighted in his letter to Rivarola, dated 20 December 1769. Paoli wrote that it was 
“true that the war can be far away”; however it was also true that “this tranquillity is 
increasingly insecure while it lasts, especially the split between the Porte and 
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Muscovy”.569 Paoli referenced the growing hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and
Russia. France was a known ally and supporter of the Turks. Paoli was kept up to date 
with the latest news concerning continental Europe. Due to the inter-connected nature 
of European politics, Paoli believed that “wars do not move with deliberate intention, 
but always arise when least expected, and a hundred incidents do that they can not 
avoid”.570 Paoli remained optimistic that a future European scale war would erupt, 
which would inevitably involve Britain, France and ultimately Corsica.
Paoli informed his friend Raimondo Cocchi in a letter dated the 8 January 1770, that 
“Parliament opens tomorrow, I’ll go there”.571 Raimondo Cocchi (died 1775) was a 
learned Florentine physician and a supporter of the Corsican cause. He was also author
of the little read work Letters on Corsica. The King’s speech opening parliament 
enabled Paoli to ‘speculate’ upon what the Commons would be discussing in the first 
part of the year. For Paoli, it was obvious that parliament would set out a peaceful 
plan, “because no one is on time, although I think all satiate too long a peace”.572 There
would be no immediate threat of war. Paoli however also noted that certain British 
politicians had hoped not for a ‘too long peace’ between Britain and France. The Duke 
of Grafton left office at the end January 1770 and was replaced by Lord North (1732-
1792) and his ministry (1770-1782). North was prime minister during the majority of 
Paoli’s exile in England. Paoli recorded in his letter to Burnaby, dated 4 March 1770, 
that Lord Chatham spoke “on the interest that there was not to leave Corsica to 
France”.573 Andrew Burnaby (1732-1812) was British travel writer, and Chaplain to the
British mission at Leghorn from 1762-1767. He visited Corsica in 1766, and wrote his 
own Journal of a tour of Corsica, which was only published in 1804. Burnaby was a 
correspondent of both Paoli and Boswell. Paoli noted in his letter to Burnaby a change 
in parliamentary proceedings from the first two months of 1770. Paoli informed 
Burnaby that “there was talk in the House [Of Lords] to the increase of sailors to get in
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a state of defence in view of hostile preparations of the House of Bourbon”.574 Large 
opposition from certain Lords in parliament led to the defeat of the motion. 
There were unmistakable tensions between Britain and the two Bourbon powers, 
France and Spain, which would become manifest in hostilities during the Falklands 
crisis in June 1770. The crisis began following the Spanish seizure of the Falkland 
Islands from British settlers. War became a real possibility, especially when France 
supported their ally Spain in the dispute. The Falklands crisis was discussed at length 
in the House of Lords on the 22 September 1770. These particular debates best 
encapsulated the discussions concerning the crisis. Lord Weymouth (1734-1796) was 
Secretary of State for the southern department from 1768-1770. During the majority of 
the eighteenth century, there were two offices that dealt with domestic, colonial, and 
foreign affairs. The Northern department dealt with Northern Europe, whilst the 
Southern department dealt with southern Europe, including Corsica. Weymouth urged 
caution on the matter, arguing that conquests were not “ever made without an expense 
exceeding, greatly exceeding their intrinsic value”.575 In the ‘glorious’ wars Britain had
previously engaged in, “the nation was still a sufferer”, especially with the large war 
debts incurred.576 Weymouth summed up the general attitude of Britain’s foreign 
policy during the early 1770s. There was a general desire to avoid conflicts with any 
European powers. The Earl of Hillsborough (1718-1793), Secretary of State for the 
colonies (1768-1772), added that the European world could potentially be plunged into
a war for years, over “what may probably be effected by a negotiation of a few 
weeks”.577
 Hillsborough perhaps summed up Britain’s new attitude in foreign policy best: 
“the prosperity of the British Empire is founded upon peace; while the sword is
sheathed, the arts are encouraged, the sciences extended- population spreads its
blessings through our territories- abundance smiles in every quarter, and all is joy”.578
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Britain was a commercial empire, whose chief wealth was industry and the number of 
its inhabitants. War would disrupt this prosperity. There were some who opposed this 
line of thought. The former prime minister, Lord Chatham argued that the first object 
of national defence was to maintain a superior naval force, larger than those of Spain 
and France combined.579 Chatham was Prime Minister during the Seven Years War and
was one of the main advocates of Britain’s continued dominance in European affairs. 
Lord Shelburne (1735-1805) maintained that the British government had such ‘feeble’,
‘incompetent’ hands, and “the reputation of the Kingdom is hourly given up”.580 
Although not directly referenced, the loss of Corsica was still in the back of 
Shelburne’s mind. Shelburne was Secretary of the Southern department in 1768, 
during the ‘Corsican crisis’. He resigned later that year due to a major falling out with 
his ministerial colleagues over the issue. The ghost of Corsica plagued the debates 
surrounding the Falklands crisis. Although never directly mentioned, discussions 
concerning Britain’s reputation were clearly all the more potent, considering the 
perceived weakness of England’s position from allowing the French to take Corsica. 
The Lords motion was 21 against, and 65 for the motion demanding more stern action 
concerning the Falklands crisis. In the end, no war came about. There was a general 
reluctance from the French regarding a war with Britain, especially from King Louis 
XV (1710-1774). Choiseul, the prime mover for war with Britain was dismissed in 
December 1770, leading the French to back down from their belligerent approach. The 
Spanish, without French support, eventually compromised, negotiating the return of 
the Falklands to Britain in January 1771, thereby ending the crisis. 
Choiseul’s dismissal from office in December 1770 put an end to any immediate hopes
Paoli had for a war between Britain and France. However, this was not the entire story.
There was a general reluctance from the British ministry to engage in any European 
wars. As the Earl of Hillsborough’s speech indicated, Britain was now an empire 
following the conquests made during the Seven Years War. Their aim was to hold 
rather than expand the territories of the empire. The unrest in America further justified 
the need to avoid any European entanglements. Where was Paoli during this period? 
The King, in a letter to Lord North dated 8 July 1770 informed the Prime Minister that 
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the King himself was to receive General Paoli “at half hour past six on Thursday 
evening at the Queen’s house”.581 Paoli kept in constant contact with the ministry and 
the King. The 24-26 January 1770 edition of the Independent Chronicle observed that 
Paoli “assiduously attends the levee of every minister almost ever since his arrival in 
England”.582 George III’s correspondence mentioned the meetings Paoli had with the 
King. Lord North’s letter to the King, dated 13 February 1771, noted that North, in 
obedience to the King’s commands, had appointed Paoli to wait on his “majesty at 
Queen’s house this evening at seven o’clock”.583 The King’s letter to Lord North, dated
11 June 1772, saw a similar request by Paoli to be granted an audience with the king.584
What was Paoli’s aim during these meetings? The intent of Paoli was indicated in Lord
North’s letter to the King, dated 12 June 1772. North sent this letter in response to the 
King’s letter from the previous day. North informed the King that he had been with 
Paoli all morning. North had informed Paoli that a payment of £1000 a month “could 
not be continued to the Corsicans who are in the Duchy of Tuscany longer than a 
twelve-month from this time”.585 Clearly, Paoli’s intention was to gain financial aid for 
the Corsican exiles in Tuscany, as indicated in his previous letter to Clemente. Paoli 
had been initially successful in this regard. This support however would be stopped by 
the end of the year. North explained to the King, that Paoli “remained with Lord North 
a considerable time”.586 The conversation ended with Paoli’s desire of an audience with
the king, “at any time your majesty will please to appoint”.587 
What can be gathered from these meetings Paoli had with Lord North and the King? 
Paoli was important enough to have continual meetings with the highest members of 
state. However, the positives ended there. Paoli was merely discussing financial aid for
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the Corsican exiles, not military assistance to regain Corsica, and he seemed to have 
continual problems gaining necessary financial support. The Home Office papers 
contained a letter from Paoli to Lord Rochford, dated 6 March 1773. Rochford (1717-
1781) was Secretary of the Southern department from 1770-1775. Paoli reminded 
Rochford of the “object of which he spoke on the last occasion”.588 Paoli informed 
Rochford that he “must communicate in time to his people in Tuscany the result of the 
request”, and wished to explain its importance by word of mouth.589 It can be gathered 
that Paoli’s ‘request’ of financial support for the Corsican exiles was successful. 
However, the fact remained that Paoli had to continually argue the importance of this 
financial aid to the British ministers. The ‘Account of money expended for foreign 
secret services’, dated 6 April 1783, amounted the ‘allowance for Corsican expenses to
do’ as £1500; the same amount as Paoli’s pension.590 It seemed that by 1783, the issue 
of Corsican expense had been resolved. What this episode revealed was the difficulty 
Paoli had in gaining anything from the British ministry concerning the Corsican cause. 
Paoli’s plan to gain British military aid to retake Corsica had failed. More importantly, 
Paoli needed the ministry more than they needed him. Paoli was not a slave of the 
ministry as claimed by the opposition: he could travel wherever and whenever he 
wanted. However, he was reliant on the pension and financial aid provided to the 
Corsican exiles by the British government. Ultimately, the British government 
remained Paoli’s greatest chance for restoration to Corsica.
What can be gathered from the period 1769-1772 concerning the Corsican cause in 
Britain? Any hope for British support for regaining Corsica remained remote, and thus 
so did Paoli’s aspirations for retaking the island. Government support for Paoli and the 
Corsicans can only be described as half-hearted at best. The difficulty Paoli found in 
gaining British financial support for the Corsican exiles in Britain, perfectly 
exemplifies the problems he faced in gaining any governmental assistance. The 
opposition had effectively disowned Paoli as their symbol of liberty. Therefore Paoli 
was obliged to seek support primarily from the ministry. Ironically, this situation only 
588  ‘General Paoli to Lord Rochford, 6 March 1773’, Calender of Home office Papers 1773-1775, ed. 
Richard Arthur Roberts, (London, Her majesty’s stationary office, 1899), 27.
589 ‘General Paoli to Lord Rochford, 6 March 1773’, Calender of Home office Papers 1773-1775, 27.
590 ‘Account of money expended for foreign secret services by Lord Grantham’, The Correspondence 
of King George The Third, vol. VI, 344 
129
further strengthened the ministry’s hand concerning both Paoli and the Corsican exiles.
Paoli as a symbol of liberty supported by the opposition was a far more dangerous 
proposition for the ministry than Paoli as an exile far from home. Paoli had little to 
bargain with when dealing with the ministry. All he could provide was the promise of 
Corsica’s potential wealth and strategic importance. Paoli’s attempt to persuade the 
British nation to undertake a major European campaign against France came at the 
wrong time. The focus of the ministry had shifted away from a Eurocentric foreign 
policy towards America: the problems in the thirteen colonies had gained far more 
importance within British foreign policy. 
Paoli and the future of the Corsican cause in Britain 1770-1775
Since his arrival in England, Paoli’s plan had been twofold. The first part had involved 
gathering as much support as possible. This had been hindered somewhat by the 
oppositions public disavowal of Paoli and the Corsican cause in Britain. The second 
part of Paoli’s plan was the hope that war between Britain and France would breakout. 
By 1770, war between Britain and France looked unlikely. The British ministry 
attempted to avoid any European entanglements at all costs. War between Britain and 
France would not break out in the short term. However, this did not mean that a war 
would not occur in the future. Paoli still had hope of gathering enough public support 
for Corsica. 
 By 1772 the situation had changed. Boswell’s Journal covered some of Paoli’s 
activities during his exile in England. More importantly, he reflected the general 
British attitude towards Paoli. Boswell was an avid note taker, particularly of people 
and their attitudes, and as such provided insights into peoples thoughts and opinions 
concerning Paoli. One such occasion was Samuel Johnson’s meeting with Paoli on 31 
March 1772. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) was a famous writer and essayist, whom 
Boswell knew prior to his trip to Corsica in 1765. Boswell idolized Johnson. He later 
famously published his biography the Life of Samuel Johnson (1791). Paoli, through 
Boswell, made a friendship with Johnson. After the meeting and dinner, Johnson went 
home with Boswell, where they drank tea. It was here Johnson commented that 
“General Paoli had lost somewhat of that grandeur in his air and manner which he had 
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when he came first to England”.591 Boswell believed the observation to be just, and in 
fact was “easily accounted for”.592 When Paoli first came to England, “he was just 
arrived from being at the head of a nation”; both in Corsica and Britain, “he was 
addressed in that high character”.593 However, “after having been near three years just 
in the style of a private gentleman, much of the majesty of his deportment must 
insensibly be lost”.594 Paoli was now only considered to be a private gentleman; the 
longer he stayed in exile, the more entrenched this persona of his became. 
Paoli certainly had lost his hold on popular memory by 1772. The British public were 
extremely fickle; Paoli and the Corsican cause had simply been forgotten as more time 
had passed. Boswell also noted an intriguing episode, on 19 March 1772, when he 
attempted to find Paoli’s house in London on Albemarle Street. The ‘chairman’ 
(Boswell does not give his name) did not know who Paoli was, until his ‘companion’ 
described him as “the foreign gentleman”.595 Boswell noted that “so little is the great 
Paoli known by some”.596 Paoli’s loss upon the public memory was not only due to the 
loss of his ‘grandeur’. The opposition’s public criticism of Paoli in 1769, certainly had 
damaged his public persona for the following years. Boswell also noted that Paoli had 
invited him to lodge at his house for the night. Boswell refused, due to “my being 
lodged there might give the Grub-street writers an opportunity of throwing out low 
abuse, and saying that he (Paoli) was pensioned by British generosity and kept a 
Scotsman gratis in his house”.597 Boswell also noted in his Journal, dated 25 March 
1775 of a dinner at the house of the bookseller Dilly. A certain ‘Davies’, a clergyman, 
“was finding fault with General Paoli as doing nothing but eat English beef”.598 
Boswell responded, by claiming that Paoli was “a game cock, ready to fight whenever 
there is a main. In the mean time he must be fed- George the Third, feeder”.599 The 
longer Paoli remained in exile in Britain, the harder it would become to justify the 
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lavish pension provided to him. The longer the Corsican exiles lingered, the more it 
seemed to become a hopeless cause. 
The newspapers from 1772-1775 contained several articles critical of Paoli’s stay in 
England. This criticism particularly focused on Paoli’s pension from the British 
government. The 2-5 April 1774 edition of the Middlesex Journal contained an article 
criticising Grafton, “that weak minister” for neglecting the Corsican and 
Mediterranean trade.600 The fall of Corsica to the French in 1769 was still a bitter pill 
for British writers to swallow even some five years after the actual events. Grafton 
“swot-led the nation with a pension to General Paoli for deserting the interest of his 
country”.601 The paper believed that the exiled Paoli was a poor reward for the relief 
efforts given to Corsica. Paoli after all “was neither a soldier nor a statesman”.602 The 
language used here to criticize Paoli, directly reflected that used by the opposition 
against Paoli in 1769. What should be remembered was that the Middlesex Journal was
one of the main opposition papers. Any criticism of Paoli inevitably meant an attack 
upon the ministry. The paper claimed that Paoli was “happy to retire with whole bones,
and to be paid for doing nothing”.603 
The criticism in the British newspapers concerning Paoli, was in contrast to the general
sentiment of support for the Corsicans themselves. 1774 saw a major revolt in Corsica 
against French rule. Little still is known about this uprising; questions such as who 
started it and how it was organised still persist. The lack of information about the 
revolt added to the mystery of Corsica for Britons. The 4 July 1774 edition of the 
Daily Advertiser contained an extract of a letter from Corsica, dated 26 May. The letter
claimed that the Corsicans were “assisted by those who followed General Paoli, and 
took refuge at Leghorn”.604 It was unlikely Paoli was directly involved in fomenting the
revolt. He did nevertheless have constant dispatches and updates from the island, as 
illustrated in Boswell’s Journal entry, dated 2 April 1776. Boswell noted that Paoli 
communicated to him in confidence, “some important intelligence concerning Corsica 
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and himself”.605 Paoli maintained constant correspondence with the Corsican exiles in 
Tuscany and elsewhere in Italy, who relayed to him news articles from the island. This 
was illustrated by Paoli’s letter to Luigi Ciavaldini, on October 2nd 1778. Luigi 
Ciavaldini fought for Paoli in Corsica, and later served as colonel and adjutant to Sir 
Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy of Corsica from 1794-1796. Paoli wanted Ciavaldini to say 
hello to “all good patriots”, and to thank a certain Mr Astoffi “for the news” from 
Corsica.606 In the future, Paoli informed Ciavaldini he would send his letters through 
either “the secretariat of the cav. Hamiliton or agent of the Neapolitan consul in 
London”.607 Paoli was the lynch pin for all Corsican exiles and supporters. He was also 
still a symbol of liberty for those on the island.  
The 4 July 1774 edition of the Daily Advertiser claimed that the rebellion had been 
formed by some ‘particular people’, but that their hopes for bringing over others to 
their cause had been “discovered before it could be put into execution”.608 The letter 
stated that mildness of government was best for a “wild and audacious set of 
people”.609 The French system was too harsh and tyrannical for the freedom loving 
Corsicans; what was needed was British constitutional government. The article 
concluded by asking how the Corsicans would react, “if supported by any power, and 
what is to be feared from them in case of a war”.610 The Corsicans were still considered
to be a warlike and dangerous people, potent in war: if Britain would support them, 
they would become a powerful asset. 
The 6 August 1774 edition of the Public Advertiser followed on from this supportive 
sentiment. The writer of the article who called themselves Probus, described that the 
Pieve of Niolo remained unconquered. In vain oppressive taxes had been levied and 
threats of punishment made: they could not “intimidate these asserters of the liberty of 
their country”.611 The influence of religious leaders eventually led to the surrender of 
this Pieve. After the surrender, forty-two prisoners of suspected families fell victim to 
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“Gallic perfidy and revenge”.612 Eleven of them were subjected to cruel and unmerited 
torture of the rack, and left to expire in sight of their countrymen. This episode, which 
was repeated among a number of newspapers, was a description of French cruelty, 
rather than Corsican bravery. France was the main enemy of Britain. They were the 
antithesis of Britain: the French were tyrannical and oppressive in contrast to British 
liberty and freedom. Probus believed that if these acts of heroism from the Corsicans 
had happened during the time of the Roman Republic, “either they [Rome] would have
sought their friendship and amity, or have conquered this isle to have associated them 
to the Roman Empire”.613 The article concluded that all of Europe “saw this little 
nation bravely defending its liberties, and it still remains unpited [sic] and 
unsupported”.614 The language used to describe the Corsicans in this newspaper was 
similar to that utilized in the time of the Corsican crisis in 1768-1769. In contrast to 
Paoli, the Corsicans were still portrayed to be ‘brave’ citizens continually fighting for 
their liberty. British newspapers still had a natural sympathy for the Corsicans 
themselves. The period 1770-1775 saw a clear separation in attitudes towards Paoli 
and towards the Corsicans themselves. For many Britons, there were those brave 
Corsicans on the island, and those lesser exiles in Britain, headed by Paoli.
The Corsican issue during the American Revolutionary war 1775-1783
The growing crisis between the American rebels and British government descended 
into war in 1775. Britain’s defeat at Saratoga in 1778 prompted both France and Spain 
to enter the war in 1778 and 1779 respectively. The entry of France into the war was 
what Paoli had been waiting for; with it would come the re-emergence of the Corsican 
issue in British foreign policy. However, there was no British attempt to take Corsica 
during the war. Why was this the case?  In fact, Paoli during these years remained 
rather inactive. He was elected to the Royal Society on the 3 March 1774, and mostly 
spent time with the literary and artistic circle that revolved around Samuel Johnson. As
seen from George III’s correspondence, Paoli from the years 1770-1773 had annual 
meetings with the King. There was no further mention of Paoli after this period. The 
Corsican issue had certainly become less popular and important by 1773. Even Paoli 
612 Public Advertiser, 6 August 1774.
613 Public Advertiser, 6 August 1774.
614 Public Advertiser, 6 August 1774.
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himself was considered to be less relevant; this feeling increased the longer he 
remained in exile in Britain. 
Boswell’s Journal recorded an interesting episode, his meeting with the king on 30 
May 1781. The journal noted that the king was aware of Boswell’s visit to Corsica, and
had read his Account of Corsica (1768). Upon the subject of Corsica, Boswell told the 
king that Paoli was “always very sensible to your majesty’s goodness to him. But 
though your majesty is pleased to make him very comfortable as a private gentleman, 
I, who have seen him in Corsica, am sensible that it is a sad change”.615 Two things 
strike me from this passage: the first is that Paoli was only considered to be a private 
gentleman, not leader of a nation; the second is that Boswell had accepted Paoli’s exile
in England. No longer was Boswell the firebrand, fighting for the Corsican cause; he 
merely accepted Paoli’s exile to be a ‘sad change’. The king believed Paoli was “a 
greater politician than a soldier”, to which Boswell replied that “the French have been 
at great pains to deprecate him as a soldier”; although Boswell was informed that Paoli
“had courage enough”.616 The King, and even Boswell, both doubted Paoli’s abilities 
as a soldier. No longer was he a great Roman general, bravely leading his forces; 
instead he was just a philosopher. The French were not the only ones who had doubted 
Paoli’s abilities as a soldier. Both the king and Boswell were certainly influenced by 
the opposition’s questioning of Paoli’s abilities and bravery as a general. The fact that 
George III doubted Paoli as a general, meant that he could not be trusted in any major 
military capacity. The king told Boswell that he did not mean Paoli to be deficient, 
“but that his forte was being a legislator- in short, putting law into a people who were 
lawless”.617 The king believed that Paoli was “a great deal better than the people among
whom he was. They were wild”.618 The king believed that the Corsicans themselves 
were uncivilised savages in the same mould as the Scottish Highlanders. Only Paoli 
could put ‘law’ into the ‘lawless’ Corsicans. Paoli was the epitome of the Corsican 
cause in Britain. Any British attempt to regain Corsica from the French would need 
Paoli’s support. Any questioning of his abilities and character could hinder any British 
615 Boswell, Boswell: Laird of Auchinleck, 1778-1782, ed. Joseph Reed and Frederick Pottle, (New 
York: McGraw-Hill book Company, 1977), 366.
616 Boswell, Boswell: Laird of Auchinleck, 366.
617 Boswell, Boswell: Laird of Auchinleck, 366.
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venture into Corsica. What is interesting to note, was that Boswell and the king’s 
discussions of Paoli all concerned his past actions in Corsica. There was no indication 
that Paoli would be able to return to Corsica in the future. The conversation between 
Boswell and the king took place in 1781, in the midst of the American Revolutionary 
War. There was no mention of the war, or its potential relation to Corsica. Why was 
this the case? 
The primary reason why there was no British attempt upon Corsica during the 
American Revolutionary war, was due to strategic and military considerations. As 
previously noted, British governmental interest was firmly fixed upon America, which 
was seen as crucial for Britain’s commercial system. Quashing the rebels was 
considered to be the primary objective. With the entry of France and Spain into the 
war, Britain was left firmly on the defensive, especially in the European theatre of war.
In previous wars such as the War of Austrian Succession (1742-1748) and Seven Years
War (1756-1763), Britain had always had a major continental power, such as Prussia 
or Austria, to tie down French forces in Europe. The American War was the first to see
Britain face a coalition of enemies unsupported and alone. In fact this was mainly due 
to the disastrous foreign policy of the North ministry, which saw Britain alienate most 
of the major powers in Europe. Their system of peace and stability had totally failed. 
Both Spain and France were always planning to revenge their losses to Britain from the
Seven Years War. With the focus upon operations in America, Europe became a 
secondary consideration. Minorca fell in 1781, and Gibraltar was under siege from 
1779-1783. There was no possible chance for an offensive against Corsica. Britain’s 
navy even suffered major naval defeats, most famously the Battle of the Chesapeake in
1781. They were far more reluctant to engage the new well equipped French fleets, 
especially in their own waters. There was even an invasion threat from both France and
Spain during these years. This situation made it impossible for any forays into the 
Mediterranean, especially with the loss of Minorca. 
In an interesting side-note to the war, some Corsican volunteers did fight for Britain 
during the war in Europe. Some were involved in the defence and evacuation of 
Minorca in 1781. These volunteers were then sent to assist the British during the Great 
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siege of Gibraltar. John Drinkwater (1762-1844), was a British army officer at 
Gibraltar. He kept a journal, which was published as A History of the late siege of 
Gibraltar (1786). On 25 July, 1782, Drinkwater noted that two ships were able to 
break through the blockade into Gibraltar. On these ships, was Signor Leonetti, 
nephew to Pascal Paoli, “the celebrated Corsican chief”.619 Paoli was still well known 
enough to be considered a ‘celebrated’ chief. Leonetti was accompanied by two 
officers, a chaplain, and sixty eight Corsican volunteers, “to offer their services to the 
governor” George Augustus Eliott (1717-1790).620 Despite the small numbers, 
Drinkwater still merited mentioning them in his published work. The volunteers 
attempted to show that Corsica and Britain could still maintain close connections. It 
was rather extraordinary that so many volunteered to fight for a nation who did so little
to aid Corsica when invaded by the French. One of the officers was Philip Masseria, 
who later served as Paoli’s emissary to Paris, during the 1790s. Drinkwater noted that 
the Corsican volunteers were formed into an independent corps, with Leonetti 
appointed captain commandant. The “governor quartered them on windmill-hill, and 
committed that post to their charge”, where they took an active part in the defence.621 
Despite their small numbers, the Corsican volunteers provided an important symbolic 
contribution, which showed that Corsica and Britain could maintain close relations. 
After the war, Masseria brought the company over to England, eventually meeting 
Paoli in London. Boswell noted Masseria’s arrival in England, in his Journal. On the 
24 March 1783, Boswell wrote that Masseria, and Pietro Colle, who had both served 
during the war, “were with the General every day at dinner”.622 Paoli still maintained 
followers in both England and Italy, through his pension from the British government. 
However, these were still few in number, and ultimately could not act without British 
governmental support.
Conclusion: Paoli’s failed plans?
Paoli arrived in Britain in September 1769 on the crest of a wave of popularity. By the 
1780s, the future of the Corsican cause in Britain looked bleak. How did this situation 
619 John Drinkwater, A History of the late Siege of Gibraltar, 2nd ed. (London, Printed by T. Spilsbury, 
1786), 249.
620 Drinkwater, A History of the late Siege of Gibraltar, 249.
621 Drinkwater, A History of the late Siege of Gibraltar, 251.
622 Boswell, Boswell: The Applause of the Jury 1782-1785, ed. Irmus Lustig and Frederick Pottle, (New
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come about? Paoli had a clear plan when he arrived in Britain: he wanted to gather as 
much support as possible for the Corsican cause, and hoped for a war to break out 
between Britain and France. Problems however began to arise with this plan. Paoli’s 
dealing with the ministry was seen by the opposition to be a betrayal of the cause of 
liberty. Samuel Vaughan was the first major opposition member to openly criticise 
Paoli. Vaughan could not understand why Paoli, an avid supporter of liberty, would 
seek help from a corrupt and weak ministry. Paoli attempted to play a political game 
whilst in England. He originally attempted to remain a political neutral, but Paoli 
understood that only the ministry’s support would enable him to regain Corsica from 
the French. After the fallout with Samuel Vaughan, Paoli began to openly distance 
himself from the opposition. This in turn caused them to more forcefully criticize his 
conduct. Paoli’s opportune absence from his proposed meetings with McCauley and 
Beckford gave further indication to the opposition of Paoli’s support for the ministry. 
He failed to understand the domestic politics of Britain: as he indicated to Count 
Rivarola, “I do not know how to bring myself”. In the end, this led to the opposition 
abandoning the Corsican cause entirely. Paoli’s reputation was damaged by the attacks 
from the opposition in 1769-1770, and he therefore became far more reliant upon 
British ministerial support. 
The period 1769-1772 was decisive for shaping the Corsican cause in Britain. The 
opposition claimed that Paoli had become a ‘slave’ of the ministry. This was certainly 
true when it came to gaining support for the Corsican cause: he was entirely in their 
power and debt. No action regarding Corsica could be taken without their support. 
Paoli sent far fewer letters to his fellow Corsican patriots after 1770. Why was this the 
case? Paoli wrote in a later letter to Rivarola that “I can not write at all, because, seeing
folk, the letters are opened. Oh God, how many spies”.623 Paoli was fearful of French 
spies; any leaked information could jeopardise the safety of those Corsicans in exile. 
Paoli’s language also suggested a distrust of the channels through which the letters 
were sent. Paoli could not fully trust the British government; they certainly were 
opening his letters to check their content. Paoli’s actions and letters were monitored by
the British government. Perhaps he had become the ‘slave’ of the ministry as 
623 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 184.
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prophesied by opposition writers. His only hope lay with a breakout of war between 
Britain and France. This did not occur in the short term due to the fall of Choiseul and 
the great reluctance of the British ministry to engage in a major European war. Since 
1763, the British ministry had abandoned the Eurocentric policy of their predecessors; 
their primary focus was on America and the Empire outside of Europe. Any major 
European war was seen to be too costly, especially following the debts Britain had 
gathered from the Seven Years War. Paoli was rather naive to believe that the same 
British ministry that had done nothing to aid Corsica during the French invasion in 
1768-1769, would come to aid him during the 1770s. Paoli’s reputation was damaged 
by the opposition to the extent that both ministry and king doubted his abilities. The 
king in particular doubted Paoli’s abilities as a general. The Corsicans themselves were
viewed as ‘savages’ and uncivilised: only Paoli could legislate and rule these lawless 
Corsicans. Any future British venture into Corsica needed Paoli involved to be 
successful. Paoli was the epitome of the Corsican cause within Britain; any weakness 
shown on his part hindered the cause.
The period 1772-1775 was a transition stage for Paoli and the Corsican cause in 
Britain. The longer Paoli and the Corsicans remained in exile in Britain, the more their 
cause became forgotten. Corsica did not remain at the forefront of news for long. 
Despite the continued presence of articles and pamphlets concerning Corsica during 
these years, there were markedly fewer than during the late 1760s. Paoli was seen to be
a private gentleman and citizen; the longer his exile persisted, the lesser his importance
to European politics became. Those articles that mentioned Paoli and the Corsicans, 
spoke of their past deeds and former greatness. The language talked of a defeated 
cause; not one where Paoli and the Corsicans could regain Corsica from the French. 
Paoli seemed to represent a bygone age; by the 1780s he was a hero from some fifteen 
years before. Lack of real action had ultimately hindered the Corsican cause in Britain. 
Paoli’s plan to keep Corsica in the British public eye had failed. The American 
Revolutionary War highlighted how far down Corsica was on the British governmental
agenda. The war fought in America became the focus for military operations. The war 
in Europe was only a secondary theatre; Britain in this front was firmly on the 
defensive. Military and strategic considerations ultimately meant that Corsica would 
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not be discussed during this war. The war also highlighted the powerlessness of Paoli 
in Britain; only the British government could decide whether Corsica would become a 
strategic target. Paoli had no influence on British governmental affairs. This was in 
part due to the fact that he was both a foreigner and a Catholic. Due to his long exile, 
he was only seen to be a private gentleman; not a King or leader. Paoli had lost his 
regal authority and aura of character.
Therefore, the period from 1769-1783 can only be considered a failure for the Corsican
cause in Britain. The Corsican cause was constantly attempting to survive and preserve
its relevance for Britain. Perhaps what should really be asked is whether the British 
government ever really contemplated taking back Corsica after the French conquest in 
1769? Any invasion would be difficult, and would cost much in manpower and money 
in return for an underdeveloped island. The American Revolutionary War did however 
produce a number of important changes in British foreign policy. Now that America 
was independent, she was no longer the primary focus of Britain’s foreign policy. 
Also, the loss of Minorca to Spain during the war meant that Britain had no base in the 
Mediterranean, barring Gibraltar. With the increased strength and power of the French 
navy, a base in the Mediterranean became far more relevant within British foreign 
policy, especially with the main French naval base located at Toulon (See Appendix 1 
for proximity of Toulon to Corsica). Britain did begin to take an active role again in 
Europe during the 1780s; their role in restoring the Stadtholder to Holland in 1787, 
along with Prussia, was considered to mark their revival within European affairs. 
Ironically, Paoli and the Corsicans greatest chance for restoration came not from 
Britain, but France. The French Revolution in 1789 would change political and 
strategic considerations in Europe. It was always extremely unlikely Britain would 
have risked any venture into Corsica. The British government never considered the 
advantages to be gained from the island great enough to risk an invasion. A British 
invasion of the island did indeed occur in 1794, during the French revolutionary wars. 
The fact that a British invasion of the island occurred at all was the most surprising 
aspect of this episode. A set of unique circumstances needed to be in place in order for 
any British intervention to occur. It was only Paoli’s presence and support on the 
island, which had prompted the British to act. Paoli was always vital to any British 
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venture into Corsica. He had gained political relevance once again with his restoration 
to the island in 1790. Perhaps the most important event to occur between 1769-1789, 
was Paoli’s conversion as a British agent. Paoli’s long exile in Britain had made him 
admire everything about the English nation. It was his initiative that led the British to 
invade the island in 1794. This led to one of the most remarkable conquests in British 
imperial history: the short lived Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796), which will be 
the subject of the final chapter.
141
The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 1794-1796: An ‘Experiment’ in British constitutional
government
On 26 December 1795 Sir Gilbert Elliot (1751-1814),Viceroy of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom (1794-1796), wrote a dispatch to the Home Secretary William Cavendish-
Bentinck, the Duke of Portland (1738-1809). In the dispatch, Elliot claimed that he 
could ‘justify’ for the first time “the experiment that has been made”; English 
government was ‘firmly’ established in Corsica.624 The ‘experiment’ Elliot referred to 
was the recently formed Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, a unique constitutional form of 
government unprecedented in the history of the British Empire. Perhaps what was 
more strange was the fact that Britain intervened in Corsica at all. As noted in the 
previous chapter, Pasquale Paoli (1725-1807) leader of the independent Corsican 
Republic, had sought exile in Britain following the French conquest of Corsica in 
1769. Paoli spent the next twenty years in Britain, languishing on the rather generous 
pension provided for him by the British government. For Paoli and the small number 
of Corsican exiles in Britain, any possibility for their return to Corsica seemed 
extremely remote. The British government was simply unwilling to intervene for a 
relatively rudimentary island. Britain was a commercial empire; their primary 
objective was to secure lucrative trade links. Corsica was not worth the expense of a 
war with France: a set of unique circumstances needed to be in place in order for any 
British intervention in Corsica to happen. 
The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 would dramatically change the geo-
strategic considerations of the major powers in Europe. It also brought about 
fundamental changes for Paoli and the Corsican exiles. Paoli was invited back to 
Corsica by the new French National Assembly in 1790. The new French revolutionary 
government espoused the three ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Paoli was seen 
to encapsulate these new ideals of the French revolution. The French invasion of 
Corsica in 1768 was perceived by the French revolutionaries to have been a battle 
between liberty and tyranny. Paoli and his Corsicans were seen to be on the side of 
liberty, battling against the forces of the tyrannical French monarchy. Paoli was 
624 FO 20/9 Elliot to the Duke of Portland, 26 December 1795.
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subsequently elected president of the new department of Corsica, returning to Corsica 
in July 1790. Paoli however remained a fervent supporter of the British constitutional 
monarchy, this support stemming from his twenty years of exile in England. Paoli’s 
loyalty to the new French government would be put to the test in 1793, when France 
declared war on Britain. For Paoli, the French revolution had fundamentally changed 
by 1793: the king Louis XVI (1754-1793) had been executed in January 1793, and the 
new Committee of Public safety had began a system of ‘terror’, aimed at eliminating 
the internal ‘enemies’ of the Republic. Paoli subsequently ‘invited’ the British to 
intervene in Corsica. Following the British expulsion from Toulon in December 1793, 
the British fleet under Admiral Samuel Hood (1724-1816) needed another naval base 
in the Mediterranean. Paoli’s invitation prompted the British to establish the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom in 1794. The union was spoken of in ‘universal’ terms, with Paoli 
noting that the protection of Great Britain promised for Corsica “prosperity and power,
uninterrupted for ages”.625 However, the Kingdom would only last for two years, with 
the evacuation of the island completed by the 21 October 1796. 
Why did the Anglo-Kingdom fail? This will be one of the fundamental questions I will
attempt to answer in this final chapter. I will argue that the establishment of the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom was the result of continued British interest in Corsica throughout 
the eighteenth century.  Britain and Corsica were both seen as islands of liberty with a 
shared kinship. It was this idea that directly influenced the formation of the unique 
style of constitutional government adopted for Corsica in 1794. The same language 
and arguments that had been used to try to convince the British government to 
intervene in Corsica in 1768, were used again in 1794. Both the Corsican Crisis in 
1768-1769 and Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 1794-1796 can be linked by one principal 
actor: Pasquale Paoli. Ironically, the arguments used to prompt British intervention in 
Corsica would sow the seeds of doubt and cause Britain’s eventual disillusionment 
with the Anglo-Corsican ‘experiment’. The promise of an island ripe for development 
was an illusion. It was clear that by the end of 1796 that the ‘experiment’ had failed 
and that both Corsica and Britain had rejected any notion of union. How did the union 
fail so spectacularly within two years? This chapter will be divided into three major 
625 The Annual Register, or, a view of the History, Politics and Literature for the Year 1794, Mocavo 
UK, Web. 02 October 2014, 99.
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sections. The first will cover the events and circumstances that led to the formation of 
the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The second section will study the constitution and 
politics of the island. The final section will study the events which led to the eventual 
fall of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Ultimately the fall of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom was initiated by a Corsican more famous than Paoli himself: Napoleon 
Bonaparte (1769-1821). 
Historians on the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom
Before delving into the formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, I will briefly 
discuss the historiographical debates concerning Britain’s acquisition of Corsica in 
1794. One of the first major works concerning the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was 
Robert Palmer’s article The Kingdom of Corsica and the science of history (1961). In 
it, Palmer argues that the formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was directly 
linked to the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1801). Both Britain and France “took 
advantage of discontents within enemy states”.626 With the case of Corsica, Britain 
used Paoli and his party to gain a foothold on the island. Palmer followed this article 
with the publication of the second volume of his book The Age of the democratic 
revolution (1964). Within the book, Palmer placed the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 
within the framework of counter-revolutionary governments, arguing that the Anglo-
Corsican government represented an alternative model to the French revolution.627 The 
model of Corsica was meant to ‘resemble’ England. The purpose of the new regime 
was to protect ‘liberty and religion’ against the ‘anarchy’ of the French.628 Palmer 
merely categorizes the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom as another version of Counter-
revolution. He compared the British actions in Corsica to the brief occupation of Italy 
by Austrian and Russian forces in 1799. Palmer’s argument misinterprets the context 
and circumstances surrounding the formation of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom. The 
constitution was created uniquely for Corsica, and in fact contained many differences 
from the British version. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was not a counter-
revolutionary model at all. Britain attempted to provide its own alternative 
626 Robert Palmer, “The Kingdom of Corsica and the science of history”, American Philosophical 
society, vol.105, no. 4, (1961), 354-360, 355.
627 Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, Part 2, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 286
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constitutional model to the French Revolution. For the Corsicans, it was a choice 
between French Revolutionary or British constitutional government.
Elisa Carrillo followed on from Palmer’s original article concerning Corsica. In her 
article The Corsican Kingdom of George III (1962), Carillo expresses her belief that 
the British occupation of Corsica was “one of the most fascinating episodes of the wars
of the French revolution”.629 Carillo agrees with Palmer that British Corsica 
represented “an attempt to roll back the tide of Jacobinism in the Mediterranean area”, 
by attempting to ‘implant’ in Southern European soil, features of the British 
constitutional system.630 Carillo goes into far more depth and detail than Palmer 
concerning Corsica, using a variety of archival sources to support her arguments. She 
believes that “strategic considerations rather than a desire to universalize the Anglo-
Saxon way of life provided the initial impetus for Britain’s occupation of Corsica”.631 
Ultimately “the kingdom hurt the very cause it was intending to serve- the war against 
revolutionary France- for it aroused the hostility of Spain” which caused the eventual 
evacuation of the island.632 Spain was a former ally of Britain in the war against 
France. Spain would eventually turn against Britain, declaring war in October 1796. 
Spain’s role in causing the British evacuation of Corsica will be discussed at length in 
the final section of this chapter.
Desmond Gregory agrees with Carillo that strategic considerations ultimately caused 
both the formation and eventual fall of the Corsican Kingdom. Gregory’s book The 
Ungovernable Rock (1985) provides the most comprehensive study of the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom from a British perspective. It argues that the occupation of Corsica 
“made considerable sense as an integral part of allied strategy in a war against 
revolutionary France”, and in relation to “British strategy in the Mediterranean over 
more than a century”.633 Gregory was the first major historian to link the establishment 
629 Elisa Carillo, “The Corsican Kingdom of George III”, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 34, no. 3
(September 1962), 254-274, 254.
630 Carillo,“Corsican Kingdom”, 254.
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632 Carillo, “Corsican Kingdom”,274.
633 Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, and its 
role in Britain’s Mediterranean Strategy during the Revolutionary War (1793-1797), (Cranbury: 
Associated University Presses, 1985), 11.
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of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom to previous interests Britain had maintained in the 
Mediterranean during the eighteenth century. Gregory merely views British interest in 
Corsica through the spectrum of strategic considerations, however. He believes that 
Britain’s “military and naval requirements could well have been satisfied by the 
leasing of bases”.634 This argument overlooks the previous political notions Britain had
concerning Corsica. I aim to argue that the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom cannot be 
understood without understanding the previous relations between Britain and Corsica 
during the eighteenth century. The strange and unique Anglo-Corsican constitution can
only be understood by knowing the previous notions and ideals Britain had concerning 
Corsica. Both Britain and Corsica were sister isles of liberty: Corsica was merely 
viewed as a less developed version of Britain. Corsica could be developed through 
British commerce and industry. If British interest in Corsica had merely been 
military/strategic, only the main naval and military bases would have been seized, as 
with Gibraltar and Minorca. 
Corsica was in fact one of the largest European states to be ruled by Britain during this 
period. In contrast, Hanover was in personal union with Britain, where in theory the 
two states “retain their independence under a common ruler”.635 Nick Harding in his 
book Hanover and the British Empire 1700-1837 (2007) argues that the relationship 
between Hanover and Britain extended further than dynastic union. However, Harding 
acknowledges that there was a “high degree of mutual independence between Hanover 
and Britain”.636 Hanover and Britain “retained separate laws, governments, churches, 
and representative assemblies throughout the dynastic union”; although there were 
certain instances of legal and institutional convergence.637 The other British territories 
in Europe, Gibraltar and Minorca, were merely military bases. The Anglo-Corsican 
kingdom provides a unique insight into how the British Empire would rule any 
territories captured in Europe during the eighteenth century. British conquests in 
Europe during this period were rare, and were usually small bases or islands. Corsica 
was a larger island with a moderately sized native catholic population. Perhaps the 
634 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 11.
635 Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire 1700-1837, vol. 4, (Woodbridge: The Bovdell Press,
2007), 7.
636 Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 8.
637 Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 8.
146
only comparison of note was Ireland; however the history and circumstances of the 
two islands were completely different. As will be illustrated, Britain treated European 
conquests far differently from those outside of Europe. What all the major historians 
do agree on is the fundamental rejection of any notion of a British-Corsican union after
1796. Was this really due to the idea that Corsica was an ‘ungovernable rock’ as 
described by Gregory in the title of his book? Why did Corsica look to France for 
union rather than Britain after 1796?
French Revolution 1789-1792: The return of Paoli to Corsica
As discussed at length in the previous chapter, Paoli had been in exile in England since
1769. The British government had made no attempt to aid Paoli in recapturing Corsica 
from the French. Paoli’s greatest chance of restoration came in 1789, with the 
unexpected events surrounding the French Revolution. The Revolution saw a complete
change of French government and identity. The declaration of the Rights of Man, 
proclaimed that all “men are born and remain free and equal in rights”.638 These rights 
were defined as “liberty, property, personal safety and resistance to oppression”.639 The
ideals of the French revolutionaries appeared to be similar to those professed by Paoli 
some twenty years earlier. Paoli was kept informed of these events. He had sent his 
fellow Corsican Philip Masseria to Corsica to ascertain the intentions of the Corsicans 
themselves. Masseria was previously the Captain of a detachment of Corsicans who 
served in Gibraltar during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783). Masseria 
would serve both Paoli and the British government as an agent in Corsica and 
elsewhere. He would later serve as Paoli’s eyes and ears in London, when the General 
was in Corsica. Masseria reported to Paoli on the 28 September 1789 that the 
inhabitants had “taken the government of the island upon themselves”.640 One of the 
Corsican deputies, Bartolomeo Arena, was in London, “to know the intentions of 
General Paoli”.641 Arena asserted that if the Corsicans had “but a proper supply of 
arms, their own people were sufficient to drive all the French out of the island”.642 At 
this point in time, Paoli and his network of Corsican exiles were still attempting to 
638 François Furet, The French Revolution, tr. Stephen Hardman, (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
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secure a free and independent Corsica. Paoli thus took advantage of the relative chaos 
and uncertainty that surrounded the Revolution. 
On Corsica itself, Masseria informed Paoli that Bastia (the capital) had deposed the 
chief magistrate of the island and 13 other persons who were considered to be 
“attached to the late despotic measures” had been banished.643 Paoli and Masseria 
however were keeping their options open. Masseria informed Paoli that he soon meant 
to go to Versailles himself, where he was sure of being “well reviewed by some in the 
assembly who are great enthusiasts in the Corsican cause”.644 The French 
revolutionaries greatly admired Paoli’s fight against the French despotic regime some 
twenty years prior. The revolutionaries and Paoli had both struggled against the same 
despotic French government for the cause of liberty: the Corsican cause had become 
identified with the French revolutionary ethos. This was a very important, if somewhat 
unrecognised moment. There was a clear separation between the former French 
despotic government which had conquered Corsica, and the new French revolutionary 
regime. Paoli’s general anti-French bias would be replaced by a general reversion 
against any kind of despotism. The French revolutionary ideals could be identified 
with Paoli’s notions of liberty. Masseria informed Paoli that he had a passport from the
national assembly, and would soon go back to Corsica. Masseria planned to “unite the 
inhabitants, and advise them to recall General de Paoli, when I think it is the proper 
time”.645 He would act in the “same spirit that animates the French at this moment”.646 
The fight for Corsica’s independence was seen to be similar to the French 
revolutionary movement, and thus Paoli and the Corsican exiles were willing to work 
with the French revolutionary government.
Pasquale Paoli was invited by the national assembly to return to Corsica in early 1790. 
Paoli left England in late March 1790. On his way back to Corsica, Paoli visited Paris 
in April 1790. The April 27th edition of the Whitehall Evening Post contained Paoli’s 
address made to the national assembly on the 24 April 1790. Paoli proclaimed “the 
643 FO 95/4/6,Intelligence from Masseria, 28 September 1789.
644 FO 95/4/6,Intelligence from Masseria, 28 September 1789.
645 FO 95/4/6,Intelligence from Masseria, 28 September 1789.
646 FO 95/4/6,Intelligence from Masseria, 28 September 1789.
148
present is the happiest day of my life”.647 He thanked the members of the National 
Assembly for restoring “the first of virtues” and the Corsicans liberties.648 After 
spending several months in Paris, Paoli arrived in Corsica on 17 July 1790, “to the 
great joy of the Corsicans”.649 A number of Corsicans had been sent to escort Paoli to 
Corsica, including a young Napoleon Bonaparte. How far were Paoli’s sentiments 
concerning France genuine? There were immediately questions raised over Paoli’s 
loyalty to the new French regime. The 19-21 August London Chronicle noted that 
Antoine Christophe Saliceti (1757-1809), one of the Corsican deputies in the National 
Assembly, complained that “the enemies of the public had circulated an accusation 
against General Paoli, of having influenced the Corsicans to put themselves under the 
protection of Great Britain”.650 Saliceti offered to prove the Corsican people were 
‘satisfied’ of being united to the French Empire. The 6 November Edition of the Argus
contained the proceedings in the National Assembly dated from 28 October 1790. 
Matteo Buttafoco (1731-1806) had made an ‘aristocratic complaint’ against Paoli, 
claiming that he had “maliciously excited in Corsica” opposition against the French 
regime.651 Buttafoco was a Corsican aristocrat, who had previously served Paoli during
the 1760s. In 1764 he had proposed to Rousseau to write a constitution for an 
independent Corsica, but joined the French army during the invasion of Corsica in 
1768. In a later letter Paoli sent to Masseria dated 24 October 1793, Paoli noted in the 
margin that Buttafoco had “betrayed his country and benefactor”. Therefore Paoli had 
no regard “for a vagabond”.652 There was a clear dislike between the two men. 
Buttafoco’s complaint was rejected by the other members of the Assembly. Some of 
these Corsican deputies in the National Assembly would cause problems for Paoli in 
the future. Even Saliceti would turn against Paoli in 1793 when the truth was known; 
Paoli was secretly a supporter of Britain.
Paoli was a converted British agent and great admirer of the British constitutional 
system. This was most evident in the speech Paoli gave to the Corsican assembly on 9 
September 1790. Paoli’s long time friend and admirer James Boswell (1740-1795) had 
647 Whitehall Evening Post, 27 -29 1790; Issue 6480.
648 Whitehall Evening Post, 27 – 29 April 1790.
649 English Chronicle or Universal Evening Post, 14 August 1790; Issue 1701.
650 London Chronicle, 19-21 August, 1790; Issue 5305.
651 Argus, 6 November, 1790; Issue 520.
652 FO 20/22 Supplementary Papers 1783-1798, Paoli to Masseria 24 October 1793.
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a copy of the speech sent from Paoli. Boswell subsequently translated and published 
the speech in the December 1790 edition of The Gentleman’s Magazine. Paoli noted 
that throughout the ages, his “countrymen have been obliged to take up arms”.653 Paoli 
wanted his listeners to recollect the Corsican Republic, which he had “almost entirely 
delivered from its external and internal enemies”.654 Corsica was now united with the 
French Empire, and subsequently a “sharer in its glory”. Corsica became a department 
of France in March 1790, and had an equal status in theory to all the other departments.
Paoli was careful to praise the wonderful “advantages” the French Revolution had 
provided for Corsica. 655  However, he never wavered in his “profound gratitude” to 
that “powerful and generous nation” from which he had just left after twenty years of 
exile.656 Paoli considered Britain to be a “second native country, after being deprived of
my own”.657 Paoli’s praise of Britain went beyond merely thanking that nation for 
providing him asylum during his twenty years of exile. Britain’s strength was derived 
from its “august monarch, who possess every virtue, and who is truly worthy of the 
homage of a free and generous people”.658 Paoli acknowledged that his sentiments 
concerning Britain will give “the smallest uneasiness to our generous French 
brethren”.659 
Paoli believed that there were several fundamental similarities between the British and 
new French political systems. Most importantly, both were now constitutional 
monarchies, where the power of the monarch was constrained by legislation and 
statutes. Paoli noted the gracious reception he had received from the French monarch 
Louis XVI (1754-1793) in Paris. Louis was pleased to give “the flattering commission 
which he instructed to me to endeavour to re-establish tranquillity among the people of
this island”.660 Paoli was clearly an ardent supporter of the French King, and of 
monarchy in general. This was due to his twenty years of exile in Britain, where he 
experienced the ‘generosity’ provided by King George III (1738-1820). Paoli indeed 
653 Pasquale Paoli, “Letter, Boswell, James”, The Gentleman’s Magazine: and Historical Chronicle; 
December 1790, vol. 60, no. 6, 1174-1176, 1174.
654 Paoli, “Letter, Boswell”, Gentleman’s Magazine, 1174.
655 Paoli, “Letter, Boswell”, Gentleman’s Magazine, 1175.
656 Paoli, “Letter, Boswell”, Gentleman’s Magazine, 1176.
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659 Paoli, “Letter, Boswell”, Gentleman’s Magazine, 1176.
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knew George III relatively well, having had a number of meetings with him. Paoli’s 
twenty years of exile had slowly transformed the previously zealous Republican 
Corsican patriot into an avid defender of Constitutional monarchy. France had recently
been transformed into a constitutional monarchy, similar to Britain. Paoli’s support for 
Britain and monarchy in general were not universally known. Paoli remained indebted 
to the national Assembly for his return to Corsica. His ideas concerning Britain could 
be placed aside for the time so long as the status-quo remained. His loyalties to the 
French Republic would be put into question when circumstances changed. 
War between Britain and France 1793- Corsica a strategic target?
Two important events would occur in early 1793 that would challenge Paoli’s loyalties
to the new French Republic. The first saw Louis XVI executed on 21 January 1793. 
During 1792, France declared war on Austria, and found themselves at war with a 
number of European powers. France was declared a Republic on the 22 September 
1792, two days after the French victory over Prussia at Valmy. The King was 
eventually put on trial in January 1793 and found guilty of crimes against the Republic.
Paoli was of the opinion that the execution of the king “endangers Frances civil 
war”.661 Paoli acknowledged that he, like his friend the Abbot Andrei, always 
supported “the cause of the king”. The Abbot Andrei was a representative of Corsica in
the National Assembly of France. For Paoli, Louis’ execution was certainly not 
needed, especially since France was “surrounded by fierce enemies”.662 For Paoli, the 
second major event to occur in 1793 was the French declaration of war on Britain and 
the United Provinces on the 1 February. Spain was also soon at war with France in 
March. The possibility of British intervention in Corsica became more of a possibility 
after the declaration of war. As seen in the last chapter, Britain had been unable, or 
unwilling, to intervene in Corsica during the American Revolutionary War (1775-
1783), in which Britain had faced both Spain and France in the European theatre, 
where she had been firmly on the defensive: the focus of Britain’s attention had been 
firmly on America. With the outbreak of war with France in 1793, circumstances were 
very different. Britain found themselves as part of coalition of European powers facing
661 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, ed. Niccolo Tommaseo, (Florence: Gio Pietro Vieusseux, 
1846), 375.
662 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 375.
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an emergent French Republic. The British fleet was therefore able to freely enter 
Mediterranean waters with Spain as an ally. 
Even before 1793, Corsica was still within British governmental interests, as was 
evidenced by the letters of intelligence received by the British Foreign Office from 
Philip Masseria, who worked as an agent and spy for both Paoli and the British 
government. As early as the 5 September 1789, Masseria noted that he would attempt 
to prove that the both the Corsicans and British were still willing to form an alliance 
with each other.663 In another letter sent to the foreign office on the 30 September 1790,
Masseria claimed that the Corsicans still had “an enthusiasm of everything that is 
English”.664 Masseria claimed that the Corsicans still secretly supported Britain. This 
stemmed back from the British moral and material support sent to the Corsicans during
the French invasion in 1768-1769. The Corsicans would soon have to make a choice; a 
future with Britain or France. Masseria sent another ‘secret’ letter on the 30 October 
1790. Contact had been made through Florence via a certain Mr Harvey. John Harvey 
(1757-1796) was Britain’s minister to Tuscany from 1787-1794. Harvey was the 
avenue through which Masseria sent his letters to England. Within this letter, Masseria 
named Ajaccio as “the most eligible place in Corsica for the English, as having a very 
gracious and good harbour, a fine citadel regularly built and a large, and rich country 
around it”.665 Masseria was detailing for the British ministry the possibility of seizing 
Ajaccio as a fortified port, similar to the role played by Port Mahon in Minorca before 
1783. Masseria would leave it to the ‘minister’ to consider the proposition. The 
‘minister’ in question was most likely Francis Osborne, Duke of Leeds, who served as 
foreign secretary from 1783-1791. 
What was the intention of Britain during this episode? At this point in time, the French 
Revolution was only in its early stages, and Britain and France were not even at war. 
Perhaps the British ministry had hoped to take advantage of the apparent instability 
caused by the French Revolution: Britain was contemplating a potential war that could 
breakout between themselves and an unstable French government. Whatever the case, 
663 FO 95/4/6, From Captain Masseria, 5 November 1789.
664 FO 20/22, From Captain Masseria, 30 September 1790.
665 FO 20/22, From Captain Masseria, 30 October 1790 (Secret).
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British governmental interest in Corsica had not diminished, especially with the 
Anglophile Paoli now on Corsica. Masseria was clearly attempting to revive British 
interest in Corsica, and was most likely working for Paoli. It is unlikely that Paoli 
would not have known about Masseria’s correspondence with Britain, for he probably 
orchestrated this correspondence: using Masseria as contact would deflect any 
suspicions the French authorities had concerning Paoli’s own intentions. What is clear 
is that British interest in Corsica had been reignited following the French Revolution in
1789, with prompting by the Anglophile Paoli. Even at this early juncture of the 
French Revolution, Paoli was attempting to draw Britain to Corsica. At this point in 
time, Britain’s interest was merely contained to acquiring Ajaccio as a naval base. The 
British ministry did not act upon this apparent support of Britain amongst the 
Corsicans in 1790. Francis Osborne was considered to be an unreliable foreign 
minister, incapable of aggressive policy.  However the seed of thought had been laid: 
Corsica had re-entered the sphere of British imperial interest.
In a later letter sent on the 16 August 1793, Masseria informed the British Foreign 
Office that the French had been watching him: they had intercepted his letters to the 
British and therefore no letters had been sent since 1790. By the time Masseria wrote 
this letter, the situation had changed. Paoli and his supporters had been declared rebels 
by the French government; therefore Britain was “free in honour and convenience” to 
aid the Corsicans. There had always been question marks raised concerning Paoli’s 
loyalty to the French National Assembly. The situation came to a head during the 
proposed French invasion of Sardinia from Corsica in January 1793. The expedition, of
which Napoleon was a part, was a complete failure. There were rumours of treachery, 
as the Sardinians had been well informed of the intended invasion. Paoli was suspected
to have played a part in the failure of the expedition. Ferdinand Gregorovius recorded a
conversation in his book Wanderings in Corsica Vol II (1855) between Paoli and his 
friend Pier Paulo Colonna di Cesari Roccas, who had commanded the failed 
expedition. Paoli reminded Cersari that “Sardinia is the natural ally of our island”.666 
666 Ferdinand Gregorovius, Wanderings in Corsica: Its History and its Heroes, vol. II, tr. Alexander 
Muir, (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and CO, 1855), 152.
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Whatever the truth of the matter, by January 1793 the National Assembly in Paris 
distrusted Paoli. Two French commissioners were soon sent to Corsica: Paoli was well 
aware of their true intentions. In a letter sent to his good friend, and fellow Corsican 
patriot Gain Francesco Galeazzi, Paoli noted that the commissioners design was “to 
persuade our department of the bad affection to France, and this through the work of 
my influence”.667 Galeazzi was president of General Council of the department (later a 
member of parliament of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom) and one of Paoli’s main 
correspondents and confidants during his time in Corsica. In the letter to Galeazzi, 
Paoli expressed that he still loved “the connection with France, because, for the social 
pact, with it we have shared everything; and every advantage and every honour like all 
other individuals of the Republic, we have the right to participate”.668 Paoli believed 
that the arrival of the two French commissioners had placed the ‘department’ of 
Corsica into “insurrection, and exposed [it] to the horrors of a civil war”.669  Paoli was 
denounced by the Republican party of nearby Toulon, and was summoned to the bar of
the Convention in April 1793. Paoli in his letter to Galezzi, noted that Joseph 
Bonaparte, elder brother to Napoleon, was “the editor of the Toulon club 
representation against me and Pozzo di Borgo”.670 Paoli refused to comply with the 
summons to Paris, and instead summoned the deputies from all the cities and 
communes of Corsica. These met in May, and sustained Paoli in opposition; revolt 
soon spread throughout the island. The commissioners with the aid of some Corsican 
republicans attempted to set up a rival government at Ajaccio. The French Revolution 
had fostered a strong, if small pro-French group in Corsica, which included the 
Bonaparte’s among their number. However the majority of the islanders still supported
Paoli and eventually expelled the commissioners and their Republican supporters. 
Among their number included a young Napoleon, who subsequently looked toward 
France to advance his military career. Saliceti sent a message to the national assembly 
dated 14 May 1793, proclaiming that “the rebellion is open; and in the name of Paoli 
the Corsican people will plunge into an abyss from which it will never escape”.671 
667 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli, 410.
668 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli,410.
669 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli,411.
670 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli,412.
671 Paoli, Lettere di Pasquale De Paoli,416.
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Foreign aid was essential for Paoli and Corsica now they were in open rebellion 
against the French Republic: there were a number of large French garrisons still on the 
island within the major fortified towns of Bastia, Calvi and St Fiorenzo (see Appendix 
3). Only foreign aid and a large fleet could force the complete expulsion of the French 
from the island. Paoli naturally turned to Britain, and from May 1793 he attempted to 
contact the British Admiral in the Mediterranean Samuel Hood (1724-1816). The 
British Mediterranean fleet numbered some 20-25 ships of the line. Their primary 
objective was to join the Spanish in the blockade of Toulon, where the main French 
Mediterranean fleet was located. One of the first Corsican attempts to contact the 
British was Philip Masseria’s Memorial, On the present situation of Corsica, a copy of 
which Masseria sent to Hood on the 16 August 1793. Masseria’s attached letter stated 
that the Memorial was the ‘dear object’ of all his wishes, and their objective was “very 
near of being accomplished”.672 Within the Memorial, Masseria argued that the 
Corsicans were for a short time “taken by the affected spirit of freedom and 
philosophy, that possessed the constituent assembly.”673 It seems that Masseria still had
a certain respect for the principles of the French Revolution. The French revolutionary 
ideals would never entirely disappear from the thoughts of the Corsicans: the French 
revolutionary government would always provide an alternative model to the British 
constitutional system. However, Masseria believed that French headiness and faith 
were never to “be depended upon”.674 It was French treachery, rather than the 
Revolutionary principles themselves, which had caused the Corsicans to rebel. The 
French Revolution had tempted the Corsicans to “distinguish between French and 
English character and faith”.675 
There was a clear choice for Corsicans between Britain and France. With the rejection 
of French rule, British protection provided the only alternative. Masseria claimed that 
the Corsican “affection for the English...never faded”; Masseria referred to the 
previous close bonds between Britain and Corsica during 1768-1769. The arguments 
Masseria used to persuade British intervention in Corsica, were similar to those used in
1768. For example, Masseria referenced the ‘happy’ situation and security of Corsica’s
672 FO 20/22, Philip Masseria, “Memorial on the Present State of Corsica”, 16 August 1793.
673 FO 20/22, Masseria, “Memorial”, 16 August 1793.
674 FO 20/22, Masseria,“Memorial”,16 August 1793.
675 FO 20/22, Masseria, “Memorial”,16 August 1793.
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harbours, which was “well known”.676 The Commerce and navigation of Corsica was 
currently only very small; English industry and wealth would in a short time provide 
Britain with ‘wines of every route’ and other articles ‘nature produces’ in Corsica.677 
Masseria’ arguments were nearly identical to those used by Boswell in his Account of 
Corsica more than twenty years earlier. Boswell argued that Corsica was “designed by 
nature to be strong”; however due to their many wars, they had “no leisure to improve 
themselves in any art of manufacture”.678 Corsica provided the promise of future 
wealth if aided in its development by British money and industry. More importantly, 
Corsica would provide Britain an important naval base in the western Mediterranean.
Admiral Hood however decided against immediately aiding the Corsican rebels. 
Instead a more lucrative prize appeared: Toulon. Hood, acting in cooperation with 
French royalists was able to seize Toulon on the 27 August 1793. The seizure of one of
France’s main naval arsenals was a major blow for the French republic. The French 
immediately sent forces for its recapture. Admiral Hood was relatively free to act on 
his own initiative during his command in the Mediterranean. A letter from William Pitt
(1759-1806), the then Prime Minister, to the Foreign Secretary William Grenville 
(1759-1834) dated 10 October 1793, revealed the full powers Hood had in the 
Mediterranean area. With reports regarding Corsica, Pitt could “not see what 
instructions can be sent till we hear further, and the business will probably be decided 
before our instructions could reach”.679 In effect, Admiral Hood was free to make his 
own judgement regarding Toulon and Corsica. Messages were carried in ships, which 
could take about a month to reach England. It would be impracticable for Hood to 
await messages from London. According to Pitt, Hood had only informed the 
Admiralty a short time ago, that he had sent a squadron to Corsica, in consequence of 
the representations brought by Captain Masseria. Masseria’s Memorial certainly had 
the desired effect in gaining the aid of the British fleet. However only a small squadron
under the command of a Captain Linzee was sent. Pitt informed Grenville that Hood’s 
letters to the admiralty mentioned no ‘particulars’, which led Pitt to conclude that 
676 FO 20/22, Masseria, “Memorial”, 16 August 1793.
677 FO 20/22, Masseria, “Memorial”,16tAugust 1793.
678 James Boswell, An Account of Corsica, the Journal of a Tour of that Island and Memoirs of Pascal 
Paoli, 4th ed. (Dublin: Printed for J. Exshaw, 1768), 133-134.
679 The Manuscripts of J.B Fortescue, preserved at Dropmore, vol. II, (London: Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1894), 441.
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“public letters are, I think, so general as to leave us very much in the dark”.680 The 
ministry attempted to alleviate this situation, by appointing a civil commissioner to 
Toulon. The War Secretary Henry Dundas (1742-1811) informed the king on the 24 
September 1793, that Sir Gilbert Elliot, “bearing so important a mission under your 
majesty, should have the rank of a privy counsellor”.681 The king replied a day later 
informing Dundas that the service upon which Elliot was going was “sufficient reason 
for allowing him to the privy council”.682 Elliot was sworn into the privy council that 
same day, and soon left England to act as the appointed commissioner extraordinary at 
Toulon. Elliot would become the main civil official in the Mediterranean, and an 
important actor in the eventual establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom.
Paoli sent a number of letters to Admiral Hood from August to December 1793. 
Paoli’s letter to Hood dated 6 October best encapsulates his feelings and frustrations at 
the time. The General thanked Hood for the small squadron sent under the command of
Linzee, who were “unhappily” not enough to capture St Florent.683 Paoli hinted in his 
last letter to Hood his wish for “your powerful protection”; despite the “openings I 
have made to you in the name of this country”, only one small squadron had been sent.
Hood at this time was preoccupied with the siege at Toulon. Paoli was in a weak 
position: there was a “total want of ammunition”, and of regularly paid troops. 
Patriotism alone allowed the Corsicans to fight on; their hopes were based upon the 
“powerful intervention of the British forces”.684 Such overtures to a great and mighty 
nation “could supply for the defence of our recovered original rights”, and 
“regeneration of this long deprived country”.685 Paoli recognised that Corsican 
independence was unlikely at this point, and therefore looked toward Britain for “your 
benevolence and protection”.686 Paoli had sent Masseria to Italy in order to gain 
information on British designs. It was only indirectly from one of Hood’s letters to the 
British consul at Leghorn Mr Sidney, “that you expected I should apply direct for aid 
680 The Manuscripts of J.B Fortescue, vol. II, 442.
681 The Later Correspondence of George III, vol. II, February 1793 to December 1797, ed. A. Aspinal, 
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to you”.687 Paoli also knew of the confidence the British government had put into 
Hood’s hands concerning “the expulsion of the French from Corsica”.688 Paoli’s 
intelligence was therefore good enough to know the boundaries of Hood’s power and 
mission in the Mediterranean. 
Only convincing Admiral Hood would allow any British venture into Corsica be made.
Therefore, Paoli fell back on the same arguments used throughout the eighteenth 
century to encourage British intervention on the island. Any intervention by Britain 
into Corsica would ensure “the advantages that may derive to a great maritime and 
commercial nation”. Paoli referred to Corsica’s immediate strategic importance, which 
was obvious to any “that overlooks a map of that sea”.689 Corsica’s strategic 
importance was one of the primary arguments used to promote British intervention on 
the island throughout the eighteenth century. Britain was first and foremost a maritime 
power and their navy was their priority. The strategic situation of Corsica was of even 
greater importance at this point in time due to the war with France. Corsica also had 
many commodities by nature, which could be “richly susceptible” with vigour and 
activity for “a rich and manufacturing nation”, whose “beneficent effect of an 
enlightened government and of a wise administration” could help the “prosperity of the
country”.690 Corsica had much promise for commercial and industrial development. 
Paoli’s language in his letter clearly showcased his admiration for the British 
constitutional system: he wanted to fix Corsica’s “destiny by making us share the 
advantages that from the British laws and British constitution are ensured to all that 
enjoy the happiness of constituting a part of the British monarchy”.691 
Paoli’s letter to Hood also contained the first suggestions concerning a union between 
Britain and Corsica. This union would be based upon the British constitution. Paoli’s 
letters, however, could not convince Hood to change his plans; Toulon was clearly a 
far more important strategic target. The Admiral had only some 20-25 ships available, 
and all were needed for the siege of Toulon. He needed to be seen supporting the 
687 FO 28/6, Paoli to Hood, 6 October, 1793.
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French royalists; any abandonment of Toulon would be seen as forsaking their cause. 
Paoli’s frustrations concerning the lack of British aid were clearly evident in a letter he
sent to Masseria dated the 24 October 1793. Paoli informed Masseria that he was “very
anxious” that “I have not received yet any letter from you”.692 The English had 
‘quitted’ the seas, and “have discouraged our people, and all my influence is required 
to persuade them, that the English will certainly assist”.693 Paoli’s authority and 
position was entirely reliant upon the promise of English aid. The answers to the letters
Paoli had sent to the English were an “absolute necessity”. Corsica’s internal situation 
“requires many changes that can not be executed but by an assembly”.694 The calling of
an assembly was delayed until a decision could be made “upon the political affairs of 
the country”; namely whether Corsica would form a union with Britain or not.695 
What is clear in Paoli’s letters is that Corsica could no longer maintain itself as an 
independent power: there was a choice between French and British rule. For Paoli the 
choice was clear; he would not accept the “bloody Jacobin faction”, and the “Corsicans
will never declare themselves Royalists because they will never ratify the unjust 
conquest” in 1769.696 Paoli and many Corsicans still had ingrained resentment against 
France following the conquest of the island in 1769. Paoli’s 24 October 1793 letter to 
Masseria was an attachment to a dispatch Masseria had sent to 240 Oxford Street, on 
the 13 December 1793. Masseria informed his contact in London that Corsica was in 
need of an English garrison and that any delay in furnishing troops could prove 
‘fatal’.697 The lack of British response to Paoli and Masseria suggested a lack of real 
interest in Corsica as a strategic target. However, Britain’s actions were determined 
entirely by the war effort. Toulon was certainly a higher priority target than Corsica; 
the main strategic promise of Corsica was its proximity to Toulon. 
The proposition of an Anglo-Corsican union-January 1794
The strategic situation in the Mediterranean would radically change in December 1793,
when Hood was compelled to withdraw from Toulon. Through the actions of a young 
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artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, the British and Spanish fleets had been 
compelled to evacuate Toulon along with a number of Royalist emigrants. Corsica was
the next obvious choice for a base in the Mediterranean. Sir Gilbert Elliot had arrived 
in the Mediterranean during the latter stages of the siege of Toulon to undertake all 
civil matters in the region. Elliot and Hood were the main decision maker behind 
British policy in the Mediterranean area. It was soon agreed that Corsica was the most 
viable base for the British navy following the loss of Toulon. Elliot’s plans for any 
future settlement of Corsica was clearly laid out in his dispatch sent to Henry Dundas, 
dated 7 January 1794. Elliot informed Dundas of the assurances provided by Paoli, that
“the only wish the people entertain, is to come under his majesty’s protection in any 
form, and under any conditions”. Their only desire was for a “reasonable degree of 
liberty in their internal government”.698 Elliot wished to know the King’s opinion 
concerning a connection between Britain and Corsica, and was desirable “that 
instructions on the point, should be forwarded as speedily as possible”.699 Elliot, in his 
capacity as civil commissioner of the Mediterranean was able to act relativity 
independently, regarding any deals made with any prospective ally. However, in 
respect to major constitutional acts, particularity regarding a potential union with 
Corsica, Elliot had to refer to London. Elliot believed there were two choices regarding
the future of Corsica: either to have it become “part of his majesty’s dominions, and as 
a dependency of Great Britain”, or to “establish the independence of the island”.700 
These two options were both suggested by Paoli in his previous letters to Hood. For 
Elliot, two leading questions need to be asked: which was the most ‘secure’ and which 
will be the least ‘expensive’.701 This was the typical approach of British foreign policy 
during the eighteenth century.
The war with France, and the vast subsides Britain provided to her allies, inevitably 
meant money was limited. Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758-1805), later Lord 
Nelson and victor at Trafalgar (1805), wrote to his wife, that “poor old England will be
drained of her riches to maintain her allies, who will not fight for themselves”.702 In 
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Nelson’s opinion, Britain’s riches were wasted on allies, whose commitment to the war
was questionable. Therefore, Elliot believed that an independent Corsica would have to
be defended “against an enemy, in the same manner, and by the same expense, as if it 
were a dependent dominion”.703 Elliot was the first major British official to suggest a 
union between Britain and Corsica. He was also aware that he would be in charge of its
civil government if the island were to come under British dominion. Elliot himself 
would only benefit if Corsica would become a dominion under Britain. However, 
Elliot’s suggestion was not merely self-arrangement. A union between Britain and 
Corsica seemed to be the only viable method during a wartime situation. An 
independent Corsica could not hope to sustain itself in the face of a powerful French 
republic.
Elliot, accompanied by Colonel John Moore and Major Kochler arrived on Corsica on 
14 January 1794, to ascertain the practicability of a British expedition to Corsica. Sir 
John Moore (1761-1809) was an eye witness account, writing his Diary of the events. 
Moore commented that the Corsican “people seemed happy to see us, and gave us 
three cheers”.704 The Corsicans “expressed much pleasure at seeing us, and great love 
for the English nation, who they hoped would deliver them from the French”.705 Paoli’s
claim that the Coriscans still harboured a strong attachment to England was proven 
correct. Moore also noted Paoli’s continued popularity among the Corsican people. 
When Moore, Elliot and Kochler arrived at Murato on the 16 January 1794, Moore 
noted that Paoli was in the Convent, surrounded by armed peasantry. These men 
received no pay, and came voluntarily to defend the General. This for Moore was 
“strong proof of [the] attachment these poor people give to General Paoli”.706 Elliot 
also noted that the mass Corsican support for Paoli was not an “artificial cry”.707 Both 
Moore and Elliot noted the Corsican chants of “viva Paoli, la Patria e la Nazione 
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Inglesse”.708 To Elliot, Paoli was “invested with sufficient authority to speak for his 
countrymen”.709 
What was resolved at the conference at Murato was very much a subject of debate 
amongst those involved. Elliot claimed later in a ‘secret’ dispatch to the Duke of 
Portland, dated 19 February 1795, that Paoli, during the interview with Elliot in 
January 1794, “never lost an opportunity of giving me to understand that he was 
determined to quit the island, and that he could not indeed live in the climate of 
Corsica”.710 Moore commented that “the General is much broken since I saw him in 
England”, although this was also due in part due to the death of his only brother 
Clemente, “to whom he was much attached”.711 Paoli himself did give certain hints of 
his poor health. One of his main reasons given for not attending the first Anglo-
Corsican parliament in February 1795, was “my age” and “painful ailments”, which 
“do not allow me” to ride long trips on horseback.712 Paoli at various times gave Elliot 
hints that his poor health would force his retirement from public life. Paoli however 
had no intention of leaving Corsica, contrary to the pact agreed at Murato, and seemed 
equally determined to maintain his political influence on the island. 
Perhaps the most important result to come from the negotiations at Murato, however, 
was the assurance given to Paoli for British intervention in Corsica. Elliot’s main 
object was for the “assembling the states or otherwise, of getting the public assent of 
the island to what the General said was their wish”.713 Elliot was following the plans he
had laid out to Dundas, in his letter dated 7 January 1794. Elliot’s main aim was to 
gain a ‘formal engagement’ from Paoli, and from those “who appear legally entitled to 
represent his people”.714 Only a Corsican assembly could approve of any potential 
union between Britain and Corsica, and Elliot wanted the union between Britain and 
Corsica to appear as legal as possible: Britain would appear as liberators rather than 
conquerors as the French had done. Paoli, however, believed that the French had to be 
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first expelled from the island before an assembly could be formed. Moore commented 
that Paoli was satisfied with the assurances Elliot had given him concerning British 
intervention on the island. They would leave “the particular mode of government 
which might be adopted” to “the King and his ministers”.715 Moore and Elliot left 
Corsica on the 20 January; Kochler stayed behind at the request of Paoli, as he was 
“afraid that, if we all left him, it might have a bad effect upon his people”.716 Once 
Elliot and Moore returned to the fleet Hood immediately dispatched a force to Corsica,
the first British troops landing on the 7 February 1794. 
The Establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom- February 1794-June 1794
British intervention in Corsica came about primarily due to military and strategic 
considerations: without the wartime situation, the union certainly would not have 
happened. Only the promptings by the Anglophile Paoli persuaded Hood and Elliot to 
intervene in Corsica. Many of the arguments used to encourage British intervention in 
Corsica in 1794 were the same as those professed in 1768. Boswell’s Account of 
Corsica (1768) was still the main source of information in Britain regarding Corsica. It
was translated into several different languages and went through a number of editions. 
Perhaps the greatest example of Boswell’s influence can be seen in the August 1794 
edition of The Edinburgh Magazine. The article entitled “Description of Corsica” 
described the island, “now happily united to the crown of Great Britain”.717 The writer 
believed that for any detailed particulars of Corsica, you “must refer to Mr Boswell’s 
description of it, and of its chief Paoli, published 1778”.718 The article quoted directly 
from Boswell’s Account of Corsica. For example, the article stated that Corsica was 
“remarkably well furnished with good harbours”. This sentence was near identical to 
Boswell’s description of the harbours of Corsica in his Account of Corsica.719 Boswell 
was not the only intellectual source of information that influenced British opinions 
concerning Corsica, however. The writer of the “Description of Corsica” hoped that 
the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom would “one day”, in the words of the French philosopher
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Rousseau, “astonish Europe”.720 The writer directly quoted from Rousseau’s famous 
paragraph concerning Corsica in the Social Contact (1762). Rousseau had followed up 
his interest in Corsica, with the publication of his Constitutional project for Corsica 
(1765), in which he expanded upon the paragraph he had devoted to Corsica in the 
Social Contact. Rousseau argued that the Corsican people were ‘fortunate’; for the 
establishment of a good constitution, they could “begin at the beginning, and take the 
steps to prevent degeneration”.721 Due to the undeveloped nature of Corsica, the 
Corsicans had not “yet adopted the vices of other nations”.722 Rousseau and Boswell 
provided the ideas which prompted British intervention into Corsica. Both agreed that 
the main draw of Corsica was its potential for development. For Rousseau, Corsica 
was still in a ‘state of nature’, uncorrupted by the ‘vices’ of the modern world. Boswell
in contrast focused far more on Corsica’s commercial potential. Boswell believed that 
an “alliance with this island” would be of “great consequence” to “any of the maritime 
powers of Europe”.723 Corsica’s harbours could be developed, allowing the island to 
become the main naval base for Britain in the Mediterranean. 
Corsica’s strategic importance was the primary impulse for Elliot and Hood’s decision 
for a union with Corsica. However, ideas concerning Corsica’s potential for 
development also influenced this decision. In a letter to his friend William Suckling 
dated 7 February 1795, Nelson expressed his belief that Britain’s union with Corsica 
would allow “the inhabitants” to “grow rich, and I hope, happy, under our mild 
government”.724 Nelson, as a naval officer, recognised the “convenient ports for our 
fleets”; he was “satisfied of Lord Hood’s great wisdom in sealing possession of it 
[Corsica]”.725 However, he also believed in Corsica’s potential development under 
British rule. Under French rule every Corsican carried a gun; now not one man in fifty 
carried arms, and “their swords are really turned into ploughshares”.726 British rule had 
encouraged the development of industry and agriculture. As a result, the expense of 
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keeping the island “will be very trifling, and its importance to us very great”.727 
Nelson’s comments were written during the early stages of the Anglo-Corsican 
kingdom. Many wrote of Corsica’s potential for development: how far was this 
actually the case? The course of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom would expose the ‘myth’
of Corsica’s potential for development. The wild praises Boswell gave concerning 
Corsica’s potential for development, would ultimately hinder the very cause he 
attempted to espouse. Expectations over Corsica’s potential for development had been 
raised too high. The establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom would slowly 
debunk the ‘myth’ of Corsica’s potential for development. 
The military operations on the island questioned the great martial abilities Boswell and
other British writers had attributed to the Corsican soldiers. Before military operations 
had begun in earnest, Nelson wrote to his wife on the 24 February 1794, that the 
Corsicans were “a brave people, and free”.728 However, in a letter sent to Lord Hood on
11 March 1794, Nelson complained that the ‘poor Corsicans’ “know nothing, but how 
to fire a musket; yet certainly a good use may be made of them”.729 Colonel Moore 
however painted a more damning picture of the Corsican’s military ability, and 
particularly that of Paoli. Moore complained that “the great cause of the failure of the 
expedition has been the failure upon the part of General Paoli and Corsicans”.730 Moore
lamented the difficulties surrounding the siege of Bastia, held by a large French 
garrison. Moore felt that “instead of the active, warlike people I took them to be, 
zealous in the cause of liberty,” the Corsicans “have proved to be a poor, idle, mean 
set, incapable of any action which requires steadiness or resolution, and have been 
absolutely of no use to us since we landed”.731 Moore was reflecting upon the image 
Boswell had provided of the Corsicans martial character. Boswell’s hero worshipping 
of Paoli and the Corsican cause meant that his writings were at times contrary to 
reality. Boswell had only created an image of what he believed the Corsican martial 
spirit was, and described them as such. The realities found on Corsica would always 
seem disappointing compared to the imagery provided by Boswell. The Corsicans were
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in fact not suited to the professional style of warfare practised by the main European 
powers. The Corsicans fought within irregular groups, usually adapted to fighting in 
the mountains. They were therefore unsuited to the needs of professional warfare. 
Ironically, the biggest problem faced by Britain during these military operations was 
the lack of troops available. There were only an estimated 1000 British troops available
for operations on the island, excluding any marines from the navy. The low number of 
British troops on the island would be a constant source of irritation for the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom, as will be seen in the next section.
On 19 April 1794, Elliot informed Paoli, that the propositions arranged at Murato had 
been approved by His Majesty and the ministry.732 The English plenipotentiaries Hood 
and Elliot, informed Paoli in a letter dated April 21st 1794, that the British government 
was willing to provide the Corsicans “eternal security and preservation of their 
independence and freedom for the future”.733 Hood and Elliot set out the preliminaries 
for the union between Britain and Corsica. The two nations would come under a 
“common sovereign” in the person of George III. However, the British would “ensure 
at the same time forever the independence of Corsica, and the maintenance of the 
ancient constitution, laws and religion”.734 The ‘independence’ of Corsica was one of 
the primary reasons why Paoli chose a British rather than French future for the island. 
For Paoli “Corsica was no longer Corsica, reunited to France”; at least under British 
rule “we do not lose the country name”.735 Under the French revolutionary government,
Corsica became united with France and became a department: for Paoli, Corsica lost its
unique history and identity when it was united with France. In a letter to his friend 
Galeazzi, Paoli believed that “if the English constitution had defects, [we] can correct 
them in its [Corsica’s] constitution, to ensure his [the king’s] happiness and 
freedom”.736 The new Anglo-Corsican constitution could be formed to suit the needs 
and characteristics of Corsica. Paoli rather naively believed that “the Kingdom of 
Corsica will now be at least as free as that of England”.737 If Paoli knew the true nature 
of the British Empire, he would have known that any overseas territories did not share 
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the same liberties enjoyed in England. Nevertheless, soon after the fall of Bastia to 
British forces on 19 May, discussions were made regarding the potential union 
between Britain and Corsica. Between 1 and 19 June, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 
was established and its unique constitution adopted.
The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom: its constitution and influences
What form of government would the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom adopt? This was the 
major question which plagued British constitutionalists during June 1794. Paoli 
himself had suggested to Hood in 1793 that “the form of the government in this island 
might be established as analogue as possible to that of England”. The model Paoli had 
in mind was “that of Ireland modified according to the circumstances of this people 
might also be taken into consideration”.738 Paoli’s ideas would be closely followed in 
the formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. More specifically, Paoli’s idea that the 
Corsicans own “circumstances” should be considered was taken into account by those 
drafting the Anglo-Corsican constitution. British ideas concerning Corsica stemmed 
from some fifty years of interactions and relations with the island, as will be seen when
studying the articles of the Anglo-Corsican constitution. 
British constitutionalism underwent a number of major changes following the 
declaration of independence of the American colonies in 1776. The American 
revolutionary war challenged the very conceptions of British constitutional 
government. The American colonies provided a challenge to what was believed then to
be the most superior government in the world. Britain slowly began to appreciate the 
need to change the laws and constitutions that governed some of their overseas 
colonies. This of course concerned predominately European populated territories. The 
first evidence of this change in British constitutional government could be seen in the 
“Royal instructions to the Peace commission”, on April 12 1778. The American war 
had been progressing badly for Britain; therefore the government were willing to give 
ground regarding American self-rule. This was evidenced when the peace commission 
offered the American colonists ‘a general assembly’, in the nature of the present 
congress, which was to consist of delegates from each of the colonies. They would 
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meet in congress “for the better management of the general concerns and interests of 
the said colonies”.739 However, “the sovereignty of the mother country should not be 
infringed”, nor any powers ascribed to the said congress “be capable of being 
construed into an impeachment of the sovereign rights of his majesty, and the 
constitutional control of this country”.740 Britain would still maintain sovereign rights 
over the American colonies. If it was desired that any American subjects wished to 
have a share of representation in the House of Commons, “the number of the 
representatives, which ought to be very small”, would be properly considered.741 The 
British commission offered very little to an already independent American Republic, 
who currently had the upper hand in the war. Such was the arrogance and belief Britain
had in its constitution and laws. The peace commission did however highlight the first 
hint of changes to ideas concerning British constitutional government overseas. 
The British peace commission of 1778 was rejected out of hand by the American 
government. In 1782, with their impending loss in the American war, there was an 
acceptance by the British government that changes needed to be made to the 
constitutional governments in other British ruled territories. More particularly, they 
feared an American style revolution in their most immediate neighbour Ireland. On the 
17 May 1782, two resolutions were passed by the then Prime Minister Lord Shelburne 
in the House of Lords. The first resolution was that the act of George I, “securing the 
dependency of Ireland upon the crown of Great Britain” ought to be repealed.742 The 
second resolution stated “that it is indispensable to the interest and happiness of both 
kingdoms, that the connection between them should be established by mutual 
consent”.743 Ireland and England historically had a very chequered relationship. It was 
believed that the total repeal of the statue of 1720, would remove the chief cause of the
Irish parliaments discontent. In a secret dispatch from Shelburne to the Duke of 
Portland, dated 18 May 1782, Shelburne stated that “the subject of a superintending 
power [was] to be reserved to this country, for all purposes of common concern, 
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whether in matters of state or general commerce”.744 In a later dispatch from William 
Pitt to the Duke of Portland dated the 7 October 1784, Pitt wanted “to give Ireland an 
almost unlimited communication of commercial advantages”.745 In return, Britain 
would receive some security that Ireland’s “strength and riches will be our benefit”.746 
William Pitt the younger (1759-1806) became the prime minister in December 1783; 
he remained in office until 1801. Pitt, in a letter sent to the Duke of Rutland on the 6 
January 1785, stated that Britain had made “England and Ireland one country in effect, 
though for local concerns under distinct legislatures”.747 This was the model which 
Paoli referred to in his letter to Hood. The Anglo-Corsican constitution however was 
very much different to the Irish model. James Caulfeild, first Earl of Charlemont 
(1728-1799) complained to Edward Malone on 29 October 1794, that Britain’s 
ministers or “rather minister”, seem “neither to care for, think of indeed know 
Ireland”.748 Rather, Pitt cared only for “his own grand acquisition, the new magnificent 
kingdom [Corsica], claims more of his attention”.749 The historical relations Britain had
with Ireland were very much different to those with Corsica. Whereas the Corsicans 
were traditionally seen to be a sister nation, Ireland was viewed by many in England as
a Catholic backwater, distinct from Britain and her liberties and virtues. British 
connotations of the Corsican character and government would play a far larger role in 
the formation of the Anglo-Corsican constitution than imitating the Irish model. 
However, Ireland did provide an outline for Elliot and the other British legislators to 
follow. 
The Anglo-Corsican Constitution was divided into twelve different chapters. Each 
chapter was composed of several articles, anywhere on the scale of three to twelve. At 
first glance, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom’s constitution did appear to be “a 
counterpart of that of Great Britain”.750 Chapter one, article two, detailed that 
744 British Colonial Developments, 177.
745 British Colonial Developments 178.
746 British Colonial Developments, 178.
747 British Colonial Developments, 179.
748 James Caulfeild, The Manuscripts and Correspondence of James, First Earl of Charlemont, vol. II, 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1894), 251.
749 Caulfeild,  Correspondence of Earl of Charlemont, 251.
750 Times, (London, England), 28 July 1794; Issue 3052.
169
legislative power was vested in the “king, and in the representatives of the people, 
lawfully elected and convened”.751 Article three stated that the legislature would be 
renamed as “parliament”, and the representatives “styled members of the 
parliament”.752 Clearly, in many respects the Anglo-Corsican constitution sought to 
emulate the British model as much as possible. Chapter two, article one, detailed that 
the territory was to be divided into “Pieves” (districts); each Pieve and towns on the 
coast with “3000 souls and upwards” had the right to send two members to parliament. 
Bishops also recognised by the Corsican nation, “shall be members of parliament”, as 
observed in the British House of Lords.753 Members of parliament would need to be 
above twenty-five years of age, and must possess at least 6000 livres in land.754 As in 
England, land ownership was prerequisite to becoming a member of parliament. One 
of the most notables differences was that the Anglo-Corsican parliament had only one 
house. There was no distinction between a House of ‘Lords’ or ‘Commons’. Instead 
there was only one chamber, which had “the right of enacting all the acts which are 
intended to have a force of law”.755 There was no major landed nobility of Corsica to 
speak of due to the constant foreign occupation of the island. The Genoese republic did
not allow a rich and powerful Corsican nobility to develop. Here was one example 
where the Anglo-Corsican constitution was adapted to Corsica’s unique situation. It 
also had far shorter fixed terms for parliament than in England, with the duration of 
one parliament two years.756 This was far shorter than the seven year parliaments in 
England, which had been set by the Septennial Act in 1716. Regular parliaments in 
Corsica meant that no one party could become too powerful within the parliament 
chamber.
One of the major differences between the Anglo-Corsican and Irish/English 
constitutions, was that Catholicism was “the only national religion in Corsica”.757 This 
was a rather extraordinary act considering that Britain was a Protestant power. During 
the first half of the eighteenth century, British foreign policy became identified with its
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‘protestant mission’. Tony Claydon in his book Europe and the making of England 
1660-1760, argues that the English “saw themselves primarily as a protestant people: a 
Christian nation chosen by God to uphold the true religion and to crush the anti-
Christian distortions of his faith which were embodied in the church of Rome”.758 The 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom seems to contradict this hypothesis. There were two reasons 
why Catholicism was accepted as the national religion in Corsica. The first reason was 
that Corsica was nearly 100% Catholic; it would be impolitic to exempt the entire 
population from government. The second reason was the unique opinion many in 
Britain had of Corsica. Many Britons believed the Corsicans to be ‘noble’ and ‘brave’ 
warriors, who could furnish for Britain some 40,000 soldiers.759 Corsica was a less 
developed version of Britain. The Catholicism of the Corsicans was in fact rarely 
spoken of, either by government officials or the British newspapers. 
Britain’s ‘protestant mission’ had very little influence upon British foreign policy 
during the latter half of the eighteenth century. As the case study of Corsica highlights,
the ideal of liberty was believed to be a far stronger bond between nations than 
religion. However, it may also be argued that it was simply expedient to accept the 
catholic religion in Corsica. It would be unwise, especially in a wartime situation, to 
challenge the established religion. In fact, during the French Revolutionary wars 
religion played little to no impact upon British foreign policy. Britain made a wide 
variety of alliances with Catholic powers, including the Pope: defeating France 
remained the priority. The Anglo-Corsican constitution also allowed for the parliament
“to determine on the number of parishes, to settle the salaries of the priests”.760 
Ecclesiastical services became subservient to the legislative body. This article caused 
frictions with the Pope in Rome, who believed that the constitution of Corsica placed 
constraints upon the catholic religion. Rome believed that only the pope could appoint 
bishops to parishes, and feared the actions of a protestant power in Corsica.761 This was
one of the many problems the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom had to face. Viceroy Elliot 
remarked that they (Roman Bishops) had “certainly not read the constitution of Corsica
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at Rome”.762 Elliot claimed that the constitution made no mention of bishops or 
parishes, and all matters would be concerted by the parliament of Corsica.763 This was 
a relatively minor issue for the Viceroy. However, it showcased some of the problems 
created by the language and wording of the Anglo-Corsican constitution.
In certain respects, the Corsican Kingdom had more freedoms than England. One 
example was the article in the constitution stating that “all other modes of worship are 
tolerated”.764 This religious toleration went further than the acts in England. The 
toleration act of 1688 “admitted the legal existence of religious congregation outside 
the Church of England”.765 However, both the penal laws and corporation acts still 
remained in place in England, preventing both dissenters and Catholics from taking 
pubic office. English Catholics were excluded from public life and advancement in 
professions.766 Irish Catholics were not much better off, with Irish parliaments ruled 
predominantly by a small Protestant elite. This made the toleration article contained 
within the Anglo-Corsican constitution more remarkable. Any religious group could 
potentially gain public office in Corsica. Britain would not reach the same level of 
religious toleration as Corsica for another thirty-five years, with the Catholic 
emancipation act of 1829, which relieved both the test act and penal laws. The Anglo-
Corsican constitution also stated that all “forms and procedures of enacting laws, and 
of determining other matters in the house”, not fixed by the constitution, would be 
regulated by parliament.767 With no House of Lords, the parliament chamber was the 
primary legislative body in the country. Any non-appearance by an MP would be 
punishable by a fine of 200 livres.768 For certain writers in Britain, the Anglo-Corsican 
constitution contained in principle “that very system of representation, which has been 
so long and unsuccessfully fought to be obtained by the people of Great Britain and 
Ireland, from a parliamentary reform”.769 The article entitled “An address to the Prime 
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minister of the King of Corsica”, was reviewed by Tobias Smollett, editor of The 
Critical review. Smollett believed that the chief object of the pamphlet had been 
“clearly proved”; that “the Corsicans have obtained a full, free, and fair representation 
in their parliament”.770 One article of the Anglo-Corsican constitution, for example, 
stated that “no member of parliament shall be called into account” by any other 
authority “except by that of the house itself”.771 Parliament was the main legislative 
body in Corsica, and not constrained by an all powerful House of Lords, as was the 
case in England. 
Why was the Anglo-Corsican constitution so uniquely created for Corsica? The 
constitution reflected the high opinion held by the British of the Corsicans as a ‘sister’ 
nation. The particular situation and circumstances of Corsica produced an equally 
unique constitutional model. The Anglo-Corsican constitution was clearly influenced 
by the previous ideas and notion of the island formed in Britain over the previous fifty 
years: only this can explain the unique constitution and the numerous political 
advantages provided to the island by Britain. However, what should be remembered 
was that Corsica was still a subject nation and territory of the British Empire. This 
point was most vividly emphasised in the third article of chapter nine, which stated that
Corsica “will consider every attempt which in war or in peace shall be made to 
promote the glory of his majesty, and the interests of the empire of Great Britain”.772 
Corsica’s purpose was to solely serve the interest of the British Empire. Perhaps more 
importantly, the parliament of Corsica “will always manifest its readiness and 
deference to adopt all regulations” consistent to those enacted by the Parliament of 
Great Britain, “for the extension and advantage of the external commerce of the 
empire, and of its dependencies”.773 The parliament of Corsica would always be 
subservient to that in Westminster. This article perhaps best encapsulates Britain’s 
ideas regarding Corsica. Britain was first and foremost a commercial empire; Corsica 
merely was to provide an ‘extension’ to the mercantile system. The ‘superiority’ of the 
Anglo-Corsican constitution over its English counterpart was also contradicted by one 
all-encompassing office of power; the Viceroy.
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The most unique, and perhaps most controversial aspect of the Anglo-Corsican 
constitution was the employment of a Viceroy, who was the king’s “immediate 
representative in Corsica”.774 The Viceroy was given a wide range of powers, including
“the power of giving his sanction or refusal to the decrees of parliament”. The Viceroy 
in effect could supersede the decrees of parliament. The executive power of the British 
system was encapsulated within one person in Corsica. Moreover, the Viceroy had to 
preform, in the King’s name “all the acts of government which are within the limits of 
the royal authority”.775 The Viceroy in this respect would be assisted by “a board of 
council and a secretary of state”.776 The King was given a wide amount of powers by 
the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The Viceroy, as the representative of the King, would 
embody those powers, including the right to “dissolve” or to “prorogue parliament”.777 
The Viceroy was also invested with the power to “open the sessions in person, and 
declare the reasons for convoking the parliament”.778 In this respect the Viceroy had 
wider ranging powers than the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. 
The office of the Viceroy of Corsica was heavily influenced by example of the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland. The Lord Lieutenant similarly represented king, and was his 
“personal deputy” in Ireland.779 The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland held many similar 
powers to the Viceroy of Corsica. All ecclesiastical and civil appointments in Ireland 
were made on the advice and recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant.780 However, in 
Ireland, the executive and legislature were distinctly separate. The Lord Lieutenant 
could not dissolve parliament like the Viceroy of Corsica; he would manage the Irish 
parliament through the ‘golden chains’ of peerage, positions and pensions that all 
passed through his hands.781 The office of Viceroy was a contentious issue throughout 
the existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Given the wide range of powers 
invested in the Viceroy, whoever held the office became in effect, the ruler of Corsica. 
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Chapter five, article eight of the constitution stated that the king “shall appoint [whom 
he wishes] to all the offices of government”.782 This duty in reality was placed entirely 
upon the shoulders of the Viceroy: due to the long distance in communication between 
Corsica and Britain, the ministers in London usually acquiesced to the appointments 
made by the Viceroy. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was usually more bound to the 
English cabinet; every decision of Irish policy was submitted to the king for his 
approval.783 The office of the Viceroy was the most contentious, and eventually most 
ruinous aspect of the Anglo-Corsican constitution. The office was highly coveted; 
whoever was appointed to the office would have a wide variety of powers at their 
disposal. Whether Sir Gilbert Elliot was the right appointment as Viceroy also 
remained a contentious issue for contemporaries. 
Reactions to the formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom in England
Reactions in Britain to the establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom were 
generally mixed, and split between those for and against intervention. What is 
important to remember is that the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was primarily a 
government venture. During the 1768 Corsican Crisis, intervention in Corsica was 
supported by a wider strata of literate society. As illustrated in the second chapter, the 
Corsican cause in Britain was endorsed by the opposition to government in 1768. In 
contrast, the 1794 Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was a government scheme. The Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom never obtained the wide spread support enjoyed by Paoli and the 
Corsicans in 1768. Why was this the case? The 26-29 July 1794 edition of the General
Evening post noted that the ‘ministerialists’ magnified “the benefits likely to be 
derived from” the acquisition of Corsica, whilst the opposition depreciated and 
condemned “the false policy which dictated the measure”.784 Those writers who 
supported the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, also promoted the “ruinous war” policy 
practised by the British government.785 British public opinion during the French 
revolutionary wars was split. There were many opponents of the war, who called 
themselves the ‘Friends of peace’. These ‘Friends of peace’ were not a “formally 
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constituted body, with an authority structure”.786 They were a wide range of individuals
who were bound by their opposition against the war and the “normative order or 
dominant views of society”.787 Within this context, it can be seen that the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom was viewed as a product of the loathed war effort against 
Revolutionary France. The debates within the House of Commons were vigorously 
reported upon by British newspapers. The Whig MP Richard Sheridan (1751-1816) 
condemned the “unpardonable blunders which marked the progress of the war, among 
which were the separate interests we pursued from the Allies at Valenciennes, Toulon, 
Corsica and the West Indies”.788 Sheridan supported the position of the leader of the 
opposition to Pitt’s government, Charles James Fox (1749-1806). Controversial in his 
own time, Fox was a known supporter of the French revolution. Fox and Sheridan 
reflected the widely held view that Pitt’s war policy was separate to that of the other 
coalition forces. Britain had their own aggrandizement agenda, and were later accused 
by their continental allies of merely ‘filching’ a few West Indies island. Corsica was 
included within Britain’s ‘selfish’ policy, which had “disgusted” their allies.789 
The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was perceived as alienating Britain’s allies and was 
considered merely to be a tool of British aggrandizement, rather than an active effort to
defeat the French Republic. Corsica’s acquisition was not vital for France’ defeat and 
was considered to be of the “smallest importance in the general scale of politics”.790 
One of the main criticisms concerning the acquisition of Corsica was the expense 
incurred in maintaining the island. The 9 April 1795 edition of the Morning Chronicle 
claimed that the French did not disturb Britain in the ‘enjoyment’ of Corsica, as it was 
“a crown of which they do not envy us the honour or the expense”.791 This was made 
worse by the fact that the Corsicans themselves refused to pay taxes; the costs for the 
administration of the island out-weighed its annual income. The opposition newspaper 
the Morning Post and fashionable world called Corsica a “useless bauble of a 
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kingdom”, which would cost Britain more money than it was worth.792 The question of 
Corsica’s value was an issue constantly raised by British newspapers throughout the 
existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom.
Ministerial arguments supporting the occupation of Corsica stemmed from those 
professed by Boswell back in 1768. The 29 August -1 September 1794 edition of the 
London Packet noted that Corsica was designed by “nature” to be strong at sea, having 
so many “good harbours” as well as “excellent timber”.793 The article concluded that 
Corsica was rich naturally in many productions, and that there was no question that 
“this island might carry on a pretty extensive commerce”.794 Corsica’s harbours and 
naturally rich produce were two typical arguments used to support British intervention 
into Corsica. These arguments were the same used by Boswell in his Account of 
Corsica (1768). For example, Boswell argued that Corsica was “designed by nature to 
be strong at sea, having so many good harbours, and so much excellent timber”.795 
These same arguments were still used some twenty-five years later. Ministerial writers 
also focused upon the virtues of the Corsicans themselves. The 30 July-1 August 1794 
edition of the London Packet compared the Corsicans to the “Scotch Highlanders”, and
their manners to “the ancient Germans, and they are extremely temperate”.796 The 
Coriscans encapsulated the image of the noble savage. Peter France, in his article 
Western European civilisation and its mountain frontiers 1750-1850, argues that 
“European writing is full of the opposition between the rational civilised self and the 
wild other”.797 Corsicans were perceived by many Britons to be noble savages, based 
upon “the manly ideal of Sparta”.798 The 9-11 April 1795 edition of the St James’s 
Chronicle commented that the new Anglo-Corsican parliament “will insensible 
assimilate and familiarize it [Corsica] with the laws a manners, and connect it in 
interest and affection, to the great Empire which has adopted it”.799 British laws and 
customs could ‘civilize’ the Corsicans, and allow them to eventually become model 
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citizens. Many writers argued that Britain and Corsica were two isles of liberty. 
Corsica was simply a less civilised version of Britain. 
This image changed during the latter part of 1795. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom had 
existed for a year, and had suffered a number of rebellions. The 19 October 1795 
edition of the Star bemoaned the “fickleness” of the inhabitants, who were most 
anxious “for the re-establishment of the French in the island”.800 The rebellions in 1795
and 1796 were perceived by many in Britain to be a rejection of the British system. For
the 23-25 February 1796 edition of the General Evening post, the rebellions illustrated 
a distinct lack of ‘gratitude’, which they owed “for the protection” provided by the 
British government.801 The article noted that the Corsicans were “high spirited and 
half-civilized”, and seemed “ill qualified” to demean themselves as British subjects.802 
The Corsicans were no longer perceived to be noble savages, but as half-civilised 
barbarians, who seemed “impatient of a foreign yoke in any shape”.803 The Corsicans 
had ‘rejected’ British rule, and therefore any attempts to civilize their manners.  
Therefore they were unworthy of British protection. The problems faced by the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom illustrated for the British newspapers, that Britain and Corsica were
incompatible for union: there were too many fundamental differences between the two 
islands. The Corsican rebellions led many writers in England to turn their back on the 
Anglo-Corsican project. This in turn explained the lack of public reaction to the 
evacuation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The constant rebellions in the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom, made it harder for British ministerial writers to justify its 
existence. The Anglo-Corsican kingdom was never popular in England. It seemed that 
British intervention in Corsica came some 25 years too late to prompt any major public
reaction within Britain. The Corsican issue was at its most popular in Britain in 1768, 
when the French first invaded the island. The Anglo-Corsican kingdom, on the other 
hand, was a government scheme, conducted in the midst of a large-scale war against 
the French republic. Corsica seemed insignificant within the major strategic 
considerations of the war against France.
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Elliot, Paoli and the contentious office of Viceroy: June 1794-October 1794
Sir Gilbert Elliot was heavily involved in the formation of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom. The act of creating the Corsican parliament was presented to the king of 
Great Britain “through his excellency sir Gilbert Elliot, his commissary plenipotentiary
in his name”.804 Already, Elliot was acting as the king’s representative. He was the only
major civil representative in the Mediterranean, and therefore was considered to be the 
prime candidate for Viceroy. The other main candidate for the office of Viceroy was 
Paoli. Moray Mclaren agrees with the opinion that it was “by an act of incredible folly 
not Paoli but Sir Gilbert Elliot was made Viceroy”.805 The character of Sir Gilbert 
Elliot has received much debate from his contemporaries and historians. Mclaren 
describes Elliot as a “strong English colonizer”, despite the fact that he came from a 
class of Scottish landed gentry, which “had jumped upon the English establishment 
bandwagon after the union of the Scottish and English parliaments of 1707”.806 Elliot 
certainly did make assertions of English greatness over the Corsicans. In one such 
instance, he stated that the Corsican nobility do not “set beyond the pitch of a good 
yeoman in England”.807 On the other hand, Elliot, in a letter to Dundas, described the 
“honoured virtues” of the Corsican people for rejecting the “poisonous and counterfeit 
liberty of France”.808 Elliot feared and hated the French revolution, as did many in 
England. To call Elliot an ‘English colonizer’ is an over simplification of his character.
For sure, Elliot did believe in “his majesty’s princely virtues, and the exalted 
reputation enjoyed throughout the world by the British nation for every honourable and
generous quality”.809 He certainly was a proponent of British constitutionalism. In this 
respect, however, he was no different form many of the British establishment figures 
during the late eighteenth century. 
Elliot divided opinion amongst his contemporaries. On the one hand, Nelson believed 
that Elliot would provide “mild administration” to Corsica. If the Corsicans did not 
unite under Elliot, “they will not deserve to be so”.810 Nelson became a good friend of 
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Elliot’s during their time together in Corsica, and kept in constant contact with Elliot 
during his time in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Sir John Moore suspected 
Elliot to be “a very unwise man, with a considerable share of ingenuity and art”.811 
Moore and Elliot generally disliked each other, which stemmed from the Viceroy’s 
difficult relations with the military on Corsica. Attitudes towards Elliot were very 
much divided amongst contemporaries by those who supported him, whereas others 
despised him. I will let the reader conclude whether Elliot was the right person to be 
the Viceroy of Corsica. I will attempt to provide a picture of Elliot through the 
decisions he made during his time as Viceroy of Corsica: only then can a conclusion be
made about his character and temperament as Viceroy of Corsica.
Elliot certainly desired to be Viceroy of Corsica. In a letter to the Duke of Portland, 
dated 7 August 1794, Elliot noted the surrender of Calvi to British forces, signalling 
the end of military operations in Corsica. Elliot noted that the annexation of Corsica 
was suspended, “until the nomination of a Viceroy could be made by his majesty”.812 
The civil affairs of the island had been suspended since 19 June. A provisional 
government under Paoli’s party had been in control of the island since. Elliot believed 
it desirable to “transmit” the provisional powers to the executive government in his 
majesty’s name, as soon as possible, due to the “inconveniences of an interregnum”.813 
The current functions of government on Corsica were exercised by persons proper for 
subordinate office, but “very indifferently qualified to exercise supreme authority”.814 
Moore, normally a critic of Elliot, agreed with him on the issue of the provisional 
government, and wrote that the “creatures” of Paoli were “a set of vulgar, low-minded 
men without talent”.815 The country was already dissatisfied with the provisional 
government, and looked “with impatience for the return of the dispatches from 
England, and the organisation of the new government”.816 Elliot believed that the 
provisional government acted more in the “vindictive spirit of an inflamed and 
triumphant party, than in the conciliating temper of a new government”.817 The British 
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government always had Elliot as their first choice for Viceroy. In fact, the bad opinion 
formed of Paoli’s provisional government played against his attempt to be Viceroy, an 
office he “certainly indulged himself in some expectation” of gaining.818 Elliot on the 
other hand attempted to be a ‘moderate force’ against the ‘vindictive’ character of the 
provisional government. 
The ministry agreed that Elliot was the best choice as Viceroy.  The Duke of Portland, 
in a letter to the King, dated 22 August 1794, noted “the moderation, the prudence, the 
judgement and general ability which Sir Gilbert Elliot has manifested in the situation 
equally new and important in which your majesty was pleased to place him”.819 
Portland acknowledged the role played by Paoli, and suggested to the king that he be 
enabled to pass “the remainder of his days in ease”.820 In a mark of respect, Portland 
suggested that the king should present Paoli a “picture of your majesty set round with 
diamonds” as a “visible mark of you appreciation of his latter services”.821 This mark 
of respect was a way of appeasing Paoli, in their decision to appoint Elliot as the 
Viceroy. Also, Portland was of the understanding that Paoli indeed planned to retire 
due to his age and infirmities. In a reply to Portland a day later, the king would 
“entirely coincide in the opinion of the Duke of Portland that Sir Gilbert Elliot is the 
properest [sic] person” as Viceroy.822 Elliot’s many letters to the ministry revealed his 
frustrations in the delay of his appointment as Viceroy. It took nearly a month for 
messages to be carried from Corsica to England on ship. Communication was an issue 
that would plague the existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. In an interesting side 
note, the Anglo-Corsican kingdom was most likely assigned a Viceroy due to its 
distance to Britain. The Viceroy acted as the representative of the king, who was able 
to make the majority of Corsica’s executive decisions without interference from 
Westminster. This was one of the fundamental differences between Corsica and 
Ireland. Ireland was located far closer to England itself; therefore executive decisions 
from Westminster to Ireland could travel relatively quicker than those to Corsica. 
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The Viceroy Elliot, and his problems with the military October 1794-January 1795
On the 1 October 1794, Elliot finally received dispatches “authorising inauguration of 
a Vice-royal government in Corsica”.823 However, as Moore noted in his Diary, the 
commission had not yet come. The dispatches from Portland only desired Elliot to take
upon himself the office of Viceroy. Moore noted that this delay was due to the 
difficulties that had occurred “with regard to the powers to be given to the Viceroy”.824 
Moore received this information from General Charles Stuart (1753-1801), his 
commanding officer. Stuart, the Commander-in-Chief of Britain’s Mediterranean 
forces, was the cause of the first major problem for the newly inaugurated Elliot. Stuart
himself was a conflicting character. On the one hand, Moore considered him to be the 
perfect soldier. In his unabashed praise, Moore believed that “never had a general 
gained more deservedly the affection and confidence of his troops”.825 Moore’s opinion
of Stuart was set during the siege of Calvi, when “by his able conduct”, he made 
himself master of a very strong post.826 Stuart was certainly a capable military officer, 
and the most competent man to hold the post of Commander-in-Chief during the entire 
existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. However, Moore was particularly biased in
his praise of Stuart and his vilification of Elliot. There was another side to Stuart, as 
indicated in George III’s own correspondence. Henry Dundas first informed the king 
of Stuart’s appointment as Lieutenant-General in Corsica on the 23 April 1794. The 
king, in his reply trusted that Mr Dundas would not fail “to hint to Stuart the necessity 
of keeping up harmony with the commander of the fleet” Admiral Hood.827 George III 
knew that “Stuart is a zealous and active officer but not wanting of high feelings, 
therefore a little caution recommended may avoid future trouble”.828 Stuart was 
someone who seemed to quarrel with his equals, particularly naval officers. There was 
a certain tension and rivalry between British military and Naval services, as 
highlighted by their lack of co-operation during the siege of Bastia.829 As George III 
noted, “Elliot seems to have some weight with Lord Hood, by that means to cultivate 
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that desirable object”.830 Elliot was able to work with the navy far better than with the 
military, as seen from his correspondence with Nelson. This may have played a part in 
both Stuart and Moore’s dislike of Elliot. Dundas later informed the king that he “had 
talked very seriously to major General Stuart on the necessity of cordial cooperation 
between the different branches of your majesty’s services”.831 Stuart was clearly a 
difficult man to work with, especially for his superiors. George III had more foresight 
than any of his contemporaries in predicting the future troubles that would arise with 
Stuart’s appointment.
Stuart’s main issue with Elliot concerned the powers of the Viceroy over the military 
forces in Corsica. Moore recorded a conversation where Stuart informed Elliot, that 
“you have no authority whatever over the army”.832 Stuart made it clear to Elliot that 
“my commission is not only to command the troops in Corsica, but to be the 
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean”.833 Stuart advised Elliot “never to interfere 
with the army till such time as your powers are explained to you by your 
commission”.834 This conversation highlighted the problems created by uncertain 
powers and limits of the office of Viceroy. Stuart asserted that only martial law existed
on the island. Moore believed that the office of ‘Viceroy’ “had not originated with the 
Corsicans”, but rather at Elliot’s instigation.835 In Moore’s opinion, “I find many 
sensible people of opinion that a military government is the only proper one for 
Corsica at present”.836 The war against France required the fullest attention; only a 
military government could ensure law and order in Corsica. A military government, 
however, was only a short term solution: it did not provide any sureties for any future 
bond between Britain and Corsica. A civil government was necessary to highlight 
Britain’s commitment to Corsica, and provided certainties over its future; namely a 
permanent union with Britain. Stuart and Moore’s opposition to Elliot may have 
stemmed from the belief that Corsica should have been subjected to a military 
government.
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One of the main promises contained within the Anglo-Corsican constitution, was that 
George III “has the exclusive direction of all military arrangements, and is to provide 
for the internal and external security of the country”.837 Britain’s authority was based 
upon their ability to defend the island from foreign threats, namely that of France. The 
wartime situation was the single most important factor during the entire existence of 
the Anglo-Corsican kingdom. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was forged (and fell) 
during the French Revolutionary wars. This context directly influenced the internal 
situation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Therefore, it was Britain’s duty to provide 
for the defence of the island, for which a Corsican militia needed to be raised: in a 
letter to the Duke of Portland, Elliot expressed his belief that the aid of a Corsican 
militia for the regular troops “is indispensable for the defence of the island”.838 This 
was due to the fact that there were only some 1000 British troops on Corsica.839 
In fact, the number of British troops never amounted to more than 1000 men during the
entire existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Elliot would later complain in a letter
to William Windham (1750-1810), dated April 2 1795, that “undoubtedly...the number 
of British [troops] now in Corsica is much too small, even on the supposition of 
foreign corps being made effective in any reasonable time”.840 William Windham was 
Secretary at War for Pitt’s government from 1794 till 1801. Elliot informed his friend 
Windham that three foreign corps had been agreed to be sent to Corsica, although he 
would have “preferred British troops”.841 These foreign corps were to be mostly made 
up of French or Italians emigrants, and were of questionable quality. Therefore, Elliot 
placed his hope in raising a Corsican militia. With his overblown optimism that was 
the typical style of his many letters, Elliot claimed to Portland that every man in 
Corsica was accustomed to the use of arms, and therefore he “cannot doubt of their 
contributing very essentially to the military force and defence of the island”.842 Elliot’s 
bursting optimism within his letters usually clouded the realities of the situation. He 
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mentioned to Portland that “we have as yet no regular returns” from the recruitment 
officers for the militia.843 As previously noted by Moore and Nelson, the Corsican 
soldiers were ill suited to be professional soldiers of the line. The lack of returns 
suggested that a militia was generally unpopular with the Corsican people, with only 
600 men gathered instead of the 2000 hoped for.844 Any perceived inadequacies in 
Britain’s defence of Corsica would be seen as a sign of weakness by the Corsican 
people: if Britain was unable to visibly defend the island from the French threat, their 
authority on the island would collapse. Britain had promised to be a protector of the 
island. How could this be effectively achieved with only 1000 effective British troops 
on the island?
Elliot’s raising of a Corsican militia undermined the position of Stuart, the 
Commander-in-Chief. Moore complained that Elliot had already named the principal 
officers, merely to enhance his own patronage. Elliot used the corps merely “as a 
means of forwarding political views”.845 Elliot was able to assert his authority due to 
the fact that his commission as Viceroy of Corsica had finally arrived by January 1795.
Why was there such a delay? George III’s correspondence reveals the answer. In a 
letter to the king dated 1 November 1794, the Duke of Portland revealed that the law 
servants claimed it was beyond their authority to “bestow upon the appointment” of 
Elliot as Viceroy.846 The office of Viceroy implied a role higher than that practised by 
the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland. Therefore the Lord Chancellor, after long deliberation, 
was of the opinion that the appointment of the Viceroy of Corsica was not to be made 
under the great seal, “but by virtue of your majesty’s sign manual only”.847 The 
Viceroy was to be appointed directly by the king. This actually made the office of 
Viceroy superior than that of a governor; he was subject only to the King himself. If 
the Viceroy could maintain the confidence of the King and his ministers, he would be 
able to stay in office. The crown lawyers were the main reason for the delay in sending
the commission. This was caused by the uncertainties surrounding the unique powers 
granted to such an office. However, as the Duke of Portland noted, this delay had 
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caused great “anxiety and impatience” among Paoli and the Corsicans of all 
descriptions, as well as the apprehensions of Elliot himself.848 The commission was 
sent in November and did not not arrive until December 1794. This was one of the first
instances to showcase the incompetency of the British ministry regarding Corsica. Due
to the great distance over which communications had to be made, the ministers were 
painfully unaware of problems created by the delay. For the Earl of Charlemont, this 
episode highlighted the inadequacies of the “present detested administration”.849 
Charlemont, writing on 29 October, questioned why there was such an “impolitic delay
of measures” in sending the commission of Viceroy.850 The ministry’s actions 
regarding the commission of the Viceroy bordered upon incompetency. 
Elliot’s appointment as Viceroy was not universally applauded. As Moore revealed, in 
January 1795, when the powers of the Viceroy over the military were revealed, 
General Stuart immediately resigned his commission. Stuart was of the opinion that 
when the King invested Elliot as the Viceroy of Corsica “with the command of the 
British army, the Lieutenant-General’s power over it ceases from this instant”.851 
Stuart’s resignation revealed the problems caused by the powers entrusted to the 
Viceroy. Whether Elliot was the right choice to make decisions regarding the military 
in Corsica was questionable, considering his lack of military background. In the 
context of the French revolutionary wars, this seemed to be a bad decision. However, it
was also clear that Stuart’s resignation was not only due the power of the Viceroy over 
the military. After all, a civilian parliament at Westminster was in charge of the British
ministry. The fact was that Stuart loathed Elliot. Stuart was an impulsive character who
found it difficult at the best of times to get on with his superiors. It was no surprise that
he decided to resign when he learnt that Elliot would be superior in command to 
himself. General Stuart would continue to cause problems for Elliot in England after 
his return from Corsica. In a later letter sent to Elliot in August 1795, Portland 
attempted to calm Elliot’s apprehensions, stating that he had “never seen or heard from
the General (Stuart) since his return from Corsica”.852 Elliot’s letters asking of Stuart’s 
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849 Caulfeild, Correspondence of Earl of Charlemont, 251.
850 Caulfeild, Correspondence of Earl of Charlemont,  251.
851 Moore, Diary, 132.
852 FO 20/8 Portland to Elliot, August 1795.
186
actions in London bordered upon paranoia. Portland also confirmed to Elliot in the 
same letter that he was entrusted with authority for the “maintenance of subordination 
and obedience in all the Corsican corps”.853 Moore believed that the government “will 
find out perhaps too late how much they have allowed themselves to be committed 
from the confidence they have reposed in the good sense and moderation of Sir 
Gilbert”; qualities which “perhaps he does not posses in so great a degree as is 
imagined”.854 Moore was clearly biased against Elliot as a supporter of General Stuart. 
Nevertheless, question marks had been raised in some quarters over the adequacy of 
Elliot as Viceroy of Corsica. However, as was seen in the delay of the commission as 
Viceroy, the British government was also at fault in causing the many problems 
accompanying the early days of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. These uncertain 
beginnings did not provide hope for the future. 
The First Anglo-Corsican Parliament, and the problems with Paoli: 1795
During the rule of the provisional government, Paoli and Elliot slowly drifted apart. In 
his letter to Portland, Elliot went as far as to wish for “Paoli’s total retreat from” 
Corsica, which “would be a desirable, if not almost necessary thing”.855 Elliot clearly 
feared Paoli’s influence within Corsica. These matters came to a head during the first 
Anglo-Corsican parliament in February 1795. Originally, the parliament had planned 
to meet at Corte on the 6 February. However, as Elliot informed Portland, due to the 
severity of winter at Corte, he decided to convoke the parliament at Bastia instead.856 
Elliot also implied, however, in a secret dispatch to Portland, that he moved the 
parliament from Corte to Bastia in order to escape Paoli’s influence.857 Paoli still had a 
wide range of supporters in the centre of the island, where Corte is situated. On 10 
February, Paoli was elected as president to the chamber. For Elliot, this was an 
untenable situation. In Elliot’s opinion, Paoli as president of the chamber of 
parliament, “is in effect king of Corsica, and that all British authority in this country 
disappears from that moment”.858 How well founded where Elliot’s fears of Paoli’s 
power and authority? As Moore noted, Paoli was certainly “extremely popular in 
853 FO 20/8, Portland to Eliot, August 1795.
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Corsica, and has a considerable party in the parliament attached to him”.859 Paoli’s 
main contact Galeazzi for example was a member of the Corsican parliament. Paoli’s 
letters reveal that many Corsicans still looked to Paoli as a figure of authority. Paoli 
had to remind Mr Guglielmi, a member of the Bastia Parliament, that “the distribution 
of seats does not depend on me, who am a simple citizen; but it is up to the 
Viceroy”.860 Paoli refused the position as president, due to his “age” and “painful 
aliments” which did not allow him to make the constant trips to and from Parliament.861
Elliot claimed that Paoli espoused democratic principles, which were not compatible 
with legal constitutional monarchy.862 
Paoli’s own letters, however, completely refute Elliot’s claims. Rather than a man who 
espoused the democratic principles of the French revolution, any reader would find 
Paoli an advocate of the British constitutional system, as can be seen in a letter the 
wrote to his friend Galeazzi, in which he stated that “the hundred years of the Roman 
Republic can not boast such glory as the hundred years of the last English 
Revolution”.863 Paoli was a known admirer of the Roman Republic: for him to describe
the English system since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as greater than Rome was 
high praise indeed. Elliot claimed that he knew what Paoli was really like; clearly he 
did not. The length of Elliot’s letter to Portland suggested that Elliot’s fear of Paoli 
bordered upon obsession, or paranoia. Elliot claimed that the length of the dispatch 
was due to the necessity for Portland to know all the details of the political situation.864 
Elliot ultimately feared that Paoli’s great authority in the island could cause “mischief”
for the Anglo-Corsican regime, although, at this moment in time, Elliot believed that 
Paoli’s presence in Corsica was not currently a “serious or insurmountable evil”.865 
Elliot concluded that he must be seen as “clearly and strongly supported at home, and I
must have the means of countering the insinuations which either Paoli, or any other 
persons might attempt to profit by my losing the confidence of his majesty and his 
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ministers”.866 Elliot clearly felt insecure in his position as Viceroy, which in part 
explains his seemingly paranoid fear of Paoli. British rule in Corsica seemed based 
upon unstable foundations: the Viceroy was entirely reliant upon being seen to be 
strongly supported by the British government at home. 
How then did Elliot attempt to govern a pro-Paolist parliament? The simple answer is 
cash. Elliot made it clear during the session of the first Corsican parliament, that 
“opposition to government is inconsistent with the enjoyment of its favours”.867 British 
money enabled the Viceroy to win the support and favours of the majority of the 
members of parliament. MPs who supported the government would receive “signal 
marks of favour, or daily solicit them”.868 Elliot confidently asserted that “the business 
of parliament has hitherto been conducted with as much tranquillity, and as little 
difference in opinion, as could be expected in any assembly of a popular nature”.869 He 
believed that the opposition consisted of only some 20-25 members, which was daily 
falling off.870 Elliot was promoting an oligarchical government, centred around the 
Viceroy, rather than a ‘popular assembly’ based upon the British system. The British 
parliament, whatever its flaws, usually consisted of a government and a sizeable 
opposition. This enabled debates and differing opinions to emerge. Elliot seemed 
adverse to allowing any form of legal opposition to his Anglo-Corsican government: 
thus his government could be characterised as authoritarian rather than parliamentary. 
Elliot’s attempt to curb any opposition to his rule was also due to the context of the 
French Revolutionary wars. Elliot believed that Corsica should at this “trying period” 
set an “example of constancy and firmness which might make greater nations blush, 
for” she was “threatened” by “an exasperated and triumphant enemy, which Europe 
combined has not been able to stem”.871 Elliot feared and loathed the French 
revolution, so any form of opposition or discontent in Corsica became identified with 
French revolutionary ideals: the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom thus became a place of fear 
and corruption.
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Elliot used government favours to create his own political party. The most prominent 
member was the young inspiring Corsican, Pozzo di Borgo. Di Borgo (1764-1842) was
a controversial figure in the history of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom. He became a 
bitter enemy of the Bonapartes and played a major role in their expulsion from 
Corsica. He was also one of Paoli’s most important assistants after his return to the 
island. However, Paoli and Di Borgo soon fell out, especially when Di Borgo became 
firmly identified with Elliot’s party. He was elected president of the council of state 
during the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. He would later serve at the Court of Russia, 
during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Moore claimed that “Sir Gilbert is supposed 
to be much influenced by Pozzo di Borgo, who is universally disliked and generally 
thought to be a scoundrel”.872 Moore was a hostile writer of both Elliot and Di Borgo. 
However, as Lady Elliot revealed, Di Borgo was Sir Gilbert’s “prime favourite”.873 Di 
Borgo did not have a large political following like Paoli, and was entirely reliant upon 
the support provided by the Viceroy. Therefore, he was generally disliked by the 
majority of Corsicans. This was most evident during the controversy surrounding the 
bust of Paoli. The controversy began during Elliot’s tour of the island from June to 
July 1795. During Elliot’s stay in Ajaccio, he was given a ball at the Hall of 
Municipality by Colonel Colonna’s battalion. Colonel Colonna was an aide-de-camp 
of the Viceroy. Various reports have been written over what transpired. Moore claimed
that Colonna, in a drunken stupor, took down Paoli’s bust in the main hall, stabbed it 
several times, and then threw it into a closet.874 The bust was quickly replaced. The 
event made much noise in the town, and eventually the news spread across the island, 
being the “subject of conversation and correspondence for a fortnight”.875 The event 
may seem trivial, but for many Corsicans the destruction of Paoli’s bust was 
considered to be a severe affront to their beloved former leader and “to the whole 
people of Corsica”.876
How did Paoli react to the defacing of his bust? His response was made very clear; “a 
small fire was caused by the spark”.877 The defaced torso was the catalyst of the 
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rebellions and protests which followed. Paoli had been disgruntled with Elliot’s 
government for several months. His frustrations were mainly directed against the 
apparent lack of defences provided by the British government for the island. In a letter 
to his friend Galeazzi, Paoli believe that “the only fleet cannot defend ourselves”; 
despite the British navy’s superiority in value and discipline to the enemy, “it can not 
be everywhere; and it never will so effectively surround the island”.878 Paoli was an 
admirer of the British navy and praised its skill and strength. However, it was the 
dismal conditions of the military on the island which concerned Paoli most of all. Paoli
did not believed that the Viceroy saw “our state, as we see it”.879 Paoli began to 
separate himself from the policies of the Viceroy. However, Paoli did not blame Elliot 
himself for the problems engulfing the island. Rather, it was the other ‘directors’ who 
“had the art of keeping out by the Viceroy all the people who can enlighten him about 
the state of things”.880 Paoli’s anger was mainly directed towards Di Borgo, who led 
the Viceroy to all kind of “extremes”.881 After Paoli’s bust had been desecrated, the 
General became far more open in his opposition to the government. However, it was 
clear that Paoli’s main grievance was against Di Borgo, who “was preferred to many 
honest patriots” for promotion.882 Promotion to higher office was meant to be based 
upon merit and reward. What was clear of the government, under the effective control 
of Di Borgo, was their ability to “give employments and take them off to whoever” 
they wanted.883 Paoli compared the Viceroy’s government to the autocratic system 
practised at Constantinople.884 The Anglo-Corsican government was autocratic in 
nature, rather than an example of constitutional monarchy. This autocracy was allowed
to subsist because of the apparent lack of legal opposition against the Viceroy’s 
government. As discussed previously, the Anglo-Corsican government under Elliot 
rewarded those who supported their policies. These policies seemed to be the complete
opposite of what was promised in the Anglo-Corsican constitution.
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The insurrections which plagued Corsica in the summer of 1795 was the first major 
challenge for the Anglo-Corsican government. Portland claimed that the ministry 
learnt with astonishment and concern “the designs which have been formed for 
rendering the inhabitants dissatisfied with their new constitution”.885 Were the 
insurrections against the new Anglo-Corsican constitution? Elliot informed Portland in 
a dispatch dated the 16 August 1795, that the majority of petitions brought to 
parliament were about taxes. One of the petitioners refused to “pay taxes”, and 
demanded “that a supply of money should be paid to them”.886 Another petitioner 
claimed that “they did not mean to pay taxes; that they fought for that and were ready 
to fight for it”.887 The main cause of discontent among Corsicans throughout the short 
history of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was taxation. The tumultuous history of 
Corsica throughout the eighteenth century meant that no government had been truly 
established on the island. Tax collection therefore had been lax, especially under the 
French regime, who were determined not to exacerbate tensions in their recent 
conquest. The Corsicans were not used to paying taxes, and generally resented their 
imposition. Taxes however were essential to the defence of the island. It was a catch 
22 moment; many Corsicans complained of the poor public defences of the island, yet 
refused to pay taxes which could help maintain better public defences for the island. 
Many of the petitions had no real political agenda behind them. The one major figure 
which united any opposition against the Viceroy’s government was General Paoli.
Elliot claimed that the discord which plagued Corsica in the summer of 1795 was 
“instigated by General Paoli”.888 Paoli certainly was a figure-head for all the 
insurrections. He was able to direct the insurrections into opposition against Elliot’s 
government. However, Paoli was clear that he was “determined to defend, and attack, 
but with legal action”.889 In a letter to Galeazzi dated 22 August 1795, Paoli wrote that 
he believed that Elliot felt all the discontent in the island was directed at “the 
constitution, and our connection with the British”.890 Paoli claimed, however, that he 
was primarily opposed to the subjection of the country to “the despotism of miserable 
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favourites”; namely Di Borgo.891 It was clear from all of Paoli’s letters that he was not 
opposed directly to the Viceroy, but his advisers who had ‘corrupted’ him. The main 
problem with the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was its inability to deal with opposition of 
any kind. Paoli noted that “legal resistance would be applauded in England”.892 The 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was meant to be a constitutional parliamentary system, but 
any opposition against the government was construed to be an insurrection against the 
British system. British constitutional government was believed to be the most superior 
in the world: any rebellion of any form, whatever its motivations, was seen to be a 
rejection of that system. 
However, what also has to be noted is that these insurrections came during a wartime 
situation. As Portland noted to Elliot, the insurrections endangered “the security” of the
island, which could cause problems for Britain’s position in the Mediterranean. 
Perhaps the most dangerous element of the insurrections was Elliot’s claim that Paoli 
was seconded by an “English party”.893 In a letter to Galeazzi dated 15 August, Paoli 
noted that some British officers had the “potential of causing disorder”.894 The leader 
of these disgruntled British officers was none other than Colonel John Moore. Moore 
was clearly dissatisfied with Elliot’s regime. During the height of the insurrections 
against the Vice royal government, Moore and three other officers visited Paoli in his 
home at Rostino on 30 July 1795. The editor of Moore’s diary, Major-General Sir J.F 
Maurice, admitted that Moore’s visit to Paoli was a “most rash act”, as it was in 
Moore’s interest to conciliate with Elliot.895 Moore, certainly an admirer of Paoli, 
became affiliated with his opposition against Elliot’s government: indeed, Moore 
believed that Elliot should have “governed through his [Paoli’s] influence.896 It is hard 
to determine whether Moore and several British officers would have acted against 
Elliot’s government. However, the threat was considered great enough to force the 
British ministry into action. When Portland finally sent his response to Elliot in August
1795, he was clear that Colonel Moore should immediately quit the island in 48 hours, 
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and come directly to the king.897 Due to the delay in communications, the dispatches 
were not received by Elliot until October. Paoli was also ‘persuaded’ to leave Corsica 
for England, with the promise of a large pension. The insurrection highlighted the 
major inefficiencies of the Anglo-Corsican government, which was unable to deal 
effectively with any kind of opposition, and once again had had to rely upon the British
ministry at Westminster to act in their favour. 
Both Moore and Paoli left Corsica around the same time, in early October 1795. Paoli 
himself admitted that he left Corsica due to the fear that “the king would withdraw his 
troops” if the island was seen to be against Elliot’s government.898 Paoli’s and Moore’s
departures ended the first major crisis of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom. Elliot was able 
to confidentially assert at the end of 1795 that British government rule was “firmly” 
established in Corsica and that the island was “capable of being governed under British
authority”.899 Any minor disturbances that might break out on the island could be easily
dealt with, so long as they were not excited by “some general and real grievance, or 
conducted and encouraged by some such leader [as Paoli]”.900 However, Moore 
believed that Paoli’s presence in Corsica “curbed his countrymen and prevented their 
acting with the violence to which they were inclined from their dislike to the Viceroy 
and his measures”.901 Paoli was certainly a restraining influence on his fellow 
Corsicans, as illustrated by his desire only for legal action, and not violence. Would 
Paoli’s absence from Corsica be a blessing or a curse for the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom? 
The British government and Corsica: 1795-1796
The actions/reactions of the British government concerning Corsica, were slow, 
ineffective and borderline incompetent. Elliot made it clear from his many dispatches 
to Portland that he must be seen to be strongly supported from the British government. 
However, Elliot did not receive a single dispatch (except from Windham) from the 
British ministry between March and August 1795. Why was this the case? It seems that
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the British ministry had to an extent lost interest of Corsica. The Prime Minister 
William Pitt in particular never seemed very interested in the conquest of Corsica. This
was most evident in one of Pitt’s famous war speeches, made to Parliament on the 9 
December 1795, in which he defended Britain’s record in the French revolutionary 
wars, which had thus far been “a scene of disasters and defeats, except in the instances 
of sea engagements”.902 The navy remained the pride and joy of the British armed 
forces. Pitt wanted each member of Parliament to observe “the three different points 
that we had gained in the present context; Martinique, Cape Nichola mole, and the 
Cape of Good Hope; and then let him ask himself whether they were not the most 
important that could fall into our hands”.903 Perhaps most significant was Corsica’s 
omission from Pitt’s list of ‘important’ conquests. Pitt himself desired peace with 
France. He believed that if there was an opportunity to negotiate for a general peace on
just and suitable terms, then there would be an “earnest desire to give it the fullest and 
speediest effect”.904 
As indicated in Pitt’s speech, the war had been progressing badly for Britain. The 
British army sent to the Low Countries had been shamefully humiliated in 1794 and 
the Dutch Republic had fallen to French forces in January 1795. In that same year, the 
coalition that had formed against France began to unravel. Prussia signed the treaty of 
Basel with France on 6 April. Perhaps most dangerous for Britain was Spain’s peace 
treaty with France on 10 July 1795. Britain’s alliance with Spain enabled Britain’s fleet
to freely roam the Mediterranean. The secret intentions of Spain would continually 
concern British policy makers. Sir John Jervis (1735-1823) was promoted to Admiral 
of the Mediterranean fleet on 1 May 1795. He wrote a series of observations on the 
operations of the British Mediterranean fleet, received by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty Earl Spencer (1758-1834) on the 6 October 1795. Even at this early 
juncture, Jervis believed that Spanish intentions could not be trusted. Any potential 
hostility from Spain against Britain, would require the British fleet to “quit the present 
position and proceed down the Mediterranean, measures must be taken respecting 
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Corsica, upon which some secret instructions may have been given”.905 Those ‘secret 
instructions’ undoubtedly meant the evacuation of Corsica. It was clear that Britain’s 
position in the Mediterranean would be untenable should Spain declare war upon 
Britain. What was also clear was the willingness of Britain to abandon their hard 
earned conquest. Why was this the case, when Corsica promised to be the greatest 
naval and commercial base in the Mediterranean?
During the course of the French Revolutionary Wars, Britain’s war debt greatly 
increased. William Morgan provided a rather pessimistic view of Britain’s prospective 
finances: he estimated that the Navy’s debt for 1796 would cost some £9,037,953.906 
However, the figures he gave provide an insight into the costs undertaken by Britain 
during the war. A letter from the Duke of Portland to the king, dated 2 October 1795 
reveals the difficulties accompanying “the present high price of corn”.907 This was 
another example of the financial issues faced by the British government. Britain also 
had to supply large subsidies to their continental allies, particularly Austria. Morgan 
estimated the cost of a loan to the Emperor at £7,205,133.908 The 10 June 1796 edition 
of the Gazetteer provided an ‘Estimate of additional demands for the current year’, 
which were to be the chief business of the new parliament.909 The estimates included 
expenses “To meet the mediated Armada” at £7,500,000, and £4,500,000 for a loan to 
the Emperor to recruit more Italian troops. In comparison, and surprisingly, the amount
calculated to preserve Corsica was a mere £250,000.910 This sum, however, would have
to be supplied exclusively by the British government. 
The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was unable to raise the money required for its own 
administration. Portland later complained to Elliot that the annual intake would not 
produce £10,000 per annum; “according to Mr Necker”, half of that sum was not paid 
in the time of the French government.911 Portland referenced Necker’s A Treatise on 
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the Administration of the Finances of France (1784), which was published in three 
volumes. Jacques Necker (1734-1804) was Louis XVI’s chief financial minster from 
1777-1781 and again in 1789-1790. Necker played a crucial role in calling the estates-
general in 1789, for the purpose of sorting out France’s troubled finances. France 
during the 1780s suffered from many financial problems. Necker’s Treatise contained 
the financial records of each of France’s provinces, and was translated into English a 
year after its initial publication in French. Necker estimated that the annual income of 
Corsica was some 600,000 livres; in contrast the civil expenses alone cost some 
250,000 livres.912 This latter sum did not include the military expenses incurred for 
maintaining troops on the island, which led Necker to conclude that it was due to 
“political considerations alone that the possession of Corsica is advantageous to 
France”.913 Portland bemoaned the fact that the Corsicans were ‘exempt’ from every 
expense attendant on their civil and military establishment, and they resisted any 
attempt “made to consent them to that change”.914 As previously mentioned, the 
Corsicans main grievance against the British government was paying taxes. The 
Anglo-Corsican administration was only operational due to British government money,
and seemed incapable of being self-sufficient. This was even more of an issue during a 
wartime situation, when money was scarce.
Vice-Admiral Collingwood wrote to his friend J.E. Blackett that “the favourable 
reports which have been made of this island are shameful falsehoods, and show how 
blind people are to the truth, when it interferes with their interests, or checks their 
vanity”.915 Collingwood questioned the very ideas that had previously been forwarded 
to promote British intervention in Corsica. Clearly, many who served in Corsica were 
somewhat disappointed by the undeveloped nature of the island. Collingwood himself 
clearly hated Corsica. This is highlighted by his complaint that “Corsica produces 
nothing but wild hogs”, and his belief that “none will lament the loss except those who 
have good appointments there”.916 Collingwood questioned the productivity of the 
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island, which had been promised to contain so much potential by many contemporary 
writers. Collingwood’s friend and fellow naval officer Horatio Nelson had previously 
been an advocate for British presence on Corsica. Nelson had claimed in 1795, that 
Corsica supplied large woods of olives, and “our naval yards will be supplied with 
excellent wood”.917 Indeed, many writers wrote of the excellent wood Corsica had 
which could be used to supply the British navy. The 20 August edition of the Star 
claimed that the French masted all their ships in the arsenal of Toulon with wood from 
Corsica.918 Was this actually the case?  Paul Bamford’s book Forests and French sea 
power (1956) reveals that the majority of Corsica’s assessable forests had been largely 
devastated by the local inhabitants and the lumbering operations of the Genoese. The 
most suitable trees that remained were “too distant from the sea”, and “extensive river 
and road constructions were considered necessary preliminaries to any naval cuts”.919 
When “exploitations finally did get under way during the war of American revolution” 
the “island provided enormous quantities of board and plank”.920 However, the great 
French dockyard of Toulon was still dependent on foreign exports. During the later 
years of the Old regime, Toulon “used a few masts from Corsica, but became largely 
dependent on the masts from the Baltic and Black sea markets”.921 What can be 
gathered from the example provided by Corsica’s timber, is that potential sources of 
wood were available. However, these were not easily accessible, and major investment
was needed in order to exploit the forests properly. 
Many of the British on the island were somewhat disappointed by the undeveloped 
nature of Corsica. Portland complained of the “poverty of the country”, and that any 
“attempts of improvement” were rebuffed by the rebellious nature of the inhabitants.922 
Could the island have been developed by a committed British government? As 
previously stated, money was short, especially in a wartime situation. Even considering
this, the British government’s attempts to develop the island were certainly lacklustre: 
the British government seemed unwilling or generally uninterested in developing the 
917 Nelson, Dispatches, vol. 2, 4.
918 Star, 20 August 1795; Issue 2186.
919 Paul Bamford, Forests and French Sea Power 1660-1789, (Toronto: Toronto university press, 
1956), 106.
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island. This attitude did not stem just from the disappointment over the undeveloped 
state of the island. As Collingwood concluded Corsica was “maintained at an immense 
expense, and it is ridiculous that it should be”.923 The governments money was wasted 
on providing appointments, and obtaining political influence in the island. For 
Collingwood, “neither the people nor the country [were] capable of being improved, 
nor does all the money that is lavished there give us any influence”.924 The Corsicans 
themselves were unable to improve, or adopt to the British system.
1796: The breaking of ‘bonds’ between Britain and Corsica
The British government’s loss of interest in Corsica stemmed from two central causes. 
The first concerned the undeveloped nature of the island, as described within the 
previous section. The second was the belief that the inhabitants themselves were 
unable to adopt the British system. The rebellions in 1795 had raised doubts within 
Britain over the suitability of a union with Corsica. Events in 1796 would ultimately 
shatter the perceived bonds between Britain and Corsica. Two major rebellions broke 
out in Corsica in 1796. The first occurred in April at Bogognano. In May, troops were 
finally sent to Bogognano, only to find the village deserted; the inhabitants had fled to 
the mountains.925 However, the rebellion at Bogognano inspired an even greater threat 
to the existence of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Elliot claimed that “the disaster in 
Piedmont...the retreat of the Austrians” had increased security risks, and therefore the 
possibility of a French invasion.926 Events in Italy had certainty emboldened the 
“Republican Party”, of “promoting troubles” in Corsica.927 What was clear was that 
there was a French ‘Republican Party’, which had slowly been building in strength in 
Corsica. Nelson also noted of the existence of a large republican party in the island, 
“which take every opportunity of making disturbances”.928  The war had been 
progressing badly for Britain and their allies in 1796. The young Corsican Napoleon 
Bonaparte had been made commander of the French armies in Italy. In an 
extraordinary campaign, he had beaten the Austrian armies in nearly every 
engagement. The vast majority of Austrian troops in Italy were shut up in the siege of 
923 Collingwood, Public and Private Correspondence, 36.
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Mantua. Elliot believed that the ‘great disadvantage’ “under which we now labour is 
the progress of French arms in Italy”.929 The population of Corsica was “not 
unnaturally impressed by the wonderful triumphs of the French armies under a 
Corsican leader”.930 
The second major rebellion in Corsica occurred in May, when Elliot was intercepted 
by a Corsican group, who numbered some 700 to 800.931 The ‘Campo’ as they called 
themselves were headed and brought together by two or three republicans. Elliot 
however maintained that the Republican party was still “too weak to avow their 
intentions”.932 The main grievances of the ‘Campo’ were their jealousy against 
individuals in chief employments, namely Di Borgo, and “the pretence of taxes” under 
which they had been “brought together”, which Elliot felt was the “only object that 
could really interest them”.933 Elliot believed that it would have been easy to break up 
the ‘Campo’ with the troops he had with him. However, Elliot sternly believed that the 
British occupation of Corsica was reliant upon the “cordial co-operation of the people 
with the authorities”.934 It would be “absurd and unwarrantable” to maintain the 
government by force; Britain was not able “nor should we desire to conquer 
Corsica”.935 Britain’s intention was never to ‘conquer’ Corsica through force of arms, 
but to assimilate the island into the British empire. Any force would inevitably lead to 
civil war, which would be disastrous for the Anglo-Corsican government, especially 
considering the small number of British troops on the island. Therefore, Elliot 
acquiesced to the grievances of the ‘Campo’, which included the resignation of those 
persons who were “known to be the real objects of jealousy”.936 Di Borgo was among 
the number to be forced to resign. 
Elliot’s acceptance of all the grievances presented by the ‘Campo’ was a considerable 
sign of weakness from the Anglo-Corsican government. Perhaps most contradictory 
929 Elliot, Life and Letters, 343.
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931 FO 20/11, Elliot to Portland, 5 June 1796.
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was Elliot’s sudden acceptance of Di Borgo’s resignation, when he had ignored the 
many calls in the previous year for him to leave office. Elliot’s own conduct was 
criticised by Portland, who did not believe that the British government should be 
“permanently charged with the expenses of the Corsican government, or that Corsica 
should be exempt from such taxes” necessary to their administration.937 Elliot’s 
character had been previously brought into question by the British government. During
the period concerning Paoli’s and Moore’s expulsions from Corsica, the king was 
“sorry to see in all Sir Gilbert Elliot’s letters a degree of jealousy that I had hoped had 
not been a part of his character”.938 Moore, on his return to England, revealed that “Sir 
Gilbert’s character is not altogether unknown in this country”.939 Elliot’s enemies in 
England, Moore and General Stuart both spoke against his conduct in Corsica. Elliot 
himself informed his friend William Windham that all his views and wishes “point 
strongly homewards and I think myself entitled to be relieved”.940 Elliot saw his 
mission as the preparation of the constitution “to see the measure fairly launched and 
floating with a favourable breeze, and then resign the helm”.941 Elliot’s commitment to 
Corsica was questionable and he desired to return to England. He seemed personally 
drained by the role of Viceroy: a replacement may have been the best course of action 
for the future of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Elliot admitted that Frederick North, 
secretary of state in Corsica, “would carry on the business here perfectly well”.942 
Frederick North (1766-1827) was the younger son and namesake of the former Prime 
Minister Lord North (1732-1792). He also served as a diplomat to Rome. Perhaps 
North would have been a more suitable Viceroy than Elliot.
The rebellions that plagued Corsica in 1796 were for Portland sufficient evidence, that 
the Corsicans had rejected the “generosity and liberality of the English”.943 Britain 
believed that their parliamentary government was the best in the world: any revolt 
against the Anglo-Corsican government was construed to be a rejection of the British 
system itself. For Nelson, “how far the conduct of those islanders, taken in a grand 
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938 The Later Correspondence of George III, vol. II, 396.
939 Moore, Diary, 180.
940 The Windham Papers, vol. II, 305.
941 Elliot, Life and Letters, 238.
942 The Windham Papers, vol. II, 305.
943 FO 20/11, Portland to Elliot, July 1796.
201
scale, deserves that a fleet and army should be kept for their security, is well deserving 
of serious consideration”.944 Nelson believed that “our Corsican brethren have (at least 
a great part of them) behaved so ill, that I hope our ministry will have no scruple in 
leaving them most perfectly free and independent”.945 Collingwood agreed with 
Nelson, and heartily wished “that our time of our leaving it [Corsica]” would come 
soon.946 What caused the general denouncement of the Corsicans by British officers 
serving in Corsica? The rebellions against the Anglo-Corsican government, certainly 
played a part in causing British dislike of the Corsicans. 
What was fundamentally clear was how different the Corsicans were to the British. 
Before the establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, Boswell and other writers 
had attempted to portray the many similarities between the English and Corsicans: both
were ‘sister’ islands of liberty. The Corsicans were consistently described as the brave 
islanders, fighting against tyranny. However, realities on the ground showed that the 
Corsicans and British were fundamentally different. Elliot commented that “faction is 
too vehement, personal jealousy is too inherent in the Corsican character”.947 Here 
Elliot referred to the infamous Vendetta, which was an intrinsic part of eighteenth 
century Corsican society. Elliot described the vendetta as “one of the most rooted 
particularities in the Corsican character”.948 A Corsican was deemed infamous if they 
“did not revenge the death” of any relation.949 Collingwood once noted an episode in 
Ajaccio, when one Corsican stabbed another in the public square. The culprit simply 
walked away, wiping his blade. Collingwood recorded with astonishment that no one 
attempted to stop him. The stabbing did not seem to be a shock for the other Corsicans.
These acts led Collingwood to brand the Corsicans as “barbarous” and distinctly alien 
to the British character.950 The peculiarities of the vendetta led the Corsican parliament 
to suspend the trials by jury enshrined in the Anglo-Corsican Constitution. These trials 
by jury emulated the British judicial system. However, as Elliot remarked, any 
Corsican “fears the dishonour of convicting his relation, or his friend, or the relation of
944 Nelson, Dispatches, vol. II, 172.
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a friend much more than that of breaking his oath as a juror”.951 Corsica was a small 
country, where the people exclusively intermarried with each other, which greatly 
connected the people to one another.952 Elliot perhaps at times understood the Corsican 
character better than many of his British contemporaries. However Elliot also believed 
in the superiority of the British Empire over any other nation. For example, Elliot 
believed the superiority of the English aristocracy over the dissolute Italian nobility of 
Italy was their strength “of character”.953 The main problem was that Britons viewed 
the world through the lens of their own superiority. 
Any subject nation that rebelled against British rule was seen to reject the British 
constitution, which was considered to be the greatest system in the world. As Elliot 
made clear to Portland, the Corsicans of the ‘Campo’ still declared their “own 
attachment to the British government”.954 However, for Portland, the late rebellions and
proceedings in Corsica “might warrant his majesty in withdrawing his protection from 
that island”.955 The ‘rejection’ of the British system, combined with the apparent 
expenses of Corsica, made Portland seriously contemplate evacuating the island in July
1796. The order would not come for another two months, however. Why was this the 
case? Even the rebellions and Corsica’s lack of productivity could not prompt a British
evacuation of the island, but they clearly played an important role in determining the 
future of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Portland informed Elliot that his majesty 
would forebear taking the step of evacuating the island for the moment, and to “wait 
for those events by which the fate of Italy must be decided”.956 Corsica was still an 
important naval base in the Mediterranean. The fate of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 
was determined by the war which harboured its own creation. The French 
Revolutionary wars in Italy will be the subject for the final section, and were where the
seeds for the fall of the Anglo-Corsican were set.
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Corsica and the War in Italy
The events in Italy should never be ignored in the study of relations of the Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom. The main reason why Britain conquered Corsica was to strengthen 
her naval position in the Mediterranean, and to this end, Corsica served two purposes. 
The first was to enable for the British fleets to observe the French fleet in Toulon, and 
the second was to provide a base from which to support Britain’s allies in Italy. As a 
result, Britain’s navy was the bedrock of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. However, 
Britain’s military force on Corsica was inadequate and complaints regarding the 
military defence of the island were raised throughout the history of the Corsican 
Kingdom. As previously noted, Paoli, Stuart and Moore and even Elliot were all aware
of the inadequate defences on the island. Collingwood, writing as late as 25 September 
1796, claimed that the military establishment on Corsica “till lately, was excessive 
even to a farce”.957As a naval officer, Collingwood was somewhat biased against the 
military arm of the British establishment. But it was clear that the navy was the only 
force adequately protecting Corsica. Admiral Christian, in a letter to Lord Spencer, 
bemoaned the fact that “the British fleet is necessarily called upon to protect 
Corsica”.958 Christian was planning for an operation to seize French Guadeloupe, and 
believed Corsica to be an unnecessary burden for the navy. 
The navy provided an even more important service to Corsica than defence: the 
delivery of supplies. Admiral Jervis complained to Earl Spencer about the situation of 
Ajaccio. Due to Ajaccio’s remote situation, and the “impracticability of the 
communication by land”, it was unsuitable as a naval port.959 The relief of the garrison 
at Ajaccio, and the convergence of ammunition stores were both tasks performed by 
ships.960 The main problem was that Corsica, in its undeveloped state, was unable to 
provide the supplies required by both the military and naval forces serving in the 
Mediterranean. Earl Spencer, Lord of the Admiralty informed Dundas that “in Corsica 
no supplies are to be had but those we send from home”.961 Later Jervis informed 
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Spencer that all provisions for both the army and navy were received from Leghorn.962 
Collingwood noted that Britain had hitherto enjoyed free access to all Italian ports, 
which had “conduced very much to the health and strength of our fleet”.963 He added 
that: “I do not know how we shall carry on the war single-handed” if the French were 
to seize the major Italian ports, not because opposing force would have increased, “but 
because all our supplies will be precarious”.964 Collingwood’s complaints over the 
undeveloped nature of Corsica are better understood in the context of this precarious 
supply-line. The future of the British navy, and her position in the Mediterranean in 
general, became dependent upon the Austrian army in Italy.
The situation in Italy had radically changed by 1796. Napoleon’s remarkable campaign
and successes in Italy was, for Nelson, nothing less than “extraordinary”.965 Nelson 
feared that “the French will soon oblige Sardinia to be their ally, and that they are 
disposed to treat Tuscany as an enemy”.966 In June 1796, Tuscany subsequently 
became subservient to France, and Leghorn was seized by French forces. This posed 
an immediate threat to the safety of Corsica, as Leghorn was the closest mainland 
Italian port to the island. On 2 July Nelson informed Elliot that he had received orders 
to blockade Leghorn, and “to be aiding and assisting your excellency in preventing any
attempts of the French on the island of Corsica”.967 The blockade required ships which 
were already in short supply in the Mediterranean. More importantly, the French were 
making active attempts to invade Corsica. Napoleon informed General Vaubois that 
some eight or nine hundred Corsicans were at Livorno, “destined to return home”.968 
They were under the command of the Corsican General Gentili, who had previously 
served Paoli in England. These Corsicans in Livorno personified the split in loyalties 
of the Corsicans in general: it became a choice between Britain or France. On the 21 
May 1796, Napoleon ordered citizen Bonelli, chief of the Battalion, to go to Corsica 
with eighteen men of his choice. Bonelli was, like Napoleon, a Corsican serving in the 
French army. He was to carry powder and arms, and 24,000 livres in cash to 
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“encourage the patriots” on the island.969 It was clear that Napoleon was actively aiding
the Republican party on Corsica, and this explains the republican party’s increased 
strength during the summer of 1796. Napoleon informed citizen Sapey that he had sent
Citizen Bonelli with thirty men to Corsica. They had been armed with hundred 
muskets, three hundred pairs of pistols, six thousand pounds of power to aid the 
patriots of Corsica.970 Citizens Braccini and Paravicini were to stay in Genoa, “to make
a correspondence with the Corsican patriots”.971 
How were these French troops able to slip past the British navy?  The British were 
certainly aware of Napoleon’s plans. The British admiral Jervis was aware that 
Napoleon had sent a ‘mission’ to Corsica “to rouse the island against Britain”.972 
However, as Nelson revealed, the French were travelling to Corsica in small Greek 
vessels, which could hold some eight to ten men. It was “almost impossible we can 
stop any of them”, especially since the French controlled “the whole coast” of Italy.973 
The larger ships of the line of the British navy found it hard to detect these small 
vessels in the water. Nelson believed that when these French or Corsican sympathisers 
landed in Corsica, they would be “concealed or assisted” by the islanders “rotten at 
heart”.974 Despite vowing to provide protection for Corsica, Britain was unable to 
prevent the landing of any French sympathizers on the island, and the recent French 
successes in Italy cast doubts in the minds of the Corsicans. As Nelson admitted to his 
father, all of Corsica’s “connections are with the French. Great numbers of Corsican 
officers are in high stations in their army, which cannot be the case with ours”.975 
Memories of the previous French republican rule of the island offered a vision of an 
alternative form of government for Corsicans. The French revolutionary system was 
certainly a far more desirable system than that which had been provided by the 
previous Bourbon regime: many Corsicans -such as Napoleon- had been able to 
progress well through the ranks of the French military. The same opportunities were 
not available within the British system. The French revolution recognised the 
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Corsicans as citizens, equal to all those in mainland France. Britain in contrast viewed 
the Corsicans as subjects, and opportunities for advancement were only available 
within Corsica itself. The door to any advancement in the British military or 
government remained firmly closed to the Corsicans. This was also due to their 
Catholic religion, which prevented Corsicans obtaining higher office within Britain 
itself. 
The French republican party did not force Britain to evacuate Corsica. The small isle 
of Capraja to the north of Corsica, was still held by the Genoese republic. Elliot 
ordered Nelson to seize the island, which he believed harboured a French agent who 
had supplied the French Republican party in Corsica with stores and ammunition.976 
Capraja was seized by Nelson without bloodshed on 18th September 1796, which was a
severe blow French plans on Corsica. The French Republican party was still too weak 
to openly avow their intentions. What caused the government ministers to call for the 
evacuation of Corsica? This was made clear in the evacuation orders provided by 
Portland to Elliot on the 31 August 1796. These ‘secret and confidential’ orders did not
reach Elliot until late September. Portland informed Elliot that the intentions of Spain 
would soon “be declared by open acts of hostility”.977 The intentions of Spain had 
always been questioned by senior British officials following their peace with France in 
1795, and the potential for war with Spain was the primary reason why British forces 
were evacuated from Corsica. Nelson was aware in August 1796, that any war with 
Spain would cause “the necessary evacuation of Corsica, and that our fleet will draw 
down the Mediterranean” toward Gibraltar.978 For Lord Admiral Spencer, the 
evacuation of Corsica enabled Britain to set their “Mediterranean fleet at liberty, on the
probable event of a rupture with Spain”.979 Due to the difficult supply-line situation, 
nearly the “whole of our force” of ships would be needed to protect every convoy of 
supplies from Gibraltar to Corsica.980 It became a military necessity to evacuate 
Corsica. 
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However, as Portland’s evacuation order noted, there were other major factors which 
motivated ministers to decide in favour of evacuating Corsica. Portland made it clear to
Elliot, that the recent rebellions in Corsica “can be considered as little less than a 
rejection of his majesty’s government, and a subversion of the constitution”.981 His 
majesty wished to “impart the blessings of the British government”, however it was 
with ‘serious concern’ and ‘regret’ “of its returning to a state of anarchy”.982 The 
ministry believed the Corsicans had rejected the British ‘blessings’ of government, 
long considered to be the greatest in the world. The return to ‘anarchy’ implied a return
to the French revolutionary model in the eyes of the British establishment. The extent 
to which Portland felt ‘regret’ over the evacuation of Corsica is questionable. This was 
highlighted by Portland’s belief that “his majesty can no longer dispense with the 
service of his troops employed on distant objects”.983 Corsica was only a ‘distant 
object’ and of little worth or value to the commercial British empire. The troops and 
navy would be redeployed to Portugal, which had shown a much greater “attachment” 
to Britain than Corsica.984 What was clear from the evacuation orders was the idea that 
the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom had failed. Britain and Corsica were clearly 
incompatible for union. Therefore, when the spectre of a potential Spanish war was 
raised, it provided the excuse needed for the British ministry to order the evacuation.
British evacuation of Anglo-Corsican Kingdom: October- November 1796
The evacuation orders from the ministry did not reach Elliot until 29 September 1796. 
Elliot himself was greatly upset by the “abruptness of the decision”, and bemoaned the 
fact that the evacuation meant “to withdraw the blessings of the British constitution 
from the people of Corsica”.985 Elliot argued that the timing of the evacuation was 
inappropriate, and believed that “the island is at this moment in a most perfect state of 
loyalty to the king, and affection for the British nation”.986 Elliot’s sentiment here was 
certainly clouded by his eternal optimism. It was clear that the Anglo-Corsican 
experiment had failed, and that the security of British rule had been compromised. 
British rule of the island relied upon one key tenant: the ability to provide security and 
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protection from any enemies. Any questions about Britain’s ability to protect Corsica 
was severely detrimental to ambitions of maintaining the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. 
This was indeed proven when Elliot informed the municipality of Bastia that Britain 
intended to evacuate the island. A committee of thirty was nominated to carry on the 
role of government. Problems began to arise, however, when the committee soon 
wrested all power from Elliot. Jervis reported to Spencer that the committee became 
emboldened when a violent gust drove the British ships from anchor. The committee 
then insisted that an equal number of Corsicans should mount guard at Bastia. They 
also refused to allow the Viceroy to send messengers to the Corsican generals at 
Leghorn, and were determined to send their own in order to secure a peaceable 
transition to French rule.987 They were aware of the inevitable French invasion that 
would follow the British evacuation, and were determined to secure the best possible 
future for Corsica under France. These the bold assertions underlined the speed with 
which British power in Corsica had evaporated. The British had indeed abandoned 
Corsica, leaving the Corsicans no choice other than French rule. Britain had betrayed 
her pledge of protection to Corsica. 
Nelson recorded that on his arrival to Corsica on 14 October the Corsicans had planned
to seize the Viceroy, and that “the town was full of armed Corsicans who had mounted 
guard at every place”.988 It was clear that the committee had taken control of the town, 
and refused “to suffer any vessel or boat to quit the mole”.989 Nelson’s arrival with his 
squadron changed the situation. He sent a clear message to the committee: if there was 
any interference in the British evacuation, the ships would open fire and “batter the 
town down”.990 The message, according to Nelson, had the “desired effect”, and that 
the town was so quiet that “no people could behave better”.991 The committee clearly 
intended to capture the Viceroy in order to obtain earn the favour of the French 
invasion forces. This became even more apparent as French troops had landed near 
Cape Corse – to the immediate north of Bastia – on 15 October. Under Nelson’s 
supervision, the evacuation of Corsica was completed by 19 October. The evacuation 
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of Bastia was extremely well timed, as French troops entered Bastia as the last British 
ships left. A Spanish fleet was also sighted off Cape Corse a day after British forces 
had been evacuated to the nearby island of Elba.992 
The arrival of French forces and the Spanish fleet shortly after the last British ships 
had left Bastia, emphasised how vulnerable Corsica was to invasion. The evacuation of
Bastia was ineptly handled until Nelson’s timely arrival. The evacuation of the British 
citadels of St Fiorenzo and Calvi was complete by 23 October, thus ending the last 
vestiges of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The evacuation of Corsica was certainly 
justified considering the major shift in strategic and military considerations. However, 
the government soon reneged on its idea for the evacuation of the island. Perhaps the 
most farcical action taken by the British government concerning Corsica was its 
decision on the 19 October, to send counter orders to Admiral Jervis, that “his 
majesty’s fleet should be continued in the Mediterranean, and that the measures for the
evacuation of Corsica should be suspended”.993 What brought about this radical 
reversal? The answer was that the ministry had made a proposal to the Catherine the 
Great (1729-1796) of Russia. Russia, and in particular the empress, had long had her 
own interest in the island, something which dated back to the 1760s. The Russian 
interest in Corsica during the eighteenth century is deserving of its own thesis. The 
British ministry hoped to obtain “the consent of the people of that island to transfer the 
sovereignty thereof to the Empress”.994 In return the British would retain the 
“commerce of his majesty’s subjects in peace” and the use of certain ports “in time of 
war”.995 
The British ministry recognised that any future union between Britain and Corsica was 
impossible but, the ministry still wanted to secure the two interests which were of the 
utmost importance for the British Empire: continued commerce and the use of 
Corsica’s naval bases. This farcical move to change the orders concerning the 
evacuation of Corsica, summed up the decision-making aptitude of the British 
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ministry. The Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer was “unsettled and anxious” over the
“contradictory nature of the various orders” sent out to Corsica.996 Once Britain’s 
intention to evacuate Corsica had been announced, their power and rule over the island
had effectively ceased. Fortunately, as Jervis later informed Spencer, it was “a great 
blessing that the evacuation of Corsica had taken place before I received the orders to 
maintain the Viceroy in the sovereignty of it, which could not have been effected for 
any length of time, as the moment the enemy had landed in force, every man in the 
interior of the island would have taken part with him, and there was not a tenable post 
in it”.997 The decision to countermand the evacuation of Corsica was made on the 19 
October, the day Bastia was evacuated. Messages from London took nearly a month to 
reach British forces in the Mediterranean, and so Jervis only received the second set of 
orders on 11 November. The sovereignty of British rule of Corsica was based upon her
ability to properly protect the island from French invasion. Once that had been 
compromised, British forces could no longer rule the island effectively.
The reaction in Britain to the evacuation of Corsica was muted. The Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom had primarily been a government venture. This was in complete contrast to 
the vast popular support for the Corsican cause in 1768, as illustrated in the second 
chapter. The Corsican crisis in 1768 dominated the main newspaper headlines, and a 
considerable number of column inches were allocated to reporting on Corsica. This 
was in part influenced by the publication of Boswell’s highly popular Account of 
Corsica in February 1768, only a few months before the French invasion of the island. 
In contrast, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom had a mixed reception in the main 
newspapers and periodicals, and those who supported the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 
were generally government writers. Those who came out against the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom were opposition writers – a complete reversal of the situation in 1768. Most 
of the British press contained the papers from Paris, which reported the evacuation of 
Corsica, but the matter prompted little reaction from the majority of British 
newspapers. The 1-3 December edition of the St James Chronicle justified the 
governments decision to evacuate Corsica. For the St James Chronicle, the evacuation 
showed that the government was willing to adopt measures “which may ultimately 
996 Spencer, Private Papers of Earl Spencer, vol. I, 329.
997 Private Papers of Earl Spencer, vol. II, 71.
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secure our best interests”.998 The newspaper alluded to the possibility of peace talks, 
and the British occupation of Corsica was seen to be a hindrance to those negotiations. 
The 22 November edition of the Morning Post and Fashionable World argued that 
while the world would comfort Louis XVIII and Stadtholder for the loss of their 
thrones, “the dethroning of King Gilbert Elliot will excite universal contempt and 
laughter”.999 The Morning Post and Fashionable World was a well-known opposition 
newspaper, and the article reflected the attitude that Corsica was of little importance to 
the British crown; Elliot was portrayed as a somewhat farcical character. Perhaps the 
only major public opposition to the evacuation in Britain was from Edmund Burke, 
who believed Britain to be “mad” for evacuating Corsica.1000 But the general consensus
was that the British fleet in the Mediterranean was needed closer to British shores, 
following Spain’s declaration of war. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom had never 
endeared itself to broad public support in Britain; in fact, it had alienated many. 
Conclusion: Why did the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom fail?  
The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom ended any aspirations Britain may have had over 
Corsica. Nelson confirmed that Britain was “now done with Corsica; I have seen the 
first and last of that Kingdom”.1001 He believed that Corsica’s “situation certainly was 
most desirable for us, but the generality of its inhabitants are so greedy of wealth, and 
so jealous of each other, that it would require the patience of Job, and the riches of 
Croesus to satisfy them”.1002 Nelson referred to the biggest issue the British 
government had on Corsica: the considerable expenses incurred for its administration. 
Due to the undeveloped nature of the island, major investment had been required to 
enable Corsica to return an annual profit to British coffers. Ultimately, the British 
Empire was motivated primarily by the acquisition of resources and wealth to augment
its mercantile system. Ironically, Nelson’s claims of the Corsicans “greed” mirrored 
the British forces’ own reason for being on the island. The harsh criticisms of the 
Corsicans themselves stemmed from the belief that they had rejected the British 
constitutional system, which was believed to be the greatest in the world. The Corsican
998 St James Chronicle or the British Evening Post, (London, England), 1-3 December 1796; Issue 
6077.
999 Morning Post and Fashionable World, (London, England), 22 November 1796; Issue 7705.
1000The Windham Papers, vol. II, 25.
1001Nelson, Dispatches, vol. II, 298.
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rejection of that system meant that they were ‘unworthy’ of British protection. As 
highlighted throughout this chapter, the primary source of Corsican grievance was 
taxation. Throughout the eighteenth century, Corsica had been in near constant 
rebellion, as both the Genoese and French were unable to implement their own 
effective taxation systems. The Corsicans naturally rejected any attempts by Britain to 
impose any sort of taxes. The other main grievance was the misrule of certain Corsican
ministers, namely Pozzo di Borgo. In this respect, the Viceroy was at fault. Elliot 
promoted certain favourites to office. These favourites had little wealth of their own 
and were therefore seen to be reliant entirely upon the favours and money provided to 
them by the Anglo-Corsican government. Pozzo di Borgo himself was particularly 
unpopular, especially after his fallout with Paoli. The rebellions against British rule 
were primarily motivated by the two issues of taxes and favouritism. Perhaps if Elliot 
had acquiesced to some of these demands in the summer of 1795, rather than May 
1796, the island might have become more settled. Elliot failed to understand the chief 
grievances of his Corsican subjects.
The Anglo-Corsican constitution itself contained the seeds for the future internal 
discord which broke out, and the office of Viceroy was a particularly contentious 
matter. The office was never raised during the discussions at Murato in January 1794, 
and was a later invention. The idea of a Viceroy implied an office of a higher level 
than that of a governor, or even the Lord lieutenant in Ireland. This title caused 
unnecessary problems, particularly concerning the extent of the Viceroy’s powers, 
which caused frictions with both General Stuart and Paoli. Whether or not Elliot was 
the right man for the job remains another contentious issue. Elliot’s character in 
particular seems unsuited for the difficult office he was to inherit. He was overly 
optimistic, even at the worst of times, and this often clouded his judgement. He was 
also particularly fearful and jealous of those who could threaten his authority. The 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom may have thrived if the principal actors had been able to 
work together. Stuart’s own disruptive personality also cannot be ignored, as it caused 
problems for all of his superiors. When Stuart was later appointed as General in 
Portugal, Burke observed that he had never heard of his abilities. Burke believed that 
Stuart’s “civil disposition” in “his late proceedings in our quondam Kingdom of 
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Corsica afford a sufficient indication” of his military abilities.1003 Stuart’s disruptive 
nature during his time in Corsica was well known. 
Paoli was also a particularly untrustworthy character; Collingwood suggested that 
Paoli in England could stir the “whole country to revolt and rebellion” by simply 
expressing his will.1004 This was certainly an exaggeration, but Collingwood’s language
suggested a certain amount of distrust. This was the primary reason why Paoli was not 
entrusted with the office of Viceroy. Paoli was certainly a major tie between Britain 
and Corsica. He was an Anglophile, and one of the founders of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom. Without his initiative, British intervention on the island may never have 
taken place. His virtual exile from Corsica in 1795 severed a major tie between Corsica
and Britain. Paoli’s absence from Corsica, however, did not mean the end for the 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Sir Gilbert Elliot was stubborn, especially with regard to 
those he believed to be his enemies, and the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom did not provide 
for an effective opposition. Any who opposed the Corsican government were viewed 
as rebellious. Paoli had wanted a valid legal opposition in the style of the British 
parliamentary system. Instead, the Viceroy’s government was autocratic – the 
complete opposite of the British model – and used financial favours to pay off potential
opposition to his government. 
What must not be forgotten is that the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom existed in a wartime 
context. Elliot could not afford for a large opposition to the government to exist 
because any official opposition could potentially collaborate with the French. Elliot 
himself never truly understood the Corsican character. His ‘jealous’ character cast 
doubts over his ability within the ministry and also by the King. Elliot himself, 
however, cannot be blamed for the downfall of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. He dealt
with the rebellions particularly well and without bloodshed. As Elliot understood, 
English occupation was reliant upon “cordial co-operation of the people with the 
authorities”; it would be “absurd and unwarrantable” to hold the island by force, which
would only lead to civil war.1005 Elliot was indeed forced to co-operate with the 
1003The Windham Papers, vol. II, 25.
1004Collingwood, Public and Private correspondence, 36.
1005Elliot, Life and Letters, 339.
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Corsican rebels, particularly those of the ‘Campo’ in May 1796, due to the small size 
of the British force he had at hand. He also fostered far more friendly relations with the
naval officers. Admirals Hood, Jervis and Nelson all respected Elliot, and praised his 
abilities as Viceroy. Nonetheless Elliot’s character tended to alienate his 
contemporaries. Ultimately, it cannot be conclusively said that the Viceroy Elliot can 
be blamed for the failure of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. 
The failure of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom can be rested firmly on the lap of the 
British ministry. Its actions concerning Corsica can only be described as inept. Little 
money was spent on developing the island. Elliot made it clear to Portland that a 
“pecuniary sacrifice” needed to be made “in the first period of our connection to” 
Corsica.1006 Elliot divided the development of Corsica into ‘periods’. The first period 
required the necessary expenses from the British government to develop the 
commercial and industrial features of Corsica. Elliot himself was committed to the 
long term future of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The ministry in contrast seemed to 
quickly lose interest in the project. The Prime Minister Pitt in particular was never 
committed to maintaining the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Sir Gilbert’s wife Lady Elliot,
complained to her friend Lady Malmesbury on 8 June 1796, that they had “heard 
nothing official for eight months”.1007 Elliot made it clear that he needed to be seen as 
strongly supported from home. Instead, the ministry rarely sent responses to his many 
letters. The time dispatches took to reach London and vice-versa was also a significant 
problem. Perhaps with more troops and money, the history of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom may have been different. However, the existence of the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom rested firmly upon Britain’s successes in the French Revolutionary wars. The
Anglo-Corsican constitution contained one other major promise: that of protection. 
With the war against Britain and their allies in 1796, the ability to provide that 
protection for Corsica was cast into doubt. Elliot noted that the circumstances of the 
war “pointed to a not distant abandonment by Great Britain of Corsica, and justified 
the restlessness of the islanders”.1008 The British ministry in fact never showed enough 
commitment to holding Corsica. Britain’s protection of Corsica seemed to be based 
1006FO 20/22, Elliot to Portland, 8 February 1795.
1007Elliot, Life and Letters, 345.
1008Elliot, Life and Letters, 343.
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entirely upon her successes in the war. When the war turned in France’s favour, the 
Anglo-Corsican Kingdom seemed doomed, because there were never enough troops 
available to effectively defend the island. The decision to evacuate Corsica however 
was the correct decision, considering the military and political circumstances. Spain’s 
declaration of war made it nearly impossible for Britain to hold Corsica. Due to the 
small size of British forces on Corsica, its defence relied solely upon the British 
Mediterranean fleet, which would be hopelessly outnumbered by a Franco-Spanish 
fleet. The evacuation of Corsica was also determined by the change in fortunes of the 
war in general. Britain was drawing her forces back to defend the mainland. This 
would prove to be prudent policy following Austria’s withdrawal from the war in 
1797.
Elliot believed that Corsica would enable Britain’s fleets to “encourage and protect 
those in much need of support, and might by her counsels accustom them to larger and 
more masculine views of policy than they were inclined to adopt”.1009 The Anglo-
Corsican Kingdom however failed to provide an example of ‘masculine’ or stable 
policy to the other Italian states. Quite the opposite occurred; the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom showcased the weaknesses and ineptitude of the British system. It was a 
shambolic model for the Italian states to follow, let alone any other nation. Rather than 
fostering future relations between states, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom only created 
tension and problems. The Spanish declaration of war on Britain, dated 5 October 
1796, was in part caused by Britain’s taking possession of Corsica, which “was 
concealed with the greatest care”.1010 Another Spanish complaint concerned the acts of 
piracy by Corsican privateers who “protected by the English government in the island, 
destroy the Spanish trade in the Mediterranean”.1011 The British occupation of Corsica 
only served to antagonise Spain, who had her own historical claims to the island. 
What originally drew the British into Corsica was the promise of wealth and 
commerce, and ultimately a strategic naval base. Rousseau and Boswell’s writings 
provided the main ideas and impetus behind British intervention into Corsica. 
1009 Elliot, Life and Letters, 247.
1010 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. XXXII, 1287.
1011 Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England, vol. XXXII, 1288.
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Therefore, British involvement on the island cannot merely be explained by the simple 
desire for a naval base in the Mediterranean. Control of Bastia or Ajaccio would have 
sufficed for this purpose. According to Rousseau and Boswell, Corsica had the 
potential to become a major commercial hub in the Mediterranean. Boswell in 
particular emphasised the fact that Corsica was sister island of liberty. Only by 
understanding British ideas of Corsica in 1768, can you understand the strange and 
unique Anglo-Corsican constitution adopted in 1794. The British legislators were 
informed and heavily influenced by the ideas raised by Boswell and other British 
writers. More importantly, there was one major actor who was involved in both 1768 
and 1794: Pasquale Paoli. Paoli was the main instigator for bringing Britain into 
Corsica, and although he failed in 1768, he would ultimately succeed in 1794. The 
formation of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom cannot be understood without 
understanding Britain’s continued interest in the island throughout the eighteenth 
century, something first forged by the Corsican revolt against Genoese rule in 1728. 
British ideas of Corsica in 1740 were somewhat similar to those of the island in 1768. 
Boswell’s Account of Corsica was the main source of information from which Britons 
drew their ideas about Corsica. The ideas behind British intervention into Corsica in 
1794 were the same raised in 1768. This time however, the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom 
was firmly a government project, unlike in 1768, when the Corsican cause was mainly 
embraced by the opposition to government. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was the 
culmination of continued British interest in the island throughout the eighteenth 
century. 
The main reason why the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom failed was that the ideas that 
informed British opinions of Corsica were wrong. Corsica was a barren backwater, 
with little scope for potential as a commercial hub in the Mediterranean. The Corsican 
character was far different to the British, and the British administrators largely failed to
understand it, finding it alien and barbaric. The Anglo-Corsican Kingdom in fact 
confirmed only one thing: Britain and Corsica were incompatible for any form of 
union. What the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom does provide, however, is a unique insight 
into the British administration of a large European territory during this period. Barring 
Hanover, which was governed primarily by a German administration, Britain ruled no 
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other large territories in Europe during the eighteenth century. Gibraltar and Minorca 
were primarily naval bases, with only small native populations. Corsica in contrast had
a substantial native population, with its own unique history. The Anglo-Corsican 
constitution highlighted how differently Britain treated her subjects in Europe to those 
outside. The Anglo-Corsican constitution was unique in the constitutional history of 
Britain, and in certain instances provided greater rights to its parliament, than the 
constitution in England. Perhaps most surprisingly was the recognition of Catholicism 
as the official religion of the island, despite the fact that Catholics in both England and 
Ireland were banned from holding office. However, the Anglo-Corsican constitution 
was based primarily upon the previous ideas and notions Britain had had of Corsica. 
The only achievement of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was that it firmly destroyed the
myths and ideas many Britons had mistakenly held about the island. Corsicans looked 
to France rather than Britain for future relations. Pasquale Paoli ultimately failed in his 
attempt for a British link with Corsica, and spent the rest of his days in exile in 
England. Corsica ultimately became identified with France, and the most famous 
Corsican in history: Napoleon Bonaparte.
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Conclusion: Britain and Corsica 1797-1815
Desmond Gregory concluded in his book The Ungovernable Rock (1985), that the 
‘experiment’ of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom “had been effectively tested and rejected
in the years 1794-1796”.1012 As seen in the previous chapter, both the British and 
Corsicans had effectively rejected any future union with each other. Admiral Jervis did
not believe “the page of history can produce an instance of such rascally business and 
ingratitude, for the whole island has been enriched by the generosity of our 
government”.1013 The British fleet had retreated to Gibraltar by early 1797. Despite the 
strong condemnations of Corsica by British naval officers, the island was still 
considered as a future strategic target. In a letter sent to the First Lord of the Admiralty
Lord Spencer on 30 June 1797, Jervis noted that “though I disapprove of any close 
connexion with Corsica, advantage may be taken in future wars, by preserving a 
communication with that perfidious race”.1014 Despite describing the Corsicans as 
‘perfidious’, Jervis still believed it to be of ‘advantage’ to maintain connection with the
island. Why? As Gregory noted, there was still a need for a base to watch the main 
French naval base of Toulon. This was supplied in 1798, when the British were able to 
retake Minorca from Spain (returned in 1802).1015 Corsica however did not become a 
major strategic target again during the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1799). The 
bad relations incurred from 1794-1796 made Corsica a less attractive target. As this 
thesis has shown, more than just strategic factors motivated Britain to annex Corsica. 
The intellectual ideas Britons had of the island were firmly proven to be a lie by 1796. 
Corsicans were now considered to be a treacherous clan-ridden nation, rather than the 
Spartan heroes described by both Rousseau and Boswell.
A unique set of circumstances needed to be in place in order for any British incursion 
into Corsica to take place. Britain during the eighteenth century seemed in general to 
be reluctant to intervene or annex any territory in Europe with a large native 
1012 Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, and its 
Role in Britain’s Mediterranean Strategy during the Revolutionary War (1793-1797), (Cranbury: 
Associated University Presses, 1985), 183.
1013 Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer: First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801, vol. II, 
(London: Navy Records Society, 1914), 63.
1014 Private papers of George, second Earl Spencer, vol.II, 211.
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population. Corsica was rather an exception to this rule; only the promises made by the
Anglophile Paoli led Britain to intervene on the island in the first place. They were 
motivated by the belief that Corsica was a rudimentary blank canvas, which could be 
developed with British constitutional ideals. Britain’s annexation of Corsica was 
influenced by their belief that British constitutional government was the most superior 
in the world. British ‘liberties’ however was simply the way in which Britain chose to 
represent themselves. British liberty was a guise to the true nature of the British 
empire; the mercantile system. Was Britain attempting to promote a cosmopolitan 
empire based upon commerce, or simply attempting to extend the interests of the 
metropolis? What was clear was that Corsica had become another battle ground in the 
contest between British commercial and the rival French Republican empire during the
1790s. 
This intellectual debate came to the fore during the turn of the nineteenth century, 
when “the shape of a future peace settlement was again being debated throughout 
Europe”.1016 Emma Rothschild, in her article Language and Empire C.1800 (2005) has 
argued that two alternative forms of Empire emerged; the “eternal empire of 
commodities” of the English and the “eternal empire of ideas” of France.1017 It was 
clear that Britain was not simply attempting a counter-revolutionary movement, aimed 
at curtailing the French revolutionary settlement in Europe. Britain attempted to 
promote their version of commercial empire, through their client Frederich Von Gentz 
(1764-1832), and his published work Essai sur l’etat actuel de l’administration des 
finances et de la richese nationale de la Grande-Bretagne (1800). This work was a 
series of facts and figures stating the great growth of British capital, which spread from
the “mines of Carinthia to the looms of Bengal”.1018  Alexandre D’Hauterive’s (1754-
1830) ‘provocative’ work the State of the French Republic at the End of the year VIII 
(1800), provided a response to Gentz’s assertions. D’Hauterive famously asserted that 
England was “aiming at the Universal Empire of Maritime commerce”.1019 Gentz 
1016 Isaac Nakhimovsky, The Closed Commercial State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 
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1017 Emma Rothschild, “Language and Empire, C1800” Historical Research, vol. 78, no. 200 (May 
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J.S. Jordan, 1801),  130.
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continued the debate, by providing a response to D’Hauterive’s work with his On the 
state of Europe before and after the French Revolution, first published in 1801. Gentz 
argued against D’Hauterive’s claim that England practised commercial tyranny. For 
Gentz, the “exclusive preference given to English manufactures in the markets of 
Europe, is not the effort of compulsion, but of choice”.1020 Gentz argued that “no nation
can procure, transport, and, of course, sell so cheap as the English”.1021 It made 
economic sense to trade primarily with English markets. It was this idea that first drew 
Britain into Corsica. They desired to access the promised great commercial wealth of 
Corsica. The lack of real wealth found on Corsica only added to the disappointment 
felt by the British administrators on the island. 
However, Britain was not drawn into Corsica only for the promise of their commercial 
wealth. Britain throughout the eighteenth century aimed primarily to annex small, 
largely barren islands or spits of land, that could be easily developed into 
naval/military bases, such as Gibraltar and Minorca. Another example of this policy 
could be seen with Malta. Malta was captured by Napoleon in 1798, on the way to his 
rather outrageous expedition to Egypt. Ironically, during the British naval expedition to
Egypt, a rather interesting comparison arose. Capitan Troubridge, who served with 
Nelson, noted that he had took possession of the island of Bequieres (see appendix 4), 
following Nelson’s victory over the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile (August 1-3 
1798). Troubridge admitted that this acquisition “is not so bright a gem in the British 
crown as Corsica, but as it was attended with no loss or expense, I am inclined to think 
it equally valuable”.1022 Corsica was still described as a “valuable gem”. However, 
Troubridge’s language revealed another major reason why Britain did not make 
another attempt to annex Corsica; the acquisition and maintenance of Bequieres was 
attended “with no loss or expense”. The expense incurred by the British administration 
of Corsica outweighed the income produced by the island, although, as noted in the 
previous chapter, British expenses on the island were inconsequential in comparison to
the money supplied elsewhere during the French Revolutionary wars. For example, 
1020Frederich Gentz, On the state of Europe, tr. John Herries, (London: Printed for J. Hatchard, 1802), 
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Britain’s ally Austria was given a loan of some £1,620,000 in the year 1797 alone.1023 
This fact however did little to mask the disappointment of the British officers and 
administrators on Corsica, upon finding an undeveloped, poor island. The British 
empire was first and foremost a commercial empire. The great commercial wealth of 
Corsica promised by both Boswell and Paoli did not exist. As David Abulufia has 
noted in his book The Great Sea: A human history of the Mediterranean (2011); Paoli 
had “overestimated” the “usefulness of Corsica”.1024 
The British captured Malta from the French in 1800. Malta in contrast to Corsica, had 
a far smaller native population, and would cost far less to maintain in consequence. 
The Peace of Amiens in 1802 provided the only period of peace between Britain and 
France during the period 1793-1815. Malta became a friction point during the peace 
negotiations. As A.T Mahan noted in his book The Influence of sea power upon the 
French revolution and Empire (1892), Malta was an “important naval station, secretly 
coveted by both” Britain and France.1025 The British refusal to evacuate Malta in part 
caused the resumption of hostilities in 1803. Why were the British so reluctant to 
evacuate Malta? Malta was the ‘gateway’ to the east. Napoleon (now head of France) 
certainly had more interests in the eastern Mediterranean, as seen from his failed 
expedition to Egypt. Corsica became less of an important strategic target during the 
Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). Nelson’s great victory at Trafalgar in 1805 ended the 
threat of French/Spanish naval dominance. The need for a harbour to watch the French 
naval base of Toulon was “not as pressing as it had been” before.1026 The Napoleonic 
wars shifted the attention of the British and French more to the central and eastern 
Mediterranean. Gregory has noted that the British fleets task of protecting the eastern 
Mediterranean “could best be done from Malta and Sicily”.1027 Sicily remained a 
British base and ally throughout the Napoleonic wars. Sicily and Malta would remain 
the “vital strategic points” after French rule extended to all of Italy, the Dalmatian 
1023 John Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815, 
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coast and even certain Greek islands such as Corfu.1028 Thus there was a less pressing 
need to return to Corsica and the western Mediterranean.
However, Britain did return very briefly to Corsica in 1814. Following Napoleon’s 
abdication at Fontainebleau (11 April 1814), the strategic situation became very fluid 
and uncertain. Lord William Bentinck (1774-1869) became commander of the British 
forces in Sicily in 1811. In 1814, Bentinck was certainly aware of the opportunities 
during this period. Napoleon’s defeat and the subsequent retreat of French armies in 
Europe left a major power vacuum, particularly in Italy. A quarter of a century of 
warfare was finally coming to an end; “no one quite knew what might happen”.1029 
John Rosselli, in his book Lord William Bentinck: The making of a liberal imperialist 
1774-1839 (1974), comments that Bentinck acted less from concrete evidence “than 
from intuition and from a desperate sense of opportunity slipping away”.1030 Bentinck 
landed in Leghorn in March, and captured Genoa the following month. Bentinck’s 
intentions were made clear in a letter sent to prime minister Robert Stewart, Viscount 
Castlereagh (1769-1822), on 23 April 1814. Bentinck planned to set up a provisional 
government in Genoa, as soon as he could ascertain “persons who may be acceptable 
to the people”.1031 Bentinck commented that he found many Genoese desired “their 
former independence and ancient form of government, with some modifications”. 
More importantly, “all are equally desirous of not being annexed to Piedmont”.1032 
Bentinck was aware that Britain intended to hand Genoa over to Piedmont. Bentinck 
did not want an Italy dominated by both Austria and Piedmont; he hoped to establish a 
“united Italy as a barrier against both France and Austria”.1033
Bentinck’s plan to free Italy from French and Austrian influence also involved Corsica.
In one of the most remarkable episodes in this entire thesis, British troops were sent to 
Corsica in what Rosselli has described as “an abortive repetition” of the Anglo-
1028 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 182.
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Corsican Kingdom.1034 It seems that even at this juncture in time, Bentinck had not 
given up the ghost of British rule in Corsica, as he attempted to resurrect “the Kingdom
of Corsica that had been established twenty years earlier”.1035 Discontent on the island 
of Corsica became widespread following the abdication of Napoleon. The 
municipalities of Saint-Florent, Bastia and L’Ile Rousse sent a petition to Bentinck 
asking to send troops to the island. After British troops arrived, Bentinck signed the 
Treaty of Bastia with Louis-Alexandre Berthier (1753-1815) in April 1814, which 
conferred sovereignty of the island to Britain. Berthier was formerly a marshal of 
Napoleon. By the time the treaty was signed, Berthier seemed to have questionable 
authority to transfer the sovereignty of Corsica to Britain, especially after Napoleon’s 
abdication.
Did both Britain and Corsica wish for another union in 1814? Castlereagh, in his 
response to Bentinck, dated 6 May 1814, believed that the resistance of the Corsicans 
“was levelled against the tyranny of Bonaparte alone”.1036 Castlereagh also made it 
clear to Bentinck that he had no intention in undermining “the auspicious restoration of
the ancient family to the throne of France”.1037 It was clear that in the case of Corsica, 
Bentinck was acting relatively independently of the British ministry. Castlereagh 
informed Bentinck that it was “impossible for Great Britain to countenance, under the 
present circumstances, any measure of separation, on the part of the Corsicans, from 
France”.1038 Castlereagh did not want to undermine the position of the Bourbons, who 
had just been restored. The convention in Paris had just decided that Louis XVIII 
(1755-1824) was sovereign of Corsica. Bentinck’s adventure was somewhat of an 
embarrassment for Castlereagh. Castlereagh informed Bentinck that he needed to 
conciliate the Corsicans “goodwill to their lawful sovereign Louis XVIII”, so the late 
events may not “have the effect of compromising their interests with the new 
government”.1039 In effect, Castlereagh ordered Bentinck to repudiate the Treaty of 
Bastia for the sake of the restored Bourbon monarchy. British troops were 
subsequently withdrawn from Corsica.
1034 Rosselli, Lord William Bentinck, 176.
1035 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock,182.
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Thus ended the brief British foray into Corsica at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Gregory agreed with Castlereagh, that it was Bonapartist rule that was rejected
in Corsica; “there was no real desire to re-embrace British rule”.1040 The “Corsican 
people as a whole had not backed the Treaty of Bastia”; the Court of Appeal in Ajaccio
had denied the legality of the treaty.1041 More importantly, Castlereagh and the British 
ministry had rejected the treaty’s legality, in their attempt to bolster the fledgling 
Bourbon regime. What should we make of this rather strange episode? It was clear that
 the phantom of British rule some twenty years previously had motivated Bentinck in 
his attempt to annex Corsica for Britain. He was also motivated by his desire to rid 
Italy of French and Austrian influence. Bentinck also failed in his attempt to re-
establish an independent Genoese Republic. Castlereagh was desirous that Bentinck 
“should not take any steps to encourage the formation which at present seems to 
prevail in Italy, in question of government”.1042 However, Castlereagh also promised 
Bentinck that there was “a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the 
principles of freedom are in full operation”.1043 Castlereagh informed Bentinck that the 
British government had to ‘abstain’ from decisions made in Italy if they wished to act 
in concert with Austria and Sardinia-Piedmont. Castlereagh spoke of the dangers of a 
transition in Italy, that “may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely to make the 
world better or happier”.1044 France, Spain, Holland and Sicily had formulated new 
constitutions; “let us see the result before we encourage further attempts”.1045 
Castlereagh, like Bentinck was what Rosselli described as a ‘liberal Imperialist’. Both 
hoped for an Italy without the foreign influences of France and Austria. However, 
Corsica was not included within this liberal imperialist framework. Corsica’s future it 
would seem, remained firmly with France. 
There were no subsequent British attempts to annex Corsica after 1814. In fact, it was 
remarkable that Corsica remained within British imperial ambitions for so long. 
However, following Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, France appeared less of a threat 
1040 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock,183.
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to British imperial ambitions. For most of the nineteenth century, Britain viewed 
France more as an ally than as an enemy. The ‘Second hundred years war’ of British-
French rivalry had come to an end in 1815, with Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo. 
With Britain secure in the Mediterranean with their naval bases at Malta and Corfu, 
Gregory had concluded, “Corsica had finally disappeared from the ambit of British 
imperial ambition”.1046 As this thesis has highlighted, British interest in Corsica was 
not merely motivated by strategic aspirations. The image of the Corsicans as heroic 
Spartan warriors, painted by both Rousseau and Boswell, persisted throughout the 
eighteenth century. Boswell in particular promised an island full of potential 
commercial wealth for Britain. British interest in Corsica became reality with the 
establishment of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796). The failure of this 
Kingdom quashed the previous notions many Britons had of the island. 
However, to suggest that British-Corsican relations ended in 1796 is not true. Not all 
Corsicans accepted French rule of the island. From 1798-1802 and 1803-1817, the 
Royal Corsican Rangers were formed as part of the British military. Formed primarily 
of Paolist exiles, and with Hudson Lowe (1769-1844) as their commander, the Rangers
took part in multiple engagements during the war, such as the Battle of Abukir in 
Egypt (1801) and the Battle of Maida in Sicily (1806).When the Rangers were 
reformed in 1803 under Lowe, they could count some 360 Corsican riflemen. They 
served primarily in the Mediterranean theatre of the war, before being disbanded in 
1817. The brief British occupation of Corsica in 1814 also served as an example of an 
attempt to augment another Anglo-Corsican union. Bentinck's expedition failed as he 
did not have British governmental support. British governmental support was the only 
way to ensure any successful venture into Corsica, as seen during the Corsican crisis in
1768-1769. British interest in Corsica after 1796 was primarily for strategic reasons. 
Bentinck wanted an Italy free from French and Austrian influence: British rule of 
Corsica could help provide a balance against Austrian and French influence in the 
region.
1046 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 183.
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1814 was the last time there was any real possibility of an Anglo-Corsican union. The 
Corsicans themselves, barring a small minority, had come to realize that “their future 
must lie with France, not with Britain”.1047 The questions over Corsica’s sovereignty 
also ended with the long round of British-French rivalry, that had dominated the 
eighteenth century. Corsica remains a province of France to this day. However, as this 
thesis has shown, Corsica could easily have become a part of the British Empire. 
Perhaps more remarkable were the notions and ideals that brought Britain to Corsica. 
Britain’s foreign policy concerning Corsica was unique in the history of the British 
empire. The Anglo-Corsican constitution was in certain respects superior to the 
constitutional framework in England at the time, especially regarding religious 
toleration. British interest in Corsica certainly remained consistent and strong during 
the period 1750-1800. This interest was a by-product of the Anglo-French rivalry. The 
British occupation of Corsica in 1794-1796 provides a unique insight into British 
administration of and for an annexed European country. This was an extremely rare 
occurrence during the eighteenth century. However, what the Anglo-Corsican 
Kingdom did highlight was the unique relations Britain had with Corsica in general. 
Both the British and Corsicans were disappointed by each other; both were 
fundamentally different peoples and cultures. Perhaps most ironic was the fact that 
both Britain and Corsica were so very different from each other. They were 
incompatible for a union; too many differences existed. Paoli would die disappointed 
as an exile in Britain in 1807. He became overshadowed by a Corsican more famous 
than himself; Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon distanced himself from his Corsican 
origins after his exile from the island in 1793. He would only return to the island once 
in 1799, on his way back from his failed Egyptian expedition. Yet Napoleon is still 
revered as a Corsican hero. He embodied the new order the Corsicans faced at the turn 
of the century; a future with France. Napoleon certainly characterised himself more as 
a Frenchman than as a Corsican. He consistently attempted to distance himself from 
his Corsican heritage. Ironically it was Bonapartist rule of the island that was rejected 
in 1814, not French ownership. Yet Napoleon characterised the bonds between Corsica
and France. Following the French Revolution in 1789, France seemed to offer far more
for Corsica than Britain ever could. Perhaps the biggest question of all was how did 
1047 Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock, 183.
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Briton’s come to hold such erroneous opinions of Corsica? Only perhaps Boswell 
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